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Abstract 
In this dissertation, firstly, I investigate whether industry effects play an important 
role in forecasting corporate failure prediction. I hypothesize and find empirical 
evidence that two structural constraints of the industry are informative in the 
corporate failure prediction: (i) industry concentration and (ii) dependence on 
customers and suppliers. Secondly, I propose a new measure of tail risk spillover: the 
conditional coexceedance (CCX). The empirical evidence shows significant volatility 
and tail risk spillovers from the financial sector to many real sectors in the U.S. 
economy from 2001 to 2011. These spillovers increase in crisis periods. The CCX in a 
given sector is positively related to its amount of debt financing and negatively related 
to its valuation and investment. Thirdly, I examine the effect of tail risk spillover on 
financing circumstances of non-financial firms in 16 European countries between 
2003 and 2011. Evidence shows that tail risk spillover of financial sectors is mostly 
driven by episodes of firms’ characteristics. Besides, I aim to examine whether 
reserving cash is valuable for financially constrained firms in that it enables firms to 
mitigate tail risks transmitted from the financial sector. The empirical result has 
offered some evidence that cash provides important benefits to financially constrained 
firms in Euro-core zone and UK by reducing the tail risk spillover from distress 
financial sector in times of credit crunch. 
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Resumen 
En esta tesis , en primer lugar, investigo si los efectos de la industria desempeñan un 
papel importante en la predicción de la predicción de fallos corporativa. Mi hipótesis 
y encontrar evidencia empírica de que dos restricciones estructurales de la industria 
son de carácter informativo en la predicción de fallos de las empresas: ( i ) la 
concentración de la industria y ( ii ) la dependencia de los clientes y proveedores. En 
segundo lugar, se propone una nueva medida de spillover riesgo de cola: la 
coexceedance condicional (CCX). La evidencia empírica muestra la volatilidad y de 
la cola significativa los efectos secundarios de riesgo del sector financiero a muchos 
sectores reales de la economía de los EE.UU. desde 2001 hasta 2011. Estos efectos 
secundarios se incrementan en los períodos de crisis. El CCX en un determinado 
sector se relaciona positivamente con la cantidad de financiación de la deuda y 
negativamente relacionado con su valoración y la inversión. En tercer lugar, se 
examina el efecto de spillover riesgo de cola sobre la financiación de las 
circunstancias de las empresas no financieras en 16 países europeos entre 2003 y 2011. 
La evidencia muestra que desborde el riesgo de cola de los sectores financieros se 
debe principalmente a los episodios de características de las empresas. Además, mi 
objetivo es examinar si la reserva de dinero en efectivo es valioso para las empresas 
restringidas financieramente, ya que permite a las empresas para mitigar los riesgos de 
cola de transmisión del sector financiero. El resultado empírico ha ofrecido algunas 
pruebas de que el efectivo proporciona importantes beneficios a restricciones 
financieras las empresas de la zona euro-core y el Reino Unido mediante la reducción 
de la propagación del riesgo de cola de sector financiero de socorro en tiempos de 
crisis crediticia. 
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CHAPTER 1  
Introduction 
    In this dissertation, there are three individual papers. In first article, we investigate whether structural 
constraints of industry will help corporate failure prediction. In second article, we propose a new measure of 
tail risk spillover, which named as conditional coexceedance (CCX). In third article, we aim to examine 
whether reserving cash is valuable for financially constrained firms in that it enables firms to mitigate tail 
risks transmitted from the financial sector. 
    The chapter 2 in the dissertation is entitled “Do Structural Constraints of the Industry Matter for Corporate 
Failure Prediction?“. Industry effects play an important role in forecasting bankruptcy; however the actual 
channels of the influence of industry characteristics on failure and bankruptcy likelihood have been barely 
addressed in the extant literature. We hypothesize and find empirical evidence that two structural constraints 
of the industry are informative in the corporate failure prediction: (i) industry concentration and (ii) 
dependence on customers and suppliers. Using an extensive database on corporate failures and bankruptcies 
in the U.S. market from 1998 to 2009, we find that the probabilities of failure and bankruptcy are 
significantly higher for firms in highly concentrated industries. The probability of bankruptcy is higher for 
firms in industries with stronger customer dependency but this factor does not affect failure probabilities.  
    The chapter 3 in the dissertation is entitled “Industry characteristics and financial risk spillovers”. This 
article proposes a new measure of tail risk spillover: the conditional coexceedance (CCX), defined as the 
number of joint occurrences of extreme negative returns in an industry, conditional on an extreme negative 
return in the financial sector. The empirical application provides evidence of significant volatility and tail 
risk spillovers from the financial sector to many real sectors in the U.S. economy from 2001 to 2011. These 
spillovers increase in crisis periods. The CCX in a given sector is positively related to its amount of debt 
financing and negatively related to its valuation and investment. Therefore, real economy sectors—which 
require relatively high debt financing and whose value and investment activity are relatively lower—are 
prime candidates for stock price volatility and depreciation in the wake of a financial sector crisis. Evidence 
also suggests that the higher the industry’s degree of competition, the stronger the tail risk spillover from the 
financial sector. 
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    The chapter 4 in the dissertation is entitled “Do Cash Holdings Influence Financial Risk Spillover? Firm 
Level Analysis in Europe”. This paper investigates the effect of tail risk spillovers from the financial sector 
to the real economy on the financing characteristics of 4320 non-financial firms located in 16 European 
countries from 2003 to 2011. We find that firms with negative cash holdings, low stock returns, low 
valuations and small distance to default suffer stronger risk spillovers. Also, the bigger the firms’ size and 
the higher its volatility and leverage the stronger the impact of tail risk spillovers. We find stronger tail risk 
spillovers for Euro-periphery countries than for Euro-core countries. These spillovers are weakest in the case 
of the UK Firms with relatively higher cash holdings are less exposed to tail risks originated in the financial 
sector.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Do Structural Constraints of the Industry Matter for Corporate Failure Prediction?  
 
2.1. Introduction 
 Industry structural constraints should affect firms’ operating strategies, financial structure decisions, 
and profitability, and therefore their failure and bankruptcy likelihood. It is important to define the difference 
between failure (the broader category) and bankruptcy (the narrower category). We consider that a firm fails 
when its stock is removed from the exchange on which it trades due to poor performance or other reasons.1 
Companies that are delisted are not necessarily bankrupt, and may continue trading over the counter. In the 
USA a firm is bankrupt when it is delisted because of Chapter 7, Chapter 11, or liquidation. Therefore all 
bankrupt firms are included in the failure category but not all failed firms go bankrupt. The literature has 
documented the importance of some industry effects on bankruptcy prediction but there is scarce evidence on 
the impact of these factors on failure. Chava and Jarrow (2004) provide empirical evidence of the impact of 
industry effects in forecasting bankruptcy, but as far as we know, the actual channels of influence of industry 
characteristics on failure and bankruptcy likelihood have not been addressed.2 As a first step to fill this gap in 
the literature we study the impact on firms’ failure and bankruptcy of two specific structural constraints: (1) 
the intensity of industry concentration, and (2) the degree of dependence on customers and suppliers. We 
first hypothesize that the higher the degree of industry concentration the higher the failure and bankruptcy 
risks for firms in this industry. The reasons are that within concentrated industries, firms have lower 
profitability because they suffer more acute agency problems, see Giroud and Muller (2010), Bloom and van 
Reenen (2007), and Nichell (1996), and become more leveraged (Chevalier, 1995). Both elements increase 
the probability of financial distress and eventually the probability of failures and bankruptcies. We next 
hypothesize that the higher the degree of industry’s customers’ dependence the higher the failure and 
bankruptcy risks for firms in this industry. The reasons are that high customers’ dependence in a given 
industry implies that firms in that industry tend to present poor economic performance,3 due to the direct 
constraint coming from customers’ market power. Our hypotheses highlight the risks inherent in low 
                                                            
1 The reasons for delisting include violating regulations and/or failing to meet financial specifications set out by the 
stock exchange. 
2 Previous papers include dummy variables into bankruptcy prediction models to take into account different industries. 
Therefore their results only imply that different industries may have different bankruptcy probabilities. What is missing 
is the specific industrial constraint (e.g. concentration) effect. 
3 See Burt (1983), Talmud (1994), Yasuda (2005), and Burt (2008). 
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flexibility, whether in the kind of product offered to the market (i.e., concentrated industries tend to produce 
specialized products) or the customers served. 
To measure industry-level variables we include macroeconomic information. Our failure and 
bankruptcy forecasting models also includes the standard market- and accounting-driven predictors. To 
assess the effect of the industry’s structural constraints on failure and bankruptcy predictions, we consider 
corporate failures and bankruptcies by U.S. public companies during the period from 1998 to 2009. 
We contribute to the literature with four main results. First, we document that failure and bankruptcy 
probabilities increase when the degree of competition in a given industry decreases. This result is robust to 
alternative industry concentration measures.4 Also in the case of failures the degree of fit is noticeably higher 
(32%) than in the case of bankruptcies (20%). This fact suggests that in the decision to go bankrupt other 
variables may be important besides the standard controls measuring economic performance. These variables 
are more successful in predicting failure (delisting). Second, firms in industries that depend more on 
customers have higher bankruptcy probabilities than firms in industries with lower dependency levels. 
However this factor does not affect failure probabilities. Third, firms in industries that depend more on 
suppliers have lower bankruptcy probabilities than firms in industries with lower dependency levels. 
However this factor increases failure probabilities. Fourth, we find that the relative size, which has usually 
been regarded as a strong factor of explaining bankruptcy in the extant literature become relatively less 
important during the more recent period.5  
The rest of this article is organized as follows: In Section 2, we relate relevant literature to our 
hypotheses about the effect of industry structural constraints, and Section 3 introduces the measures of 
industry-level variables. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 contains the failure and bankruptcy 
prediction models, and Section 6 presents the main empirical results. Section 7 provides robustness tests. We 
conclude in Section 8. 
 
                                                            
4 We use the Census concentration information from Bureau Economic Analysis. In addition, our robustness tests are 
based on (1) the Assets-based Herfindahl Index, and (2) Sales-based HHI on n-digit Industry Code. We also use Eight-
firm, Twenty-firm, and Fifty-firm Concentration Ratio as alternative Census-based concentration measures. 
5 The data set used in Chava and Jarrow’s (2004) and Campbell et al. (2008) is between 1962 and 1999, whereas we use 
data from 1998 to 2009. 
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2.2. Relevant Literature and Hypotheses 
This paper relates firms’ failure and bankruptcy probabilities to two industrial characteristics: (1) 
industry concentration and (2) industry customers’ and suppliers’ dependence on other sectors. Accordingly, 
three hypotheses are proposed in the following sections. 
 
2.2.1. Product Market Concentration  
Industrial organization literature suggests the structure of product markets affects managers’ operating 
decisions that eventually determine a corporation’s survivability (Brander and Lewis, 1986). Managerial 
incentives support that managers of firms in competitive industries are under pressure to reduce slack and 
improve efficiency (Giroud and Muller, 2010),6 and poor management practices are more prevalent in non-
competitive industries (Bloom and van Reenen, 2007). Chevalier (1995) claims that a decrease in the level of 
industry competition rises up leverage in the participating firms. Opler and Titman (1994) argue that 
customers are more reluctant to purchase specialized products that are likely to be produced in concentrated 
industries from a distressed firm.  
Overall, firms in a concentrated industry are more likely to face distress due to two reasons: (1) they are 
less profitable because of poor management and (2) they are more leveraged. We hypothesize in turn that: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The higher an industry’s concentration, the higher the incidence of failure and 
bankruptcy among firms belonging to the industry. 
 
2.2.2. External Industry Constraints 
 Hertzel et al. (2008) argue that a firm’s financial distress is connected to firms’ interaction occurred in 
other industries. Extant literature also suggests that both excessive dependence on customers and suppliers 
may negatively affect the firm’s economic performance (Burt, 1983, 1988, Talmud, 1994, Yasuda, 2005, and 
                                                            
6 Their results show that the corporations’ operating performance for firms in competitive industries has no significant 
impact, while it significantly drops for those in non-competitive industries after the policy of business combination 
laws, which aims at reducing the threat of a hostile takeover. 
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Burt, 2008). However the influence of supplier dependence on firms’ distress probabilities might be in 
opposite direction for two reasons: (1) a suppliers’ dependent firm usually finds it rather easy to look for 
substitute suppliers; (2) a firm limits leverage both before and after contracting due to worries about 
suppliers threatening to curtail its specialized factors of production (Sarig 1998). We then posit the following 
hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 2a: The stronger the direct customers’ dependence, the higher the incidence of failure and 
bankruptcy.  
Hypothesis 2b: The relationship between the direct suppliers’ dependence and the incidence of failure 
and bankruptcy is unclear.  
 
This paper further explores external industry effects on firms’ distress associated with indirect 
customers’ (suppliers’) dependence. Burt (2008) suggest that industry-structure effect on industry 
performance can be related to both the industry’s own buying and selling and to networks around the 
industry’s suppliers and customers. That is to say, dependent relations embedded among the network around 
suppliers or customers also have potential impact on firms’ distress. Here we regard this sort of dependence 
as indirect external dependence. Similarly to the discussion of direct external constraints, we separately 
consider indirect customers’ constraint and indirect suppliers’ constraint.  
 
Hypothesis 3a: The stronger the indirect customers’ constraints, the higher the incidence of failures 
and bankruptcy among firms belonging to the industry. 
Hypothesis 3b: The relationship between the indirect suppliers’ constraints and the incidence of 
bankruptcy or failures among the firms belonging to the industry is unclear. 
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2.3. Measures of Industry Structural Constraints 
2.3.1. Concentration Ratio 
We hypothesize that firms in a more concentrated industries are more likely to fail due to poor 
management or extreme leverage. Testing the hypothesis requires measures for evaluating the degree of 
industry concentration. This study tests several variables which measure industry concentration. The baseline 
analysis is based on the use of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), which generates the concentration 
ratio in industry j as follows: 
                                                                             
2
1
Herfindahl
I
j ij
i
s

                                                                          (1) 
where sij is the market share of firm i in industry j. Small values of this ratio imply that the market contains 
many competing firms; large values imply that few large firms dominate the market. We use the entire 
distribution of industry market share information to assess HHI for each year and for each industry. 
Following Hou and Robinson (2006), we compute HHI by the use of “sales” variable provided by 
COMPUSTAT, denoted as sales-based HHI. The assets-based HHI, which is computed by total assets in 
COMPUSTAT, is also considered for robustness (see Section 2.7) purposes. Notice that we denote the 
COMPUSTAT concentration ratio to refer measures based on COMPUSTAT data in order to discriminate it 
from the Census concentration ratio which are also employed in the robustness test section.  
 
2.3.2. External Industry Constraint  
2.3.2.1.   Direct Customers’ and Suppliers’ dependence 
 We are interested in resource dependence, or the extent to which producers in a given market depend 
on another market to buy or sell, directly or indirectly as in Burt et al. (2002). The rationale is in line with 
Preffer and Salancik (1978) in the sense that the dependence is defined as the importance of a given input or 
output to the organization and the extent to which these factors are controlled by relative few counterparties. 
Burt et al. (2002) measure external industry constraints by one variable that aggregate customers and 
suppliers together. We think it is better to analyze their effects separately and following Shih’s (2007) 
8 
 
suggestion, we split Burt et al.’s (2002) combined measure into customers’ and suppliers’ dependence, 
denoted as Ci,C and Ci,S respectively. For industry i, they can be calculated using the following method:  
, ,i type ij type
j
C c , ji  , type C or S,                                         (2) 
where                        , ,ij type ij type jc w H  ,                                                                     (3) 
2
, , , ,ij type ij type iq type qj type
q
w p p p
 
   
 
 , jqi                                     (4) 
,
ij
ij C
ij
j
z
p
z


, ,
ji
ij S
ji
j
z
p
z


, ,
iq
iq C
ij
j
z
p
z


; and 


j
ji
qi
Siq z
z
p , , ji                        (5) 
Hj is the concentration ratio of industry j, computed by HHI ; and zij is the dollar worth of the 
commodities sold to industry j from industry i. The intuition is that the squared term in Equation (4) 
is the degree of direct and indirect dependence of industry i on market j, measured by pij, or the 
proportion of industry i’s sales that occur directly to market j, plus the proportion of industry i’s 
sales that indirectly involve market j through market q. The customer (supplier) constraint on 
industry i is a weighted sum of dependence on customer (supplier) industries j where business is 
concentrated in a few dominant companies, measured by jH . The constraint index in Eq. (2) is the 
sum of such dependencies, measuring the aggregate extent to which the producer is dependent on 
coordinated customers, as the customer constraint (Ci,C) or on coordinated suppliers, as the supplier 
constraint (Ci,S). It leads the notion that the larger values of Ci,C and Ci,S the higher dependence and 
consistent with arguments in Section 2, the higher external industry constraints. 
 
2.3.2.2.Indirect Customers’ and Suppliers’ dependence 
By definition, the indirect customers’ (suppliers’) dependence are captured by taking average 
values of direct customers’ (suppliers’) dependence (Ci,C and Ci,S , see Section 3.2.1.) of other 
industries around the network beyond direct customers and suppliers. For a simple case, assume 
that industry X is trading with two industries Y and Z with Ci,C equivalent to 13 and 14 respectively. 
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The indirect customers’ dependence for the industry X is the average of the constraints in the 
industries Y and Z, which is  13 14 2 13.5  . The general formula is  ,
1
1 N
n c
n
C
N 
 , where N is the 
number of trading industries. Indirect suppliers’ dependence is measured similarly but replacing Ci,C 
by Ci,S. 
 
2.4. Data  
2.4.1. Databases 
The empirical analysis is based on the data covering all firms traded on the three major U.S. exchanges 
(NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ) from 1998 to 2009. To compute the degree of industrial customers’ and suppliers’ 
dependence, we use the Annual Input-Output tables with level of aggregation Sector published by the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis (BEA). Specifically, we adopt the Use Table of Input-Output Accounts for the U.S. 
Economy, which reports a matrix with the values of commodity flows between each pair of industries. The 
most updated information of Use Table is based on annual data and starts in 1998.7 The Input–Output tables 
classify the industries based on the Input–Output (IO) industry code. We use the document relating North 
American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes to IO codes, 8  to group firms in the 
CRSP/COMPUSTAT database into different industries based on IO code. If firms are not  classified into one 
of IO codes, these observations are deleted. We end up with fourteen industries.9  
In addition, several well-known predictors of firms’ financial distress are also taken into account as 
control variables in the failure and bankruptcy prediction models. Following Shumway (2001) and Campbell 
et al. (2008), we choose six variables which are based on stock market and accounting information: (1) the 
annual excess return (EXRET), (2) the relative size (RSIZ), (3) the volatility (SIGMA), (4) the ratio of net 
income to total assets (NI/TA), (5) the ratio of total liability to total assets (TL/TA), and (6) the ratio of cash to 
                                                            
7 We do not use Input-Output tables before 1998 because they are published every five years, such as 1987, 1992, and 
1997 and do not contain yearly data 
8 This document, available on the BEA website, is “A Document for 2002 Benchmark Input-Output Accounts: Summary 
Make Table and Use Table before Redefinitions.” 
9 The fourteen industries are : (1) agriculture, forestry; fishing and hunting; (2) mining; (3) utilities; (4) construction; (5) 
manufacturing; (6) wholesale trade; (7) retail trade; (8) transportation and warehousing; (9) information; (10) finance, 
insurance, real estate, rental, and leasing; (11) professional and business services; (12) educational services, health care, 
and social assistance; (13) arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation, and food services; and (14) other services, 
except government. 
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total assets (CASH/TA). 10  The variables are computed by merging accounting information from 
COMPUSTAT (yearly, firm-level) and market information from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) (monthly, firm-level). A firm contributes a year-observation after it starts appearing in the databases 
until the end of the sample period or its delisting year. Following Dichev (1998), we use exchange delisting 
for bankruptcy or liquidation as a proxy for bankruptcy (delisting codes: 400, 572, 574), and adopt a broader 
measure of failure that includes firms delisted due to bankruptcy, liquidation, or poor performance (delisting 
codes: 400, 550－585).11 We use June, 30 as “end-of-year” as suggested by Chava and Purnanandam (2010). 
That is, for every June 30 of each year, we regard a firm as failed or bankrupt if the firm is delisted during 
the next year (July 1 to June 30 of next year) and if its delisting code satisfies the above definition.12 We lag 
accounting data by six months to ensure that it is available as of the model estimation date. For example, if a 
firm’s fiscal year ends in December 2007, we consider this information available as of June 30, 2008. Like 
most of early works did (Shumway, 2001, Chava and Jarrow, 2004, Campbell et al., 2008), we discard 
outliers (e.g., typos, reporting errors) by truncating all variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles of their pooled 
distributions across all firm-year observation, and replacing any observation below the 1st percentile with the 
1st percentile and any observation above the 99th percentile with the 99th percentile. This procedure 
(winsorizing) ensures that extreme outliers do not drive the empirical results. Finally, our sample contains 
12031 firms and 72945 firm-year observations from 1998 to 2009, which includes 247 bankruptcies and 
2496 failures according to these criteria.13 
 
2.4.2. Description of Bankruptcies and Failures 
Figure 1 depicts bankruptcies and failures as a percentage of active companies per year in our sample. 
The general shape of the occurrence of bankruptcies (black line) and failures (dotted line) reflects national 
recessions, as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER),14 which has reported two 
                                                            
10 The detailed information is provided in Appendix A. 
11 The Appendix B provides definitions of the CRSP delisting codes. 
12 We found that the number of bankruptcies from January to June is significantly lower than from July to December. 
Since yearly accounting reports are normally published several months after the end of December, firms that file for 
bankruptcy from January to June are very likely those firms that do not provide accounting reports for the last year. 
Moreover we deleted those observations which have missing data in year t-1. 
13 Note that the starting year of our independent variable in our bankruptcy prediction model is 1997 because it relies on 
one-year ahead data. 
14 The NBER defines a recession as “a significant decline in economic activity spread across the economy, lasting more 
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recessions since 1998. The first recession in the early 2000s, combined the collapse of the speculative dot-
com bubble and the September 11 attacks. In Figure 1, we do find a relatively higher bankruptcy incidence in 
2000–2002. The second recession called “Great Recession”, running from December 2007 to June 2009. 
Again, in Figure 1, we observe a big increase in bankruptcies as well as failures in 2008. Overall, the failure 
indicator tracks the bankruptcy indicator closely except for the year 1998, when the former reached to the 
highest level whereas the latter was at normal level. This finding is consistent with Campbell et al. (2008) 
regarding the dramatic increase in failures after 1998, reflecting the financial distress of many young firms 
that were freshly listed during the bonanza of the late 1990s.15 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
Figure 2 shows bankruptcies by stock exchange listing. Over a half of the firms in our sample that filed 
for bankruptcy were listed on NASDAQ. The remaining percentage is almost evenly spread between the 
NYSE and AMEX. As for failures, almost 80% of them were listed on NASDAQ.16 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
Table 1 contains an overview of bankruptcies and failures by IO code. Most of them happen in the 
manufacturing sector (96 and 965 respectively), followed by the information industry (33 and 408) and then 
finance, insurance, real estate, rental, and leasing (31 and 311) during our sample period.  
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
2.4.3. Summary Statistics of the Independent Variables  
We report summary statistics for all firms in Panel A of Table 2, and for subsamples with bankrupt and 
failed firms in Panels B, and C respectively.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
than a few months, normally visible in real gross domestic product (GDP), real income, employment, industrial 
production, and wholesale-retail sales.” 
15 The bankruptcy data used in Campbell et al. (2008) is the same as the data used in Chava and Jarrow (2004). 
Although we only rely on delisting codes to discriminate bankruptcies and failures from other delisting firms due to 
other reasons, our data reflects important findings as Campbell et al. (2008) and macroeconomic situations. 
16 Shumway (2001) considers the NYSE and AMEX, where bankruptcies happen with much lower frequency than in the 
NASDAQ. 
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Economic intuition suggests that firms about to fail or file for bankruptcy should have lower than 
average excess returns (EXRET), should be relatively smaller  (RSIZ), should be more volatile (SIGMA), 
should have lower income (NI/TA), large liabilities (TL/TA), and low liquidity (CASH/TA), in comparison 
with the aggregated sample. The summary statistics are consistent with the intuition. For example the 
average value of EXRET from the whole sample is +5% per year, whereas it is -58% and -40% in the 
bankruptcy and failure group respectively, which reflects the underperformance of stocks before delisting 
due to bankruptcy or poor performance. The overall relative size (RSIZ) is around -11, and it decreases to -12 
and -13 for bankruptcies and failures, indicating smaller firms are more prone to financial distress. The 
average value of the annualized firm-level volatility (SIGMA) is around 48% for the whole sample, but 
almost doubles both in bankruptcies and failures as expected. The net income relative to total asset (NI/TA) is 
-4,7% in the whole sample, which indicates that, on average, firms suffered losses during this period. This 
variable is much more negative for failures (-33,8%) and bankruptcies (-22,8%). The ratio of TL/TA is close 
to 50% for all firms, and, not surprisingly, it is higher for bankruptcies and failures (75% and 64% 
respectively) suggesting that high leverage tends to go hand in hand with financial distress. Interestingly the 
cash ratio for all firms and for failed firms is similar (18%) but is somewhat lower for bankrupt firms (12%).    
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
The column 7 of Table 2 shows that the average concentration ratio (HHI) is similar in the case 
of bankruptcy (38%) and failure (34%), and lower for the total sample (28%). Therefore failed 
(bankrupt) firms tend to be in industries which are 10 (6) percentage points more concentrated than 
the average industry. The external industry variables (direct dependence: Ci,C, Ci,S and indirect 
dependence: ICi,C, ICi,S), present similar values in the three panels. Table 3 contains the correlation 
matrix of the independent variables which shows the relatively low cross correlations among 
explanatory variables with the exception of ICi,C, and ICi,S (0,667).    
 [INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
2.5. Bankruptcy Prediction Model 
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Following Shumway (2001), Chava and Jarrow (2004), and Campbell et al. (2008), we use a simple 
hazard model to estimate the probabilities of failure and bankruptcy over the next period in a dynamic logit 
model. The main advantage of a simple hazard model is that we can control for and adjust the firm’s at-risk 
period. For longer sampling periods, it is important to acknowledge that some firms file for bankruptcy after 
many years of being at risk, whereas other firms fail in their first risky year. Our model incorporates time-
varying covariates that change over time; if a firm’s financial health deteriorates before failure and 
bankruptcy, its financial data reveals its changing financial health over time. 
We assume that the marginal probability of failure and bankruptcy in the next period follows a logistic 
distribution, expressed as: 
 1
, 1
1
1
1 exp( )t it i t
P Y
X  
 
  
                                                     (6) 
with the parameters ( , )   and time-varying covariates 
, 1i tX   
for the discrete time hazard rate. The 
dependent variable itY  equals to 1 when a bankruptcy or a failure takes place, and otherwise is 0.  
We report McFadden’s pseudo-R2 coefficient to assess the explanatory power of a dynamic logit model, 
which is calculated as 1 − L1/L0, where L1 is the log-likelihood of the estimated model and L0 is the log-
likelihood of a null model consisting of only a constant term. In addition, we implement log-likelihood ratio 
test on the difference of -2Log(LF)17 values between the benchmark model (only with six market- and 
accounting-driven variables) and models which include additionally industry-level variables. The test 
statistics is based on Chi-Square distribution with n degrees of freedom, where n is the difference of the 
number of independent variables between the two compared models.  
 
2.6. Empirical Results 
This section provides empirical evidence on the effects of industry structure on bankruptcy and failure. 
The analysis is based on fitting model (6) to our data set, regressing the bankruptcy or failure indicator on 
                                                            
17 The -2Log(LF) denotes -2 times log likelihood value in the paper. 
 
14 
 
industry constraint variables (HHI, Ci,C, Ci,S, ICi,C, ICi,S) and market- and accounting-driven variables as 
additional controls.  
 
2.6.1. The Impact of Industry Constraints on Bankruptcies 
    The results are in Table 4. The baseline specification including only the six controls is the Model 1. All 
variables, except NI/TA, are significant at conventional levels and present the expected signs. That is, 
increases in EXERT and RSIZ, NI/TA, CASH/TA reduce the probability of bankruptcy, whereas increases in 
SIGMA and TL/TA have the opposite effect. Consistently with Chava and Jarrow’s (2004) we find that NI/TA 
is not significant when including market-driven variables in the bankruptcy model. The variable RSIZ, is 
only marginally significant in the Model 1 and becomes non-significant when the concentration and direct 
industry constraints variables are added into models (see Model 2 and 3). This finding deserves two 
comments. First, the relative size has usually been regarded as a strong factor of bankruptcy in the literature, 
whereas our results suggest a diminishing impact when using a more recent data set. Second, the significance 
of RSIZ vanishes once industry constraint variables are added into the bankruptcy model. This fact implies 
that the industry structural effect dominates the effect of firms’ relative size on predicting bankruptcy in this 
sample.  
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
The Models 2, 3, and 4 are designed to test whether industry structural constraints provide extra 
predicting power upon the traditional bankruptcy prediction model. First, the measure of industry 
concentration HHI is always significantly positive across all regressions. This is consistent with the first 
hypothesis, namely, that the higher the industry concentration level, the higher the bankruptcy probability. 
Panel B shows that the difference of -2Log(LF) between the Model 1 and the Model 2 is 21,12, and the near 
zero p-value 18  implies that the intensity of industry concentration gives extra power in discriminating 
bankrupt entities from non-bankrupt ones.   
                                                            
18 P-VALUE is computed from chi-square distribution with n degree of freedom, where n refers to the difference of the 
number of independent variables between two compared models. 
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Second, the estimation results of Model 3 show a significantly positive impact of the direct customer 
constraint (Ci,C), and a significantly negative impact of the direct supplier constraint (Ci,S). The former 
finding suggest that the stronger customers’ dependence the higher the probability of bankruptcy, which is 
consistent with the hypothesis 2a. The latter finding supports the concept in Sarig (1998) that when a firm 
worries about suppliers threatening to curtail its specialized factors of production, it reacts limiting its 
leverage and thus reducing the firms’ probability of bankruptcy. The implication is that the sign in hypothesis 
2b should be negative. The difference of -2Log(LF) values between the Model 1 and the Model 3 is 38,58, 
and the near zero p-value indicates that direct external industry constraints provide additional power on 
bankruptcy prediction.  
Finally, the Model 4 shows that the effect of ICi,C is significantly positive, whereas the effect of ICi,S is 
negative and marginally significant. The former result indicates that firms are more likely to go bankrupt 
when operating in an industry with high-level customer dependence around the network of other industries, 
which is consistent with the hypothesis 3a. The difference of -2Log(LF) values between Model 1 and Model 
4 is 48,8 with p-value close to 0, which again suggests that industry structural constraints do matter for 
bankruptcy prediction although their economic impact is not striking. 
 
2.6.2. The Impact of Industry Constraints on Failures  
The estimation results are reported in Table 5. First, variables on the benchmark model (the Model 1) 
are all consistent with expected signs and strongly significant. Compared to our previous results on the case 
of bankruptcies, failures appear more often to firms with smaller size and lower net income. Also the degree 
of fit is noticeably higher (32%) than in the case of bankruptcies (20%). This fact suggests that in the 
decision to go bankrupt other variables may be important besides the standard controls measuring economic 
performance. These variables are more successful in predicting failure (delisting). Second, the impact of HHI 
is always significantly positive, which once again backs up the Hypothesis 1. Third, the variables Ci,C and  
Ci,S are not significant (Model 3). When included in Model 4 Ci,S is positive (in contradiction with the results 
for bankruptcies) and significant. The effect of ICi,C is negative and significant and the effect of ICi,S is 
positive and significant. The impact of these variables is the opposite in the case of failures than in the case 
of bankruptcies. This puzzling result may be due to the high degree of correlation between ICi,C, and ICi,S 
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(0,667) which obscure the estimation of their separate effects. In summary, the effect of the variables 
reflecting direct and indirect external constraints on failures is mixed and their economic impact is not 
remarkable.    
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
 
2.6.3. Additional Test on the Concentration Ratio 
It can be argued that the concentration measure HHI based on COMPUSTAT data is open to criticisms 
because it only covers public firms, disregarding private firms (Ali et al., 2009). Therefore as a robustness 
test we also consider the four-firm concentration ratio (CR4), published on BEA as our alternative 
concentration measure.19 The CR4 is based on information on sales, receipts, or revenue of the largest four 
firms in an industry as a percentage of total industry sales, receipts, or revenue. For example, a CR4 of 0,55 
means that the largest four firms in the industry account for 55% of all industry receipts.20  
 As an additional test we classify industries as “competitive” or “concentrated” using dummy 
variables. Here we consider three commonly used criteria to classify competitive and concentrated industries. 
First, if the concentration ratio is above 0,4, the industry is considered to be concentrated, and thus we 
include the variable, Dummy(0,4) that equals to one if the concentration ratio is over 0,4, and is zero 
otherwise. Second, an industry is regarded as competitive if the concentration ratio ranges between 0 and 0,5, 
as medium concentrated if it varies from 0,5 to 0,8 percent, and as highly concentrated if it is over 0,8 
percent. Therefore we construct the dummy variable, Dummy (0,5) equals to one when the concentration 
ratio is above 0,5 and otherwise is zero. Moreover we also consider the variable Dummy(Medium) that equals 
to one if the concentration ratio is larger than the average value of concentration ratios in a given year and 
otherwise is zero. 
Furthermore, we split the sample into two periods. The first one is from 1998 to 2009 to be consistent 
with previous analysis, and the second one is from 1990 to 2009 due to available CR4 data.  
                                                            
19 The website is http://www.census.gov/econ/concentration.html. Notice that the Census HHI is available only for 
manufacturing industry, we choose the four-firm concentration ratio which is available for most industries). 
20  Due to some limitations on CR4 data from BEA, we have to do some adjustments in matching CR4 to 
CRSP/COMPUSTAT data. 
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The summary statistics of HHI and CR4,21 indicate that the median (mean) of HHI is 0,2 (0,187) for the 
period of 1990–2009 and 0.294 (0,281) for 1998–2009 respectively. The median (mean) of CR4 is 0,318 and 
0,324 for the period of 1990–2009 and 0,334 and 0,351 for 1998–2009 respectively. Both mean and median 
on CR4 are larger than those on HHI. The Census-concentration ratios naturally should be larger than 
COMPUSTAT-based concentration ratios, since the CR4 includes both public and private firms, whereas the 
HHI only uses public firms’ information, and in some sectors it is not unlikely that some private firms are 
those firms with relative larger revenue, sales, or receipts.  
Table 6 reports the estimation results from logit regressions for failures and bankruptcies using the CR4 
or dummy variables and the six control variables (EXRET, RSIZ, SIGMA, NI/TA, TL/TA CASH/TA). To 
save space, the table only displays the estimation results on industry concentration related variables since the 
impact of the control variables is similar to Tables 4 and 5. The results on bankruptcies (failures) are shown 
in left hand side (right hand side) of Table 6, and on HHI (CR4) are reported in Panel A (Panel B) of Table 6 
respectively.   
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
Overall the results support Hypothesis 1. First, the HHI (the first row of Panel A) still remains 
significantly positive when data period is extended to 1990–2009, and the CR4 (the first row of Panel B) also 
shows positive significance, except for the case of failure during period 1998–2009. Second, we turn to 
explore whether the Hypothesis 1 still holds when an industry is classified into either competitiveness or 
concentration with the use of alternative dummy variables as substitution for HHI or CR4. In terms of HHI-
based dummy variables (see Panel A), it shows consistent positive significance. For CR4-based dummy 
variables (see Panel B), estimation results are always positive and significant, in particular for bankruptcies. 
However in the case of failures, only the Dummy(0,4) variable is significant. The non-significant results on 
CR4-based variables might be attributed to some limitations of using data from the Census: (1) it is updated 
every five year, whereas COMPUSTAT-based variables are renewed annually; (2) it is not available for all 
industries, which implies that the sample does not cover the whole economy.  
 
                                                            
21 The table of summary statistics on HHI and CR4 is available upon request. 
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2.7. Robustness Tests 
As a robustness test, we consider more COMPUSTAT-based concentration measures employed by 
other studies, including (1) the Assets-based HHI, and (2) Sales-based HHI on n-digit Industry Code. We 
also use Eight-firm, Twenty-firm, and Fifty-firm Concentration Ratio as alternative Census-based 
concentration measures to re-examine the industry effect on bankruptcies or failures. Our main results are 
not materially affected by changes in the concentration measures.22  
 
2.8. Conclusion 
 We empirically investigate the connection between industry structural constraints and firms’ failure 
prediction based on two dimensions: (1) the intensity of industry concentration, and (2) the degree of 
dependence on customers and suppliers. The key results are: (i) failure and bankruptcy probabilities increase 
when the degree of competition in a given industry decreases., (ii) the probability of bankruptcy is higher for 
firms in industries with relatively stronger customer dependency but this factor does not affect failure 
probabilities. One implication of this paper is that the government, investors, and entrepreneurs should 
realize that a firm bears more failure and bankruptcy risk when it operates in highly concentrated sectors
                                                            
22 All tables that contain robustness results are available upon request. 
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Appendix A 
Description of the Independent Variables 
We use a dynamic logit regression to analyze bankruptcy/failure prediction, This section describes the 
construction of the explanatory variables,  
Excess return (EXRET) is computed from the sum of monthly returns minus the value-weighted 
CRSP NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ index return over past twelve months, Low past excess returns 
should increase the chance of bankruptcy, because the decrease in equity value increases leverage 
and therefore default probabilities, 
Relative size (RSIZ) is the logarithm of each firm’s market equity value (outstanding shares  stock 
prices) divided by the total NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ market equity value at the end of June, The 
lower the relative size, the higher the default probability, such that we expect a negative relationship 
between RSIZ and bankruptcy likelihood, 
Volatility (SIGMA) denoted as annualized volatility is obtained based on the standard deviation of 
the residuals from regressing monthly stock returns on the monthly value-weighted 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ index returns over the past twelve months, It measures the probability of 
the firm’s asset values being below the default threshold, so we expect that higher SIGMA indicates 
a higher probability of bankruptcy or failure, 
NI/TA, or the firm’s net income divided by total assets, This ratio typically represents a firm’s 
profitability, and we expect a negative effect on bankruptcy,  
TL/TA, or the firm’s total liabilities divided by total assets, As a proxy of leverage, a firm with high 
TL/TA tends to have high probability of bankruptcy,  
CASH/TA, or the firm the ratio of a company’s cash and short-term assets to its total assets, This 
ratio measures a firm’s liquidity, and we expect a negative effect on bankruptcy, Firms often default 
because of their inability to pay their financial obligations on time due to the imbalance between 
their cash inflows and outflows (see Laitinen and Laitinen, 1998),  
20 
 
Note that we remove any firm-year observations with less than ten monthly returns from the volatility 
estimation and any yearly observation with missing accounting variables.  
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Appendix B 
Delisting codes in the CRSP Database 
Delisting 
Code 
Definition 
400 Issue stopped trading as result of company liquidation 
550 Delisted by current exchange - insufficient number of market makers 
551 Delisted by current exchange - insufficient number of shareholders 
552 Delisted by current exchange - price fell below acceptable level 
560 Delisted by current exchange - insufficient capital, surplus, and/or equity 
561 Delisted by current exchange - insufficient (or non-compliance with rules of) float or assets 
570 Delisted by current exchange - company request (no reason given) 
572 Delisted by current exchange - company request, liquidation 
573 Delisted by current exchange - company request, deregistration (gone private) 
574 Delisted by current exchange - bankruptcy, declared insolvent 
575 Delisted by current exchange - company request, offer rescinded, issue withdrawn by 
underwriter 
580 Delisted by current exchange - delinquent in filing, non-payment of fees 
581 Delisted by current exchange - failure to register under 12G of Securities Exchange Act 
582 Delisted by current exchange - failure to meet exception or equity requirements 
583 Delisted by current exchange - denied temporary exception requirement 
584 Delisted by current exchange - does not meet exchange's financial guidelines for continued 
listing 
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CHAPTER 3 
Industry characteristics and financial risk spillovers 
 
3.1. Introduction 
In many countries, the financial sector is a key funding source for industrial and service (i.e., real 
economy) firms with limited internal funds. Intuitively then, real economy firms’ risk and return should be 
strongly affected by the vagaries of the financial sector—in particular, its profitability and stability. The 
financial crisis of 2007–2009 illustrates a situation in which acute distress in the financial sector caused a 
severe credit crunch, with devastating effects on the real economy. Therefore, it is not surprising that the 
links between the financial sector and real economy sectors have been widely explored. Previous literature 
has focused on industrial real output (see Rajan and Zingales, 1998),23 stock market returns (Baur, 2011),24 
and the links between other measures of returns and profitability. However, the linkage between risk in the 
financial sector and that in the real economy sector has received little attention so far. This is surprising, 
given the aforementioned evidence from the 2007–2009 financial crisis. This article is an attempt to fill this 
literature gap with two contributions: a new measure of tail risk spillovers and some empirical evidence on 
this important subject. 
We explore the extent to which the financial industry’s risk spills over to industrial and service sectors’ 
risk from several perspectives. First, we determine whether risk spillover from the financial sector to real 
economy sectors existed over the past decade and to what extent the intense distress of the financial sector in 
the 2007–2009 financial crisis affected it. Second, we consider both volatility and tail risk spillover, because 
they provide different insights on risks. Note that whereas volatility characterizes dispersion from average 
returns, tail risk focuses on the left tail of the return’s distribution. Third, we investigate whether tail risk 
spillover is affected by the real economy sector’s product market structure (competition versus 
concentration). Fourth, we investigate whether the tail risk spillover is driven by three industry 
                                                            
23 Rajan and Zingales (1998) point out that the industry’s growth is related to its dependence on external sources of 
finance, stemming from industry-specific technological factors, which can affect initial project scale, gestation period, 
cash-harvest period, and further investment needs. Accordingly, an extensive body of literature tests the impact of banks 
on the real economy at country, industry, and firm levels across countries and over time (Beck et al., 2000; Beck and 
Levine, 2002, 2004; Cetorelli and Gambera, 2001; Chava and Purnanandam, 2011; Cole et al., 2008; Claessens and 
Laeven, 2005; Dell’Ariccia et al., 2008; Hoggarth et al., 2002; Kroszner et al., 2007; Levine, 2005; Vives, 2001). 
24 Baur (2011) finds that the 2007–2009 crisis led to an increased comovement of returns among financial sectors’ 
stocks across countries and between the financial sector’s and real economy sector’s stock returns. 
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characteristics: net debt financing, valuation, and investment. These characteristics are closely related to the 
industry’s investment opportunities and future perspectives. 
Furthermore, we develop a new proxy for capturing financial tail risk spillover: conditional 
coexceedance (CCX). The CCX measures the frequency of simultaneous extreme negative stock returns in 
the financial and real economy sectors. We also compute probabilities of tail risk spillover at the industry 
level over time, distinguishing crisis and non-crisis periods. Finally, we study the determinants of the CCX 
measure in terms of the industry’s structural characteristics. We use U.S. stock market data for 2001–2011. 
The main empirical results are as follows: (1) Increases in financial industry’s volatility and tail risk cause 
corresponding increases in the real economy sector’s risk variables, and the effect of this spillover is stronger 
during a financial crisis period. (2) The tail risk spillover from the financial sector to the real economy sector, 
as measured by the CCX, is stronger if the real economy industry is more competitive, uses a high proportion 
of net debts, and has a relatively low level of valuation and investments. 
The study is related to several strands of literature. Our results are consistent with Diebold and Yilmaz 
(2012) in the sense that the financial sector’s volatility generally increases sharply and spills over to other 
economic sectors in times of financial distress.25 Furthermore, our study pertains to tail risk dependence (e.g., 
Bae et al., 2003), in that we introduce the CCX measure and document the financial sector’s role in affecting 
the industrial sector’s tail risk. We document a risk increase in real economy sectors stemming from 
increases in the instability of the financial sector and the consequent negative impact on the economy, in line 
with Kroszner et al. (2007). Moreover, while recent evidence supports the view that the intensity of 
competition in a given industry has significant implications for firms’ cash flows and stock returns (Hoberg 
and Phillips, 2010; Hou and Robinson, 2006), the significant effect of the degree of competition on the 
linkage of tail risks between the real economy and financial sectors is a novel result. Finally, we provide a 
possible reason for the higher risks of highly competitive industries (Valta 2012): their tail risk connection 
with the financial sector. 
In summary, our contributions to literature are as follows. First, we develop novel empirical 
methodologies for testing the effect of volatility and tail risk spillover from the financial to the real economy 
sectors before and during the 2007–2009 financial crisis. Second, our empirical analysis in the U.S. market 
                                                            
25 The leading role of the financial sector with respect to aggregate volatility is also documented in Houston and Stiroh 
(2006), Wang (2010), and Cheong et al. (2011).  
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over the preceding decade confirms that risk spillovers (in both volatility and tail risk dependence) increased 
during the crisis period. Third, we relate the financial risk spillover measure CCX to the real economy 
industry’s product market structure, investment opportunities, and valuation. Finally, we empirically 
document that the effect of the real economy industry characteristics on tail risk spillover measures exhibits 
variation across industries: It is stronger for industries that face more competitive product markets, use 
higher net debts, and have lower levels of valuation and investment. 
The study in turn provides two key implications. First, our findings demonstrate the close connection 
between the financial and real economy sectors. This result is important for practitioners, because it supports 
the view that difficulties in the financial sector are, sooner or later, followed by large increases in uncertainty 
in other industries. Second, our CCX-based results imply that the financial sector’s extreme returns are a 
concurrent indicator of real economy sectors’ extreme returns. Therefore, our CCX measure can provide 
warning signals of impending turmoil in stock prices of real economy firms when a financial crisis 
materializes. Policy makers and regulators interested in evaluating the economic costs of financial crises 
should find our results useful. In particular, one of the Basel III capital accord’s key objectives is to reduce 
the risk of spillover from the financial sector to the real economy. Given that the purpose of Basel III norms 
is to reduce the frequency and severity of these spillovers, our modeling approach could be used to assess 
their effectiveness. Finally, because real sectors, which require debts and whose value and investment 
activity are relatively lower, are prime candidates for depreciation in the wake of the financial sector crisis, 
investors can benefit from our findings as well. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses how risk spillover and 
industry characteristics interact. Section 3 addresses empirical methodologies. Section 4 introduces the 
database and construction of the industry characteristic variables. Section 5 discusses the empirical results. 
Section 6 describes robustness tests, and Section 7 concludes with a discussion of limitations and suggestion 
for further research. 
 
3.2. Risk spillover and industry characteristics 
3.2.1. Volatility spillover 
Evidence regarding the extent to which risk increases in the financial sector spill over to risk increases 
in industrial sectors is relatively scarce. Houston and Stiroh (2006) find that in the U.S. economy, the 
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financial sector’s volatility has had a significant and negative impact on economic growth from 1985 to 
1994.26  Noting volatilities, Wang (2010) shows that the financial sector’s volatility leads non-financial 
sectors’ in the U.S. market from 1963 to 2008, and Cheong et al.’s (2011) results support this view in the 
United Kingdom’s economy from 1990 to 2010. However, to our knowledge, there is no evidence from other 
economic areas or time periods. 
A related question is whether the 2007–2009 financial crisis affected the risk spillover mechanism from 
the financial sector to the real economy. If a sudden loss occurs within the financial system, its 
contractionary impact on real economy sectors is bound to be strong (see Kroszner et al., 2007). The 2007–
2009 crisis has led to an increased comovement between the financial sector’s and real economy’s stock 
returns (Baur, 2011). Recent evidence indicates that the 2007–2009 financial crisis has had a negative impact 
on industrial sectors’ investment activities (Campello et al., 2010).27 Finally, the shortage of external funding 
weakens firms’ operating flexibility during crisis periods because firms face budget constraints, reducing 
their investments and thereby increasing their equity risk (Ortiz-Molina and Phillips, forthcoming). In line 
with previous evidence, we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Volatility spillovers occur from the financial sector to real economy sectors and are 
stronger during financial crises. 
 
3.2.2. Tail risk spillover and product market structure 
In contrast to volatility, which is characterized by dispersion from average returns, tail risk concentrates 
on the left tail of returns’ distribution. The left tail risk has been addressed in extant literature. Bae et al. 
(2003) study extreme comovements between stock returns using exceedance correlations. Hartmann et al. 
(2004) employ a non-parametric measure, using extreme value theory to gauge spillover effects between 
stock and bond markets. 
With regard to the linkage of tail risk between financial and industrial sectors, Christiansen and Ranaldo 
(2009) apply Bae et al.’s (2003) method to compare the financial integration of the old and new European 
                                                            
26 It was a turbulent period for the U.S. banking sector. Large banks suffered huge losses from loans to developing 
countries. Savings and loans failures peaked in 1988 and 1989. 
27 They report that 86% of U.S. chief financial officers canceled or postponed attractive investment opportunities 
because they were unable to borrow externally. 
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Union countries’ stock markets and find strong persistence of coexceedance for both regions, especially in 
lower tail coexceedance. Beine et al. (2010) measure stock market coexceedance using quantile regression 
and demonstrate that financial liberalization leads to an increase in the left tail’s comovements. Fry et al. 
(2010) focus on the coskewness of market returns, showing spillover effects between the real estate and 
equity market within and between countries for the 1997 Hong Kong crisis and the 2007 subprime crisis. 
Thus, we expect tail risk spillovers to exist and be especially intense in downturns, a point that also became 
evident during the 2007–2009 financial crisis. Therefore, we hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 2a: Tail risk spillovers occur from the financial sector to real economy sectors and are 
stronger during financial crises. 
Next, we determine the effect of different product market structures on tail risk spillover. Valta (2012) 
studies U.S. firms from 1992 to 2007 and finds strong empirical evidence that banks charge significantly 
higher interest rates in loans given to firms in competitive environments because of their higher default risk 
and lower asset liquidation value. Moreover, Ortiz-Molina and Phillips (forthcoming) find that the cost of 
inflexible operations is higher for firms that face more competitive risk in product markets. Therefore, we 
predict that competitive industries experience more financial tail risk spillover than concentrated industries 
and hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 2b: The stronger (weaker) the tail risk spillover from the financial sector, the higher (lower) 
the degree of competition in a given industry. 
 
3.2.3. Tail risk spillover and industry characteristics 
We further investigate the differential impact of various industry characteristics on the linkage between 
the financial sector’s and real economy’s risks. We consider three industry-level variables: industry net debt 
issuance, industry valuation, and industry investment. 
A possible channel through which the financial sector affects industrial firms’ growth and risks is the 
firm’s external financing dependence. For example, beginning with Rajan and Zingales (1998), scholars have 
paid a great deal of attention to the degree of competition in the banking sector and how dependency on 
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external financing across nonfinancial industries affects nonfinancial industries’ growth and structure.28 The 
evidence shows that sectors that are highly dependent on external finance tend to experience a substantially 
greater contraction of value added during banking crises (Kroszner et al., 2007). Real asset illiquidity 
increases for firms that have less access to external capital or are closer to default and face more competition 
(Ortiz-Molina and Phillips, forthcoming). 
In particular, debt is the main source of external finance for firms’ operating flexibility and real 
investment activities (Valta, 2012). Industries that depend heavily on debt financing sometimes encounter 
difficulties raising funds from the financial sector. In normal times, firms have a better chance of finding 
funding sources, from either the financial sector or selling assets. However, when the financial sector is in 
crisis, credit constraints may appear. In these circumstances, asset markets also likely are stressed. Thus, 
industrial sectors that have higher level of net debt may face a more negative impact when the financial 
sector is distressed, leading to an increase in tail codependence. In summary,  
 
Hypothesis 3a: The higher the industry’s debt financing, the greater the tail risk spillover from the 
financial sector. 
 
Ortiz-Molina and Phillips (forthcoming) suggest that the problem arising from illiquid asset markets is 
more serious for firms with low valuations (low market-to-book ratios). Industrial sectors with higher 
valuations can obtain higher prices when selling assets and thus reduce their dependence on the financial 
sector. In addition, Fama and French (1995) and Chen and Zhang (1998) show that firms with low market-to-
book ratios have persistently lower earnings, higher financial leverage, and more earnings uncertainty. That 
is, we expect that low market-to-book (low valuation) firms experience greater distress risks and therefore 
greater tail risks in connection with the financial sector during weak economic times. We hypothesize: 
 
  Hypothesis 3b: The higher the industry’s valuation, the lower the tail risk spillover from the financial sector. 
                                                            
28 Vives (2001) posits that the degree of competition in the financial sector is crucial when firms seek external financing. 
By adopting an industrial organization-based measure to assess the banking sector’s competition, research shows that 
greater competition in the banking sector fosters the growth rate of financially dependent industries (Claessens and 
Laeven, 2005). 
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The level of investment in industrial sectors could also drive the financial tail risk connection. If firms 
cannot fully exploit their investment opportunities, they risk losing these opportunities, and thus market 
share, to rivals (Valta, 2012). In other words, the ex ante higher investment means firms fully exploit their 
investment opportunities and likely have more ex post internal financing resources, thus reducing their 
dependence on the distressed financial industry and their tail risks. 
 
Hypothesis 3c: The higher the industry’s investment, the lower the tail risk spillover from the financial sector. 
 
In summary, we expect that some industry characteristics affect tail risk spillover more than others. We 
posit that this effect is stronger for more competitive industries, for industries that bear greater debts, and for 
those with low level of valuation and investment. 
 
3.3. Empirical methodologies 
3.3.1. Volatility spillovers 
To model volatility spillovers, we follow Liu and Pan (1997) and employ a two-stage VAR-GARCH 
approach to demonstrate the mechanism of volatility transmission. However, we modify their approach in 
both the first and second stages to suit the problem at hand. Specifically, in the first stage, we model two 
equity index return series, corresponding to the U.S. financial sector and to a given U.S. industrial sector 
respectively, including both series in a VAR system. In doing so, we adjust for autocorrelations in each 
series as well as for cross-correlations between series. The residuals obtained after fitting the VAR model29 
are denoted 
,i tr  and ,FIN tr , where i and FIN represent any non-financial industrial sector and the financial 
sector, respectively. Next, we standardize the series 
,FIN tr  by means of a GARCH(1,1) process, as follows: 
 2, ,~ 0,FIN t FIN tr N  ,                                                                 (1) 
2 2 2
, , 1 , 1FIN t FIN FIN FIN t FIN FIN tr                                                          (2) 
 , ,
,
~ 0,1FIN t FIN t
FIN t
r
e N

 ,                                                             (3) 
                                                            
29 We chose the optimal lag in the VAR system using the Schwarz-Bayesian criterion. 
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where the standardized series is 
,FIN te . In the second stage, we model volatility spillovers using  
 2, ,~ 0,i t i tr N                                                                       (4) 
2 2 2 2 2
, , 1 , 1 1 , 1 2 , 1crisisi t i i i t i i t i FIN t i FIN t
r e e             ,                                      (5) 
here 
2
, 1crisisFIN t
e   equals 
2
, 1FIN te   during crisis periods and zero otherwise.
30 There is a volatility spillover from 
the financial sector to the industry i if the coefficient 1i  in Equation (5) is significantly positive. If the 
financial crisis amplifies the spillover, we expect the coefficient 2i  in Equation (5) to be significantly 
positive as well.31 As a robustness test, we also relax the normality assumption in Equations (1) and (4) by 
allowing residuals to follow student t-distribution.32  
 
3.3.2. Tail risk spillover 
3.3.2.1. Conditional coexceedance (CCX) 
– 
of the marginal return distribution. Formally, an exceedance for industry i at time t is defined as follows: 
 
1,    if  
,  1,...,
0,otherwise
i
i t
t
r c
I c t T
 
 

,                                                     (6) 
where  itI c  is the indicator function that equals 1 when the return itr  belongs to the set c and 0 otherwise. 
We arbitrarily define c as the set of asset returns located below the 5th quantile of the marginal distribution 
of daily returns.33 Next, we posit a new measure of tail risk spillover from the financial sector to non-
financial sectors in the spirit of Bae et al. (2003) by concentrating on the occurrence of simultaneous 
                                                            
30 To obtain a crisis period encompassing all major financial and economic events, we adopt timelines provided by the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS, 2009). The BIS study separates the timeline into four phases from the third 
quarter in 2007 until the end of 2009. Phase 1 spans from Q3 in 2007 until mid-September 2008 and is described as 
“initial financial turmoil.” Phase 2 (mid-September 2008 until late 2008) is defined as “sharp financial market 
deterioration,” and phase 3 is a phase of macroeconomic deterioration (until first quarter 2009). Thus, we define the 
crisis period as beginning in the third quarter of 2007 and ending in the first quarter of 2009. 
31 In Equation (5), the parameter  measures the spillover of shocks from a financial sector to another sector in normal 
periods; the parameter  measures the additional contribution of the crisis period to this spillover, and thus ( ) 
reflects total effect of volatility spillover during crisis periods. If  is positive (negative), there is an additional 
increased (decreased) transmission of unexpected shocks from the U.S. financial sector to another sector i in the crisis 
period compared with non-crisis periods. Baur (2011) applies a similar setting to examine whether a contagion exists 
from the financial sector to the real economy by observing equity returns during 2007–2009. 
32 The results do not materially change in comparison with the normality assumption. Detailed results are available on 
request. 
33 We use the 5% quantile as the baseline. We also used the 1% and 2.5% quantiles as a robustness test, and the results 
are similar to those based on the 5% quantile. Detailed results are available on request. 
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negative extreme returns across assets as the key element of spillover.34 We define our new measure, CCX, 
for a non-financial industry i at time t as follows: 
    ,  1,...,i i FINt t tCCX I c I c t T   ,                                                   (7) 
where i
tCCX  equals 1 if a non-financial industry i and the financial sector both have exceedances at time t 
and 0 otherwise. We name the measure “conditional coexceedance” to stress the key role of the financial 
sector in our measure and to distinguish it from the unconditional measures used in Bae et al. (2003).35 The 
intuition supporting this measure is that a non-financial industry is exposed to tail risks, which are dependent 
on the simultaneous occurrence of extreme negative returns in the financial sector. 
With this measure, we can compute the observed frequencies (likelihoods) of CCX for a given non-
financial industry i. To do so, we compute the proportion of CCX over a fixed time horizon as follows: 
 1 1 0Probi i i in n n  ,                                                               (8) 
where 
1
in  is the number of ones and 0
in  is the number of zeroes in the indicator series in Equation (7). 
Furthermore, we separate Probi  into two components to identify the relative frequency of CCX during crisis 
and non-crisis periods for an industrial sector i as follows: 
 
1,
1, 0,
Prob
i
crisisi
crisis i i
crisis crisis
n
n n


, and 
 
1,
1, 0,
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i
non crisisi
non crisis i i
non crisis non crisis
n
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

 


                 (9) 
where 1,
i
crisisn  ( 0,
i
crisisn ) is the number of ones (zeroes) in the indicator series during the crisis period, and 
1,
i
non crisisn   ( 0,
i
non crisisn  ) is the number of ones (zeroes) in the indicator series during the non-crisis period.
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3.3.3. Determinants of CCX 
Given that CCX take only non-negative integer values, we use the Poisson panel regression model to 
study their possible determinants. The dependent variable is the total number of daily CCXs observed in one 
                                                            
34 Bae et al. (2003) claim that coexceedances are superior to the correlation coefficient if non-linearities in market 
behavior exist because coexceedances are not restricted to describe linear market behavior. 
35 Bae et al. (2003) define a coexceedance of n at t as the situation when n assets present exceedances on the same day t, 
whereas in our setting, one of units in a coexceedance must be the financial sector. 
36 When testing for equality of the likelihood during crisis and non-crisis periods, the standard normality-based tests are 
inappropriate because, by construction, both variables follow non-Gaussian distributions. Therefore, we employ the 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test, which is a nonparametric alternative to the standard two-sample t-test. The Wilcoxon test is 
based solely on the order in which the observations from the two samples. Because we want to know whether the 
distribution of Probcrisis is shifted to the right of distribution Probnon-crisis, in the “Empirical Results” section, we report 
tests for this one-sided alternative. 
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quarter in a given industry, and the explanatory variables are proxies for industry debt financing, industry 
valuation, industry investment, and control variables. We chose these explanatory variables because Hoberg 
and Phillips’s (2010) evidence supports their prominent role in identifying the conditions that likely surround 
industry booms and busts. 
Given that some of our explanatory variables are generated regressors, and therefore prone to the 
problem of errors in variables, standard ordinary least squares–based methods are suboptimal. Instead, we 
apply the estimation method based on the generalized method of moments (GMM) with suitable instrumental 
variables. This approach improves the efficiency and consistency of the estimates and mitigates to a 
considerable extent the errors-in-variables problem.37 The baseline panel model specification is as follows: 
 , , , 1 , , 1 ,1 1
N L
i t n n i t l l i t dummy dummy i tn l
CCX EXP X control Industry Time               (10a)
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 

,          (10b) 
where the dependent variable 
,i tCCX  is the actual number of coexceedances observed quarterly for industry 
i. The dependent variable is regressed on the set of one-quarter lagged explanatory variables X and control. 
The vector of variables 
, ,n i tX  contains the industrial characteristic variables for industry i (net debt financing, 
spread from a normative value and a normative investment). The vectors Dcrisis,t and Dnon-crisis,t are dummy 
variables for the crisis and non-crisis periods, respectively. Both variables are designed to determine whether 
the relationship between CCX and industry effects is sensitive to the emergence of financial crisis. In 
particular, we define the crisis period as between the third quarter of 2007 and the first quarter of 2009. The 
vector of 
, ,l i tcontrol  contains variables related to other industries’ characteristics: volatility of profitability, 
debt cost, earnings per share, and size. We expected the impact of the volatility of profitability on CCX to be 
positive, because industries with higher profit instability would likely need more external financing and 
therefore are more exposed to financial sector upheavals. Similar reasoning applies to firms with relatively 
high costs of financing. In contrast, we expect firms and those with high earnings per share to be relatively 
less exposed to the financial sector’s disturbances. Finally, the model includes industry and time dummies. 
                                                            
37 We also employed the conditional maximum likelihood estimation (CMLE) method in line with Silva and Tenreyro 
(2006). Although most estimated coefficients are largely in agreement under both methods, a few are not, suggesting 
that the errors in variables problem may have material influence on the results. Therefore, we chose to present the 
GMM estimations in the main text. The CMLE results are available on request. 
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3.4. Database and industry characteristic variables 
3.4.1. Database: Sample selection and industry classification 
The empirical results are based on stock prices of firms traded in the U.S. market with available data 
from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) from January 2001 to December 2011. 38  We 
aggregate firm-level returns into value-weighted industry-level returns to test the industry-level volatility 
spillovers and tail risk spillovers. We work with 73 non-financial industries and one financial sector39 (see 
Appendix A), adopting three-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes. 
Regarding the construction of industry characteristic variables, we use quarterly accounting information 
obtained from COMPUSTAT databases. 
We use the fitted Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) that Hoberg and Phillips (2010) propose to 
identify competitive and concentrated industries. 40  Specifically, we define an industry as competitive 
(concentrated) if the fitted HHI is in the lowest (highest) quartile of the yearly sample distribution (see Valta, 
2012).41  
 
3.4.2. Industry characteristic variables 
We construct three industry-level proxies for new opportunities and future prospects, including (1) net 
debt financing, (2) spread between the actual value and a normative value, and (3) spread between the actual 
investment and a normative investment. A detailed description of these variables follows.  
 
3.4.2.1. Net debt financing  
We measure a given firm’s net debt financing in a given quarter as the firm’s net debt issuing activity 
divided by total assets. The firm’s net debt issuing activity is equal to long-term debt issuance minus long-
term debt reduction (Hoberg and Phillips, 2010). Consequently, the industry’s net debt financing is the total 
amount of net debt financing for all firms in the industry divided by total industry assets. 
Those industries demanding higher levels of debt-like financing should be more vulnerable to the 
financial sector’s distress. Thus, we expect the tail risk of industries with a greater dependency on debt 
                                                            
38 We chose the initial year as 2001 because Bureau of Labor Statistics data (only available from 2001) are required to 
classify a sector’s degree of competition. 
39 The three-digit NAICS codes for firms belonging to the financial sector are 521–525 and 531–533. 
40 Appendix B presents the details on the fitted HHI. 
41 We also use the highest and lowest 10% of fitted HHI as a robustness check, and the results do not change materially.  
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financing to be strongly linked with the financial sector’s tail risk, which implies a positive coefficient in the 
regression. 
 
3.4.2.2. Spread between the actual value and a normative value 
We define an industry spread time-series valuation (hereafter, “spread valuation”) using the procedure 
Hoberg and Phillips (2010) propose. First, we compute the normative value using the valuation model in 
Pastor and Veronesi (2003). We regress the log of the market-to-book ratio,  log M B , of the reciprocal of 
1 plus firm age (AGE), a dividend dummy (DD), firm leverage (LEV), the log of total assets (SIZE), current 
firm return on investment (ROE), and the volatility of profitability (VOLP) for each firm i. 
 , , , , , ,
,
log logi i i i i i
i
M
a bAGE cDD dLEV e SIZE fVOLP gROE
B      
 
       
 
 
, 12, , 1.t t    ,                                                                (11) 
where book equity is constructed as stockholders’ equity plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment 
tax credit minus the book value of preferred stock. We compute the market equity by multiplying the 
common stock price by common shares outstanding. In addition, LEV is total long-term debt divided by total 
asset, and ROE is earnings divided by the preceding year’s book equity. We calculate earnings as income 
before extraordinary items available to common stockholders, plus deferred taxes from the income statement, 
plus investment tax credit. We calculate the VOLP by regressing the ROE on lagged ROE for all firms in 
each industry and taking the variance of the residuals. We winsorize the VOLP and ROE variables at both 
the 1% and the 99% levels. We estimate the valuation regression mentioned previously using a rolling 12-
quarter window of lagged data in each industry to obtain a set of coefficients that we apply to each quarter t, 
which provides a measure of predicted valuation. Finally, we compute spread (unpredicted) valuations, 
expressed as follows: 
,
, ,
Spread Valuation = log Predicted logi t
i t i t
M M
B B
    
          
                               (12) 
We winsorize this measure at the 1% and 99% levels. The spread valuation determines a firm’s intrinsic 
worth based on its estimated future free cash flows. The industry-level spread valuation is the average over 
all firms in each industry. We posit that the higher the level of spread valuation, the lower its funding 
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dependence on the financial sector, because highly valued industries usually can easily sell their assets if 
needed and therefore are less dependent on external financing. The implication is that we should expect a 
negative regression coefficient. 
 
3.4.2.3. Spread between the actual investment and a normative investment 
Similar to the case of spread valuation, we define an industry spread time-series investment (hereafter, 
“spread investment”) as the variable of spread between the actual investment and a normative investment. 
First, we compute a normative investment based on Hoberg and Phillips’s (2010) proposed methodology. 
That is, we regress the log of capital expenditures divided by lagged property, plant, and equipment; 
TOBINQ is Tobin’s q, and the other independent variables are the same as in the regression in Equation (11): 
 , , , , ,
, 1
, ,
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                     (13)  
From the preceding model, we calculate spread investment as the difference between the actual investment 
and the predicted investment, as follows: 
, ,
,
, 1 , 1
Spread Investment = log Predicted logi t i ti t
i t i t
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    
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                        (14) 
We measure the industry-level spread investment by averaging over all firms in each industry. An ex ante 
higher spread investment means that firms fully exploit their investment opportunities and likely have more 
ex post internal financing resources, thus reducing their dependence on the financial industry. The previous 
reasoning implies a negative regression coefficient. 
 
3.5. Empirical results 
3.5.1. Summary statistics 
Tables 7 and 8 present descriptive statistics of industry returns during the full sample period 
and during the financial crisis, respectively. The number of firms within each sector varies 
considerably. For example, Computer and Electronic Product manufacturing is the most populated 
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sector, containing an average of 627 firms. In contrast, Wholesale Electronic Markets and Agents 
and Brokers contain an average of only 2.2 firms. Average returns are usually positive or zero in the 
full sample, and as expected, they are usually lower in the crisis period than in the full sample, with 
the exception of the Crop Production and Educational Services industries. Regarding the standard 
deviation, the crisis sample presents larger figures compared with the full sample, as expected. The 
least volatile sectors, in both the full sample (first figure) and the crisis period (second figure), are 
Food Manufacturing (0.010, 0.016), Beverage and Tobacco (0.011, 0.015), and Chemical 
Manufacturing (0.012, 0.017). In the full sample, the most volatile sectors are Hospitals (0.028) and 
Nursing & Residential Care (0.028). The two sectors that are the most volatile in the full sample are 
also the most volatile in the crisis period, with daily volatilities of 0.045 and 0.053, respectively. 
Notably, they present substantial one-day negative returns (Hospitals: –25.1% [2008/6/12] and 
Nursing –23.5% [2008/10/27]). The reasons for these significant drops in prices are as follows: The 
Hospitals sector contained only two stocks that day, and one of them (Chindex International, Inc), 
announced an unexpectedly bad result for its 2008 income, dragging the sector index with it. The 
Nursing sector also contained only two stocks and one of them (Sunrise Senior Living Inc.) suffered 
heavy losses that day due to negative news about its expected profitability. The Air Transportation 
sector also exhibited a significant negative return (–31.1%) in one day (2001/9/17); on that day, 
airline stock trading resumed after the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, and 
investors dumped these stocks given the uncertain prospects of the airline industry at that time. 
It is worth mentioning that the financial sector has an average volatility of 0.019 in the full 
sample and 0.035 in the crisis sample, presenting lower volatility than the average of all sectors in 
the full sample (0.0198) and higher volatility than the average of all sectors in the crisis period 
(0.030). Jarque-Bera statistics are highly significant for both sample periods, suggesting that the 
normality assumption is unlikely to hold  
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE] 
36 
 
Table 9 reports descriptive statistics of the dependent and explanatory variables in the Poisson 
regression analysis (see Equation (10)). The dependent variable, CCX, becomes larger in crisis period than in 
full sample. The variable net debt financing (ND_I) is always positive, on average, implying that real 
economy firms have positive net debt issuing activity in both the whole period and the crisis sub-period. 
Note, however, that debt financing needs increased in this last sub-period. The spread valuation (VAL_I) is 
small and positive in the full sample (0.1%) but strongly negative during the crisis, with an average 
undervaluation close to 17%. Regarding the spread investment (INV_I), the actual investment is always 
higher than the predicted investment and much higher (9.9%) during the crisis than in the full sample (4.6%) 
on average. This finding is surprising; investment should have constricted as the financial sector experienced 
distress, but its median value was slightly lower during the crisis and its standard deviation was much higher 
(1.59), compared with it (0.95) over the whole sample. The volatility of profits, leverage, and debt costs all 
increase in the crisis period, indicating the overall increase in firms’ riskiness. Surprisingly, net income is 
always negative (–0.2%, –0.7%), implying negative earnings per share in the full period as well as during the 
crisis. Most variables present noticeable increases in their volatilities during the crisis, as expected. 
[INSERT TABLE 9 HERE] 
 
3.5.2. Volatility spillovers 
Table 10 displays the results of the volatility spillover model shown in Equations (1)–(5). The table also 
shows the coefficient estimates in the full sample (γ1) and the additional impact due to the crisis period (γ2), 
with their corresponding t-statistics. The notation “c” indicates spillover. Several important findings are 
worth noting. 
First, the coefficient estimate reflecting spillovers in the full sample (γ1) shows that 55 of 73 industries 
suffer significant volatility spillovers from the financial sector (approximately 75% of all cases). The 
coefficient varies significantly across the sample of sectors. For example, the average size of the γ1 
coefficient is 0.34, but there are some industries with particularly strong spillover effects, such as Air 
Transport (2.35), Repair and Maintenance (0.89), and Amusement, Gambling, and Recreation Industries 
(0.81). In contrast, several industries seem unaffected by volatility spillovers, such as Textile Product Mills, 
Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing, Furniture, and Nursing, among others. 
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Second, the coefficient estimate of γ2 measures the additional crisis-specific influence. A positive and 
statistically significant value of γ2 implies additional volatility spillovers in crisis periods. Table 4 shows that 
61 of 73 industries (84% of all cases) exhibit an increase in volatility spillovers originating from the financial 
sector. Compared with normal periods (55 of 73), this spillover effect is stronger during crisis periods. For 
those 55 industries that suffer volatility spillover in non-crisis periods, 48 industries (87%) have additional 
volatility exposure to the financial sector during the crisis period. In contrast, of the 18 industries not 
exposed to volatility spillovers from the financial sector in non-crisis periods, 13 (72%) of them are exposed 
during crisis periods. This result implies that industries more sensitive to movements of financial sectors’ 
volatilities in normal times are also more likely to have additional spillover effects during crises. The average 
size of the γ2 coefficient is 0.55, but the coefficient varies across sectors. This coefficient estimate is above 
1.26 in three industries: Air Transport (2.38), Hospitals (1.26), and Ambulatory Health Care Services (1.26). 
In contrast, the coefficient estimate is below 0.06 in three industries: Data Processing, Hosting, and Related 
Services (0.06), Animal Production and Aquaculture (0.06), and Beverage and Tobacco Product 
Manufacturing (0.006). Overall, the evidence suggests that very few sectors are immune to the effects of the 
volatility spillovers in crisis times, and some sectors are more severely affected than others. 
Furthermore, the degree of volatility spillover in the crisis period can be calculated by adding the 
coefficient estimates γ1 and γ2. The Air Transport industry has the highest value of (γ1+γ2) with 4.74, 
followed by Repair and Maintenance with 1.98. Compared with the average size of the γ1+γ2 coefficient of 
0.9, the two industries’ volatilities are strongly sensitive to the volatility of the financial sector. 
Finally, there are only five industries whose volatilities seem to be unaffected in any circumstances by 
the financial sector’s volatility: Animal Production and Aquaculture, Textile Product Mills, Electronics and 
Appliance Stores, Pipeline Transportation, and Personal and Laundry Services. 
In summary, consistent with our Hypothesis 1, the empirical evidence generally supports the existence 
of volatility spillovers from the financial sector to real economy sectors and shows that these spillovers are 
usually stronger in the crisis period. The results suggest that volatility shocks originating from the financial 
sector are a source of risks that affect most other real economy sectors. 
[INSERT TABLE 10 HERE] 
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3.5.3. Tail risk spillover 
In this section, we present the results for the variable CCX, our proxy for financial tail risk spillover, 
with where the intuition that the larger the measure, the higher the spillover exposure. Table 11 shows the 
likelihoods of CCX over the whole sample and during crisis and non-crisis periods. In the full sample and on 
average, on less than 3% of the days, simultaneous negative extreme returns manifest in the financial and 
real sectors. However, the situation changes dramatically when we split the sample into crisis and non-crisis 
periods. In the first case, on more than 8% of the days, simultaneous extreme negative returns are manifest, 
whereas in the second case, this figure is less than 1.4%. Furthermore, and as the Wilcoxon test indicates, 
these averages are statistically different at any reasonable significance level. Indeed, all industries exhibit an 
increased tail risk comovement with the financial sector in the financial crisis period compared with the non-
crisis period.42 Industries whose tail risks are more exposed to financial sector distress in crisis situations are 
Fabricated Metal (12%), Printing (12%), and Forestry and Logging (11.34%); those less exposed are Animal 
Production (3.8%) and Wholesale Electronic Markets (4.1%). Overall, the empirical evidence supports 
Hypothesis 2a, in that tail risk spillovers from the financial sector to real economy sectors occur and are 
amplified during the financial crisis. 
[INSERT TABLE 11 HERE] 
 
3.5.4. Competition versus concentration 
To test Hypothesis 2b, this section addresses whether the strength of tail risk spillover increases with the 
degree of the industry’s competitiveness. We measure the CCX at yearly frequency because the competitive 
identification for each industry is updated every year. Specifically, for a given year, we use daily returns to 
compute the CCX, and we update the sample year by year. We classify the industries’ degree of competition 
using the fitted HHI measure. We consider an industry concentrated if it belongs to the highest 25% of fitted 
HHI and competitive if it belongs to the lowest 25% of fitted HHI. 
[INSERT TABLE 12 HERE] 
                                                            
42 As a robustness test, we changed the starting point of the full sample from 2001 to 2003. The results do no change 
materially. We also changed the beginning of the crisis period to the first quarter of 2007. The results support our 
hypotheses even more strongly in that all industries exhibit an increased tail risk comovement with the financial sector 
in the financial crisis period compared with the non-crisis period. Details are available on request. 
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Table 12 presents the likelihoods of CCX for competitive and concentrated industries in Column 3 and 
4, respectively, for each year as well as for the total sample. The CCX measure is always higher for 
competitive industries than for concentrated ones, though the differences are only significant (at 5%) for two 
years. However, the average difference using all years is positive and significant at the 1% level. Therefore, 
the data provide some support to Hypothesis 2b, in that competitive industries’ tail risk may be more affected 
than concentrated industries’ by extreme negative returns in the financial sector. 
 
3.5.5. CCX and industry characteristics 
3.5.5.1. The effect of industry characteristics 
Next, we consider the impact of the variables of industry characteristics on outcomes of CCX, which 
represents the tail risk spillover from the financial sector to other industries. Table 13 displays the results of 
industry-level regressions of CCX on net debt financing, spread valuation, and spread investment, 
respectively (Equations (10a)). In Model 5, the most complete model, the impact of net debt financing is 
positively related to CCX, whereas spread valuation and spread investment are negatively related to CCX, as 
expected. The results are consistent with our Hypotheses 3a, 3b, and 3c. The spread valuation is the variable 
with the highest economic impact43 on CCX, followed by size. The control variables have the expected signs 
and are all significant. The degree of fit is measured by the pseudo-R2 increases when industry-level 
variables are included in the equation,44 but the bulk of this increment is associated with the spread valuation 
variable, which confirms its relevant role. 
[INSERT TABLE 13 HERE] 
Next, we split each of the industry characteristics variables into non-crisis and crisis periods (Equation 
(10b)), the results of which are shown in Table 14. The effect of the variable net debt is weakly significant in 
the non-crisis periods but clearly significant in the crisis periods, as well as in the total sample. The spread 
valuation and spread investment are significant in both periods. Thus, we conclude that in the crisis period, 
the impact of the net debt variable on CCX increases, but the main results obtained in Table 13 remain 
unchanged, providing additional support to Hypotheses 3a, 3b, and 3c. 
                                                            
43 The economic impact of the variable X on the dependent variable Y is measured by the percentage change of Y when 
there is an increase of one standard deviation of X. Formally, we compute it as [exp(bxsx)*Ym – Ym]/Ym, where bx is X’s 
regression coefficient, sx is X’s volatility, and Ym is the average sample value of Y. 
44 For panel regression models, standard measures of fit are not well defined. We take the square of the correlation 
between the original and fitted values of the dependent variable as the pseudo-R2. 
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[INSERT TABLE 14 HERE] 
 
3.5.5.2. The effect of competitive and concentrated industries 
The degree of competition fundamentally affects firms’ operating decisions and the riskiness of their 
business environment. As such, it is important to understand whether and how this characteristic of the 
product market structure affects financial tail risk spillovers. This section follows the main analysis by using 
Equations (10a) and (10b) on industry characteristic variables, but we focus on competitive and concentrated 
industries separately. 
[INSERT TABLE 15 HERE] 
Comparing competitive industries (see Table 15, Panel A) with concentrated industries (see Table 15, 
Panel B), the expected signs remain, but there are changes in statistical significance.45 First, in the case of 
competitive industries, spread investment is not significant in the full sample, whereas it is significant in the 
non-crisis period. The data show some evidence of a positive (negative) impact of debt financing (spread 
investment) on CCX in the crisis (non-crisis) period. However, spread valuation and debt financing remain 
significant explanatory variables for CCX in all periods. Therefore, for competitive industries, the variables 
that seem to keep their explanatory power more consistently are net debt financing and spread valuation. The 
results are different for concentrated industries, where the only significant variable is spread valuation. A 
possible reason for this non-significant effect is that, in line with Ghosal and Loungani (1996), the impact of 
price uncertainty on the investment decision is small for relatively non-competitive industries, because the 
outcome depends on the strategic interaction within the industry. Therefore, the level of spread investment in 
concentrated industries might not necessarily provide useful information in predicting CCX.46 
 
3.6. Robustness tests 
We conducted a battery of robustness checks. First, we used distance-to-default (DD) as a proxy for tail 
risks. Second, we re-examined our main analysis by discarding some industries with abnormal returns. Third, 
                                                            
45 To save space, we do not report estimation results for control variables in Table 15. 
46  Note that these results are based on a subsample of somewhat extreme observations (highly competitive or 
concentrated industries). It is worth emphasizing that we define competition (concentration) if the fitted HHI is in the 
lowest (highest) quartile of the yearly sample distribution. 
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we tested the reverse causality from economic sectors to financial industry. Fourth, we computed a dynamic 
CCX using a three-day window and determined its relationship with industry characteristics. 
 
3.6.1. The exposure of distance-to-default 
We adopted the aggregate Merton’s (1974) DD metric to test tail risk spillovers and to determine the 
extent to which the spillover effect from the financial sector to other industries becomes worse during the 
crisis period.47 To do so, we calculated monthly DD for each firm within a given sector, first using a rolling 
window and then averaging all firms to build an industry-level DD. To match the sample frequency of our 
control variables (quarterly), we aggregated the monthly DD to quarterly frequency. We ran two regressions 
to analyze the tail risk spillover from the financial sector to other industries and determine whether the 
spillover effect becomes more severe in the wake of financial crises.48 The panel regressions are as follows:  
, 1 , 1 , 1 ,1
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where 
,i tDD represents the distance-to-default for industry i, , 1fin tDD  is the DD for the financial sector 
lagged one period, 
, 1j tcontrol  are a set of control variables lagged one period,
49 and
,i t is the residual. 
We included industry and time dummies to avoid estimation bias, and we estimated the coefficients by 
means of a Prais-Winsten regression robust to heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation across 
panels. If there is significant impact of the lagged financial sector’s DD on industry i’s DD, we expect that 
i1  0   in Equation (15). In addition, if the financial crisis increases the impact of these spillovers, we 
i2 i1    in Equation (16). 
Table 16 reports the empirical results. First, there is a significant and positive relationship between the 
industries’ and the financial sector’s DDs. The control variables are significant and have the expected sign.50 
                                                            
47 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999) considers Merton’s DD model an industry standard risk. We 
calculate DD in line with the bulk of the literature based on Merton’s model (1974). Calculation details are available on 
request. 
48 The variable DDfin-non-crisis is equal to DDfin multiplied by a dummy variable, which equals 1 before the thirdc quarter 
of 2007 and after the first quarter of 2009 and 0 otherwise. We obtained the DDfin-crisis variable by multiplying the DDfin 
by a dummy variable equals 1 after the third quarter of 2007 and before the first quarter of 2009 and 0 otherwise. 
49 Industries’ control variables are the volatility of profitability (VOLP), leverage, earnings per share (EP), and SIZE 
(defined as market value rather than total assets to avoid collinearity problems) for each industry.  
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Comparing the results of Model 1 with Model 2’s enables us to investigate whether the influence of tail risk 
spillover is stronger during the crisis period. The evidence shows a larger estimated coefficient on crisis-
specific DD, revealing that tail risk spillover is stronger during crisis periods. Overall, the results support 
Hypothesis 2a. 
[INSERT TABLE 16 HERE] 
 
3.6.2. The impact of extreme returns 
Because we find extreme negative returns in some health care–related industries (e.g., Hospitals, 
Nursing), which could distort our analysis, we excluded those sectors and re-examined the relationship 
between CCX and industry characteristics. This reexamination involved only cases based on all industries 
and concentrated industries because these suspicious sectors are all identified as concentrated ones in our 
study. In general, our main analysis remains the same.51 
 
3.6.3. Reverse causality: Volatility 
To test for reverse causality in volatility spillovers from real economy sectors to the financial sector, we 
switched i and FIN in Equations (1)–(5) and re-estimated this set of equations for each industry i. The results 
provide little supportive evidence of significant volatility spillovers from non-financial sectors to the 
financial industry in the full sample period. However, in the crisis period, there are many cases of significant 
volatility spillovers from real economy sectors to the financial sector. As an additional test, we used the 30-
industry daily data from the Fama-French website. The results are similar. Therefore, we conclude that in 
crisis periods, there is a complex feedback mechanism of volatility spillovers between the financial sector 
and many real economy sectors. However, we note that the initial shock to the economic system originated in 
the financial sector. 
3.6.4. Reverse causality: Tail risk 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
50 The signs of these coefficients are consistent with simple economic intuition; for example, smaller firms tend to use 
more short-term debt than larger firms, which make the whole industry riskier and more prone to financial distress. An 
industry with higher volatility of profitability and higher leverage bears more risk and thereby decreases the DD (higher 
default probability). In line with the preceding statement, higher volatility of profitability and leverage will result in 
lower DD (higher default probability), whereas higher earnings per share and size will cause higher DD (lower default 
probability). 
51 To save space, the results in Section 3.6.2, 3.6.3, 3.6.4, and 3.6.5 are not included here but are available on request. 
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Possible feedback effects of tail events between the financial and non-financial sectors are difficult to 
take into account in our baseline setting, because by its very nature, the i
tCCX  measure focuses on 
concurrent events. To shed light on possible feedback effects, we used two additional CCX-based measures: 
(i) , which equals 1 if industry i has an 
exceedance on day t and the financial industry has an exceedance on day t – 1.  
(ii) , which equals 1 if industry i has an 
exceedance on day t – 1 and the financial industry has an exceedance on day t. 
We hypothesize that if there is a feedback effect and the financial and non-financial sector effects 
are causing each other, measures CCX(i,t,FIN,t-1) and CCX(i,t-1,FIN,t) should have similar likelihood. In 
contrast, if tail risk events tend to manifest first in the financial (non-financial) sector and 
subsequently in the non-financial (financial) sector, measure CCX(i,t,fin,t-1) should have higher (lower) 
likelihood than measure CCX(i,t-1,fin,t). To test this idea, we computed likelihoods for both measures 
across the full sample period, the crisis period, and the non-crisis period. Then, we computed 
average values of probabilities of CCX on all industries across different time periods. The results 
(available on request) suggest that the likelihood of measure CCX(i,t,fin,t-1) is significantly higher than 
the likelihood of CCX(i,t-1,fin,t) during the full sample and crisis periods. Therefore, the evidence 
suggests that in crisis and full sample periods, tail risk events occur first in the financial sector and 
then in non-financial sectors. However, in the non-crisis period, a feedback effect cannot be ruled 
out. Therefore, our assumption that in crisis periods, extreme volatility episodes begin in the 
financial sector and then spill over to other non-financial sectors seems to be borne out by the data. 
 
3.6.5. Dynamic CCX 
To assess the possible dynamic nature of CCX, we re-computed this variable using a moving three-day 
window. That is, we defined the CCX as including the financial sector’s extreme returns within a moving 
three-day window. Then, we computed the likelihoods and re-estimated the base model regression of 
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Equation (10a) using this alternative measure as the dependent variable. We find that results are broadly 
consistent with our Hypotheses 2a, 3a, 3b, and 3c. 
 
3.7. Conclusion 
In this article, we propose a new approach to measure tail risk spillovers from one economic sector to 
other sectors: the CCX. We apply our approach to the financial sector and real economy industries in the 
United States from 2001 to 2011. We find large volatility and tail risk spillovers from the financial sector to 
many real economy sectors during this period. These spillovers are even stronger during the 2007–2009 
financial crisis. In addition, we find evidence suggesting that the higher the degree of competition, the 
stronger these tail risk spillovers. 
Three industry characteristics help explain the size of tail spillovers. The net debt financing has a 
positive effect on the size, whereas valuation and investment have a negative impact. The variable with the 
most relevant impact from the economic viewpoint is the valuation. Our results have implications for 
practitioners, in that they support the view that difficulties in the financial sector are sooner or later followed 
by large increases in uncertainty in many (but not all) industries and services. Furthermore, our results add to 
the increasing body of literature supporting the role of financial sector risk as a leading indicator of real 
economy overall risk and specifically tail risk. Our results may also help financial regulators evaluate the 
true overall economic cost of financial crises. 
Looking forward, while recent research has shown that firm’ capital structure decisions depend on 
industry structure (e.g., Bradley et al., 1984; MacKay and Phillips, 2005), the extent to which product market 
structure may affect tail risk remains an open question. We provide evidence linking product market 
characteristics to CCX, so our results point to a worthwhile avenue for further research. Another promising 
line of research is to explore the implications of our findings on loss aversion–based portfolio choice. 
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Appendix A  
NAICS 
code Industry name 
NAICS 
code Industry name 
111 Crop Production 444 
Building Material and Garden Equipment and Supplies 
Dealers 
112 Animal Production and Aquaculture 445 Food and Beverage Stores 
113 Forestry and Logging 446 Health and Personal Care Stores 
211 Oil and Gas Extraction 447 Gasoline Stations 
212 Mining (except Oil and Gas) 448 Clothing and Clothing Accessories Stores 
213 Support Activities for Mining 451 
Sporting Goods, Hobby, Musical Instrument, and Book 
Stores 
221 Utilities 452 General Merchandise Stores 
236 Construction of Buildings 453 Miscellaneous Store Retailers 
237 Heavy and Civil Engineering Construction 454 Nonstore Retailers 
238 Specialty Trade Contractors 481 Air Transportation 
311 Food Manufacturing 482 Rail Transportation 
312 Beverage and Tobacco Product Manufacturing 483 Water Transportation 
313 Textile Mills 484 Truck Transportation 
314 Textile Product Mills 486 Pipeline Transportation 
315 Apparel Manufacturing 488 Support Activities for Transportation 
316 Leather and Allied Product Manufacturing 492 Couriers and Messengers 
321 Wood Product Manufacturing 493 Warehousing and Storage 
322 Paper Manufacturing 511 Publishing Industries (except Internet) 
323 Printing and Related Support Activities 512 Motion Picture and Sound Recording Industries 
324 Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing 515 Broadcasting (except Internet) 
325 Chemical Manufacturing 517 Telecommunications 
326 Plastics and Rubber Products Manufacturing 518 Data Processing, Hosting, and Related Services 
327 Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing 519 Other Information Services 
331 Primary Metal Manufacturing 541 Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 
332 Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing 561 Administrative and Support Services 
333 Machinery Manufacturing 562 Waste Management and Remediation Services 
334 Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing 611 Educational Services 
335 
Electrical Equipment, Appliance, and Component 
Manufacturing 621 Ambulatory Health Care Services 
336 Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 622 Hospitals 
337 Furniture and Related Product Manufacturing 623 Nursing and Residential Care Facilities 
339 Miscellaneous Manufacturing 711 Performing Arts, Spectator Sports, and Related Industries 
423 Merchant Wholesalers, Durable Goods 713 Amusement, Gambling, and Recreation Industries 
424 Merchant Wholesalers, Nondurable Goods 721 Accommodation 
425 Wholesale Electronic Markets and Agents and Brokers 722 Food Services and Drinking Places 
441 Motor Vehicle and Parts Dealers 811 Repair and Maintenance 
442 Furniture and Home Furnishings Stores 812 Personal and Laundry Services 
443 Electronics and Appliance Stores   
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Appendix B 
Classifying industries as competitive or concentrated  
Following Hoberg and Phillips (2010), we classify industries as competitive or concentrated using an 
indicator that combines Compustat data with Herfindahl index data from the Census Bureau (U.S. 
Department of Commerce) and employee data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).  
We computed the fitted-HHI using a two-step procedure. First, for the manufacturing industries for 
which we had information on their HHIs including both public and private firms for every five years, we 
regressed the industry HHI (obtained from the Commerce Department) on three variables: the Compustat 
public-firm-only Herfindahl index, the average number of employees per firm using the BLS data (based on 
public and private firms), and the number of employees per firm for public firms using Compustat data. 
Second, we used the estimated coefficients from this regression to compute fitted HHI for all industries. This 
fitted HHI has the advantage of capturing the influence of both public and private firms. In the current study, 
we do not use these fitted HHI directly as an explanatory variable into any regression because of possible 
measurement errors. However, we consider the highest 25% (10%) of fitted HHI to correspond to 
concentrated industries and those with lowest 25% (10%) to correspond to competitive industries.  
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CHAPTER 4 
Do Cash Holdings Influence Financial Risk Spillover? Firm Level Analysis in Europe 
 
4.1.  Introduction 
Due to the financial and economic crisis that started in 2007 and Sovereign debt crisis of Europe zone, 
research on financial stability is facing new challenges and has embarked on a growing research agenda. 
There is a consensus to develop new and enhanced measures to understand the transmission channels from 
the financial sector to the real economy and to provide policy making with improved analytic tools. The 
growing literature on financial stability has been urged to expand the focus and to incorporate the interaction 
between the financial system and the rest of the economic agents and sectors. In Europe, in particular, 
financial markets and the banking sector have experienced tremendous instability, starting with the 2007-09 
global financial crisis promptly followed by a sovereign debt crisis. This paper addresses the importance of 
risk transmitted from the financial sector to corporate sectors in the euro area.  
We explore the extent to which financial industry’s risk spills over to real economy firms via several 
perspectives. We ask three main questions. First, whether risks of financial sector spill over to non-financial 
firms in Europe? If yes, whether financial crisis event strengthens this tail risk spillover? Second, whether a 
firm’s liquidity provision (e.g., cash holding) offsets its transmitted tail risks from the financial sector during 
crises? Third, whether a firm’s financial condition (financially constrained or unconstrained) drives the effect 
of cash holdings on such transmitted risks? 
To shed light on these questions, we hypothesize and examine three predictions. First, literatures 
support that there is a volatility spillover from financial sectors to real economy sectors both in US and UK 
(Wang (2010), Cheong et al. (2011)), and also exists extremely negative equity co-movements in US market, 
especially so during crises (see by Chiu, Peña, and Wang (2014)). Thus we presume there are tail risk 
spillovers from the financial sector to firms in real economy sectors. These spillovers are stronger during 
financial crisis. Second, some literature (see Ferreira and Vilela (2004) and Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009))52 
                                                            
52 Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009) document that the average cash-to-assets ratio for U.S. industrial firms more than 
doubles from 1980 to 2006 largely due to precautionary motives. Cash ratios increase because firms’ cash flows become 
riskier; firms hold fewer inventories and receivables and are increasingly R&D intensive. Ferreira and Vilela (2004) 
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argue that cash holdings can be valuable when other sources of funds are insufficient to satisfy firms’ 
demand for capital. Refinancing risk should be greater when credit market conditions are tighter. Harford, 
Klasa, and Maxwell (2013) find market puts a greater value on an incremental dollar of cash when the firm 
has significant refinancing risk. Therefore, we presume cash is valuable for firms in times of financial crisis 
through mitigating extreme risk propagated from financial sectors. Regarding the third question, existing 
literature document that financially constrained firms have greater cash reserves than unconstrained firms, 
and the role of cash holding is more valuable for financially constrained firms (see Faulkender and Wang 
(2006), Denis and Sibilkov (2010), Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010), and Campello et al. (2012)). 
Moreover, Lin and Paravisini (2013) provide evidence on the causal link between financing constraints and 
the risk of corporate cash flows and returns. They document how firms’ cash, payout, and investment 
policies respond endogenously to mitigate the impact of constraints on risk. Thus, we presume cash holdings 
mitigate risks propagated from financial sectors more for firms classified as financially constrained firms 
when credit market conditions tighten. 
To examine these hypotheses, we construct a measure of capturing tail risk spillovers from financial 
sector to a non-financial firm, named CCX henceforth. The measure is firstly proposed by Chiu et al. (2014), 
and it regards a tail risk spillover as a simultaneous negative extreme movement between the financial sector 
and an industrial sector.53 Then, we use Panel Poisson regression to test the role of cash holdings on such risk 
spillovers. 
We study firms in 16 countries in Europe with period between 2003 and 2011. To have a clear analysis, 
we divide all countries into four regions: (1) Euro-periphery countries (Portugal, Italy, Greece, Spain, 
Ireland), (2) Euro-core countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands), (3) major 
European countries - but not euro countries (Sweden, Switzerland, Norway, Denmark), and (4) United 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
investigate the determinants of corporate cash holdings in EMU countries and find that cash holdings are positively 
affected by the investment opportunity set and cash flows and negatively affected by asset’s liquidity, leverage and size. 
Bank debt and cash holdings are negatively related, and capital markets development has a negative impact on cash 
levels. 
53 Different to that work, where they look at real economy impact at industry level, we instead analyze this impact at 
firm level. The firm-level evidence should be as much important as the aggregate-level one. The reason is that if 
different transmission channels imply different firm-level effects related to firm characteristics, one has a better chance 
to isolate and quantify the different channels. Such information is lost in the aggregate data. Also from corporate 
borrowers’ perspective, the liquidity crisis in capital markets creates uncertainty about the ease of future access to 
capital, which impinged the fiscal health of many corporations. 
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Kingdom (UK). Overall, CCX is larger for Euro-periphery countries and less for UK, indicating that firms 
located in Euro-periphery suffer more risks stemming from the distressed financial sector.  
Furthermore, our results are in supportive of the prediction 1 that CCX is more severe during financial 
crises periods across all regions. Moreover, our evidence favors the prediction 2 and 3 that cash provides 
important benefits to financially constrained firms in times of credit crunch and especially for financially 
constrained firms, restricted to two particular regions: Euro-core countries and UK We also document that 
CCX are positively associated with a firm’s volatility, default risk, leverage, and size, whereas negatively 
related cash holding, return, and market-to-book ratio.  
This study contributes to the growing literature in several dimensions. First, the relationship between 
the financial and real sides of the economy has long been a topic of intense interest and debate. Previous 
literature has investigated this linkage focusing on industrial real output (see Rajan and Zingales, 1998), 
stock market returns (Baur, 2011),54  and the links between other measures of returns and profitability. 
However the linkage between the financial sector’s risk and real economy risk has received little attention so 
far. The purpose of this paper is to fill the gap in the literature. Second, we complement the study of Chiu et 
al. 2014 by offering evidence that financial sectors spill over risks to real economy sectors at firm-level in 
Europe. Third, this paper establishes the new link between firms’ liquidity management (e.g., cash holdings), 
firms’ financing conditions (e.g., financial constraints) and tail risks propagated from distressed financial 
sectors. This complements the recent works that examine whether capital liquidity affects firm behavior 
focuses on the 2007-2008 credit crisis (e.g., Campello, Graham and Harvey (2010), Ivashina and Scharfstein 
(2010), Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010)). We provide evidence showing that reserving cash is still 
valuable for financially constrained firms in that it enables firms to mitigate tail risks transmitted from the 
financial sector.  
The study provides two key implications. First, our findings remark the close connection between the 
financial sector and non-financial firms. Investors are particularly keen to understand risks spilled over to 
real economy, in order to able to assess the benefits of portfolio diversification. Second, our results may also 
be useful to policy makers and regulators because they are interested in evaluating the possible economic 
                                                            
54 Baur (2011) finds that the most recent crisis led to an increased co-movement of returns among financial sector stocks 
across countries and between financial sector’s stock returns and real economy sector’s stock returns. 
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costs due to financial crises. In particular, one of the key objectives of the Basel III capital accord is to 
reduce the risk of spillover from the financial sector to the real economy. 
In the next section we describe literature reviews and prediction. The econometric methodology to be 
used in estimating is given in Section 3. Section 4 introduces the database and the construction of the firms’ 
characteristic variables. In Section 5 discusses the empirical results. Robustness test are provided in Section 
6. Section 7 concludes. 
 
4.2.  Literature Reviews and Prediction 
4.2.1. Tail Risk Spillovers 
The global financial crisis has led to an increased co-movement between financial sector’s stock returns 
and real economy’s stock returns (Baur, 2011), and has had a negative impact on industrial sectors’ 
investment activities (Campello et al., 2010; Ortiz-Molina and Phillips, forthcoming). The evidence on the 
extent to which risk increases in the financial sector spill over risk to firms in real economy sectors is 
relatively scarce. Some studies explore such risk transmission channel by looking at volatility. For example, 
Wang (2010) shows that the financial sector’s volatility leads non-financial sectors’ in the U.S. market in the 
period from 1963 to 2008 and Cheong et al. (2011) support this view in the UK economy from 1990 to 2010. 
On the other hand, some studies document the linkage of tail risks between financial and industrial sectors. 
For example, Fry et al. (2010) focus on the coskewness of market returns, showing spillover effects between 
the real estate and equity market within and between countries for the Hong Kong crisis in 1997 and in the 
subprime crisis in 2007. Furthermore, literatures document that macro-economic shocks have significant 
impacts on corporate sector probabilities of default in the euro area (see Castren et al. (2010) and Carling et 
al. (2007)). Given that financial crises are often followed by macro-economic shocks, it implies that financial 
sectors’ distress affects non-financial firms’ default probabilities and thus their tail risks. Finally, Chiu et al. 
(2014) has offered direct evidence showing that financial sectors spill over risks to real economy sectors at 
industry-level, and such risk spillovers are stronger during weak economic times. So, our prediction 1 is as 
follows: 
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Prediction 1: There are tail risk spillovers from the financial sector to non-financial firms in Europe. These 
spillovers are stronger during financial crisis. 
 
4.2.2. Cash Holdings and Tail Risks 
Prior works have supported that cash holdings play an important role on firms’ performance, but there is 
no clear cut on whether holding cash is good or bad. Some studies focus on the “dark side”- the potential for 
managerial abuse due to agency problems (e.g., Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Harford, 1999; Harford, 
Mansi and Maxwell, 2008; Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, 2006). In contrast, some works show a “bright 
side” or precautionary saving motive – seemingly excess cash may in fact benefit firms in times of 
dislocation in markets for external finance. The economic intuition is that cash holdings can be valuable 
when other sources of funds, including cash flows, are insufficient to satisfy firms’ demand for capital. Firms 
facing external financing constraints can use available cash holdings to fund the necessary expenditures.  
In terms of bright side, literatures also document cash can serve a valuable role in mitigating refinancing 
risk. For example, Harford, Klasa, and Maxwell (2012) support that cash reserves can reduce refinancing 
risks especially for firms whose debt has shorter maturity. The economic intuition is that cash reserves could 
enable the firm to keep fully investing in its growth opportunities and allow the firm to avoid selling off key 
firm assets to pay off debt that is coming due. Based the above statement, we set up our prediction 2. 
 
Prediction 2: Cash is valuable for firms in times of financial crisis through mitigating extreme risks 
propagated from financial sectors. 
 
4.2.3. The Role of Cash Holdings on Financial Constrained Firms 
Presuming that cash holding is able to help to mitigate transmitted risks from the financial sector in 
times of crisis, is this effect systematically to all firms? We focus on investigating whether firms’ financing 
conditions (financially constraint or unconstraint) drive this effect. The existing literatures document that 
financially constrained firms have greater cash reserves than unconstrained firms, and the role of cash 
holding is more important for financially constrained firms. For example Faulkender and Wang (2006), and 
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Denis and Sibilkov (2010) show that cash holdings benefit financially constrained firms by enabling these 
firms to fully invest in their growth prospects. Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010) provide evidence that cash 
reserves are more important for financially constrained firms in mitigating post-crisis investment declines.55 
The authors argue that firms in response to constrained external financing accumulate cash to mitigate the 
potential value loss by forgone future investment opportunities. Most importantly, Lin and Paravisini (2013) 
provide evidence on the causal link between financing constraints and the risk of corporate cash flows and 
returns. They document how firms’ cash, payout, and investment policies respond endogenously to mitigate 
the impact of constraints on risk. Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) point out financing constraints generate 
the rationale for active risk management. Collectively, these studies support the view that higher cash 
holdings are more valuable for financially constrained firms during crisis period. Therefore, our prediction 3 
is as follows: 
Prediction 3: Cash holdings mitigate risks propagated from financial sectors more for firms classified as 
financially constrained firms when credit market conditions tighten. 
 
4.3. Empirical Methodologies 
4.3.1. Tail Risk Spillover Measure 
4.3.1.1.  Conditional coexceedance CCX 
We employ the measure proposed by Chiu et al. (2014) to capture tail risk spillover from the financial 
sector to non-financial firms.56 We define an extreme return, or exceedance, as one that lies either below 
(above) the 5th (1-5th) quantile of the marginal return distribution. Formally an exceedance for industry i at 
time t is defined as 
We define an exceedance for firm i at time t as 
 
1,    if  
,  1,...,
0,otherwise
i
i t
t
r c
I c t T
 
 

                                                      (1) 
                                                            
55 Campello et al. (2012) extend this result to European firms. 
56 Differently, we apply the measure on firm level, whereas they are on industry level. 
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where It(c) is the indicator function that equals one when the return 
i
tr belongs to the set c and equals zero 
otherwise.57 Next, we measure tail risk spillover, named “conditional coexceedance” (henceforth CCX) for a 
non-financial firm i at time t as  
    ,  1,...,i i FINt t tCCX I c I c t T                                                      (2) 
where CCX equals one if a non-financial firm i and the financial sector both have exceedances at t, CCX is 
equal to zero otherwise. The intuition supporting this measure is that non-financial firms are exposed to tail 
risks which are dependent on the simultaneous occurrence of extreme negative returns in the financial sector.  
 
4.3.2. Panel Poisson regression model 
To examine whether cash holdings influence tail risk spillovers, we use a Panel Poisson regression 
specification, given the nature of CCX measure with only the non-negative integers. The dependent variable 
is the sum of daily conditional coexceedances observed in a quarter in a given firm, and the explanatory 
variables are cash holdings and other firm risk characteristic variables. They are (1) annualized volatility 
(vol), (2) distance-to-default (dd), (3) logarithm of market-to-book ratio (logmb), (4) quarterly return (ret), (5) 
logarithm of book asset value (size), (6) ratio of book value of total liability to market value of asset (tlmta).  
The economic rationales of using these variables are described in Section 4.4.2. Besides, we use GDP per 
capita to control economic development, 58  and include year dummies to account for unobserved 
heterogeneity across years that may be correlated with the explanatory variables. Formally, the baseline 
panel model specification is as follows: 
                                                                                
                                                                                                                                 (3) 
 
where the dependent variable CCXi,t is the actual number of coexceedances observed quarterly for firm i at 
time t. Furthermore, we perform Panel Poisson regression with fixed effects for two reasons. First a 
Hausman test rejects the random effects estimator in favor of a fixed effects estimator. On this basis, fixed 
                                                            
57 We arbitrarily define c as the set of asset returns located below the 5th quantile of the marginal distribution of daily 
returns. 
58 To ensure that we can control for the effects of the business cycle and year specific events we use the GDP growth 
rate to control for cyclical effects (see Bougheas, S., Mizen, P., Yalcin, C., 2006) 
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effects specifications are preferred. Second, the inclusion of firm fixed effects can mitigate some 
endogeneity concerns, because such specification controls for unobserved sources of firm heterogeneity. 
Nevertheless, we also implement the random effects specifications as robustness.59,60 We follow Peterson 
(2009) and correct for possible serial correlation and heteroscedasticity by clustering at the firm level. 
To examine what extent that cash holdings influence CCX during the crisis period, we include crisis 
dummy and the interaction term of                      into the regression, as displayed as follows. 
 
                                                                          
                                                                         
                                                                                                                                                          (4) 
 
In this model specification, we focus on the coefficient of   . A significantly negative sign of this coefficient 
indicates that cash holdings are able to further reduce financial risk spillovers during crises periods. 
 
4.4.  Database, Firms’ characteristic Variables, and Criteria of Financial Constraint  
4.4.1. Database: Sample Selection 
Our sample contains data on financial sectors and non-financial firms from 16 European countries: 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom. Different with identification strategy of Bartram, 
Taylor, and Wang (2007),61 we divide the Euro-zone into Euro-periphery countries and Euro-core countries 
and regard UK as an independent group. Hence, we divide countries into four regions (groups): (1) Euro-
periphery countries (Portugal, Italy, Greece, Spain, Ireland), (2) Euro-core countries (Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands), (3) Other European countries - but not euro countries (Sweden, 
                                                            
59 In random effect model we also include several controls for country, industry, and year effects. The results are similar 
as fixed effect and upon requested. 
60 The random effects model assumed the individual effects are independent, identically distributed and uncorrelated 
with the observed effect. This method will produce inconsistent estimator if the unobserved individual heterogeneity 
specific effect is correlated with explanatory variables. In which the fixed effects estimators will be more appropriate.  
61 Bartram, Taylor, and Wang (2007) conducted their data for twelve Euro-zone countries (France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Finland, Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Austria and Luxembourg) and five non-Euro European 
countries (UK, Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark and Norway).  
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Switzerland, Norway, Denmark), and (4) United Kingdom (UK).62  The sample spans from 2003 to 2011, 
where we identify three mutually exclusive periods: (1) July 2007−March 2009 (named, Crisis_07_09); (2) 
May 2010−December 2011 (named, Crisis_EU); (3) period that does not cover Crisis_07_09 and Crisis_EU 
(named, Stable).63 
Regarding the construction of firms characteristic variables, we use quarterly accounting information 
obtained from Compustat Global databases from 2003 to 2011, which provides financial and income 
statements for publicly traded companies accounting for over 96% of European market capitalization. 
Because the original data are denominated in local currencies, we convert variables to US dollar values by 
using exchange rates from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. To compute our tail risk 
spillover measure, security price of firms in each country are obtained from Security Price Global Compustat. 
We focus on industrial firms, but discard firms operated in utility sector (GIC= 5510). Finally, we have 
103,189 firm-quarter observations. In addition, we eliminate observations with negative values for assets and 
winsorize our independent variables at both the 5% and the 95% level. Details on construction of financial 
variables are summarized in Table A.1. 
Furthermore, this paper examines the tail risk transmission from the financial sector at industry-level to 
non-financial firms at firm-level, so we aggregate firm-level returns within the financial sector into value-
weighted industry-level returns.64 
 
4.4.2. Firms’ Characteristic Variables  
We attribute our variables of firms’ characteristics to many categories, firms’ risk characteristics (equity 
return volatility, distance-to-default), profitability (quarterly return), growth opportunity (market-to-book 
ratio), cash holding, sizes and leverage. The economic rationales of choosing these are described in the 
following. 
                                                            
62  We delete Luxembourg because the number of firms is less than 30, and include Ireland to the group “Euro-
periphery”. In addition, we regard UK as an independent group because the observation of firms is 28.13% of all 
sample. 
63 To obtain a crisis period encompassing all major financial and economic events, we adopt timelines provided by the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS, 2009). Hence, in this paper, we define the Global financial crisis period 
starting in the third quarter of 2007 and ending in the first quarter of 2009. The recent European Monetary Union 
sovereign debt crisis is from May 2010 to December 2011.  
64 According to GIC group, the financial industry is composed of (1) 4010 Banks, (2) 4020 Diversified Financials, (3) 
4030 Insurance, and (4) 4040 Real Estate. 
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Volatility (vol), shock propagation is more likely in a highly volatile environment overriding all asset 
classes. Unhedged or leveraged international allocations may also increase contagion. CCX are more likely 
to occur when volatility is pervasively high in all financial markets. Distance-to-Default (dd), a market based 
indicator of the soundness of the firms. The dd indicates how far a firm’s asset value is away from its default 
point, and thus we should expect the higher the dd and the lower the CCX. Quarterly Return (ret) is proxied 
for a firm’s profitability, and thus we expect that the higher the quarterly return the lower the CCX. 
Logarithm of market-to-book ratio (logmb) is proxied for growth opportunity. Ortiz-Molina and Phillips 
(forthcoming) suggest that the problem arising from illiquid asset markets is higher for firms with low 
valuations (low market-to-book ratios). In addition, Fama and French (1995) and Chen and Zhang (1998) 
show that firms with high book-to-market ratios have persistently low earning, higher financial leverage, and 
more earnings uncertainty. That is, we can expect that higher book-to-market (low valuation) firms 
experience greater distressed risks, and then greater tail risks connection with the financial sector during 
weak economic times. Cash Holding (cashmta) is expected to reduce CCX because firms’ reserving cash 
allow to better cope with adverse shocks when access to capital markets is costly. Firm size (logsize), is 
usually considered as an important firm risk characteristic, but there is no clear expectation on the 
relationship between firm size and CCX. On the one hand, large firms are more diversified and thus should 
be relatively less exposed to financial sector’s disturbances. On the other hand, large firms are likely to rely 
on external financing sources, and have high connection with financial sector, leading to suffer tail risk 
spillover from distress financial industry. The ratio of total liability to asset (tlmta) stands for a firm’s 
leverage. A firm with higher leverage implies that it raises more funds externally from banks and public debt 
markets, and thus its risk is more sensitive to the risk of the financial sector. 
 
4.4.3. Criteria of financial constraint 
This paper also analyzes whether the influence of cash holding on CCX is driven by firm financial 
conditions, where we particularly look at a firm’s constraint of financing. We follow literatures and consider 
three schemes of identifying a financial constrained firm. The detailed description of the chosen criteria is 
provided as below. 
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Firm size. In every quarter during 2003-2011, we rank firms based on their book value of total assets. 
We then assign those firms in the below (above) median of the firm size distribution to the financially 
constrained (unconstrained) group. This approach is used in literature (e.g., Erickson and Whited (2000); 
Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004); and Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2007)), and the intuition is 
that smaller firms are less well known, and they will be more vulnerable to capital market imperfections.  
Age. We rank firms based on their age over the 2003 to 2011 period, and assign to the financially 
constrained (unconstrained) group those firms in the bottom (top) median of the age distribution. The 
rankings are again performed on an quarter basis. The younger firms are attributed to more financially 
constrained group in line with Hadlock and Pierce (2010), proposing that firm size and age are particularly 
useful predictors of financial constraint levels. 
Annual payout ratio. In very year over the 2003 to 2011 period, we assign annual cash payout ratio 
distribution below (above) the median are classified as constrained (unconstrained) firms to the financially 
constrained (unconstrained) group. This approach is widely applied in literature, such as Almeida, Campello, 
and Weisbach (2004). The intuition follows from Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) argue that 
unconstrained firms are more likely to have higher payout ratios, while constrained firms are likely to have 
lower payout ratios.  
We report the correlation matrix among three criteria of financial constraint in A.2. Generally speaking, 
correlations are not high, ranging from 0.15 to 0.33, indicating that the three identification criteria are not 
perfectly substitutable, and our financial constraint criteria complement each other. 
 
4.5. Empirical Result 
4.5.1.  Summary Statistics 
Tables 1 provides information on the number of observations, firms across European countries, firms 
across different regions, and descriptive statistics for firms’ key financial variables in each country.  
In Panel A of Table 17 the number of observations and the distribution of CCX vary widely across 
countries. The maximum number of firms is UK (1356), and four countries which Austria, Belgium, Ireland, 
58 
 
and Portugal has less than 100 firms. The total number of firms in the full sample is 4320. We note that 
CCXs are indeed prevalent in European countries, with the larger number of country Italy, Greece, and Spain 
respectively (0.949, 0.925, and 0.922). The least dd (3.069), logmb (-0.179), and ret (-0.024) were all 
occurred in Greece, which is somewhat explains why firms operated in that country have high level of CCX. 
Other two negative returns appeared in Italy and Portugal (-0.012, -0.003). Besides, firms in Portugal and 
Italy have relative higher leverage compared with other countries (0.659, 0.624). The Panel B reports 
summary statistics across different regions in terms of CCXs and firms’ characteristics. We find euro-
periphery performs highest of CCX and tlmta, while lowest of dd, logmb, and cashmta. Since 2010, countries 
in euro-periphery, including Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy, have faced some episodes of 
heightened turbulence in their sovereign debt markets. On the other hand, UK suffers less tail risk spillover 
from financial industry. 
[INSERT TABLE 17 HERE] 
 
4.5.2.  Preliminary Results  
Panel A, B, and C of Figure 3 plot CCX over the period of 2003-2011. It is clear to observe that most 
countries displayed highest levels of CCX during 2007-2009 global financial crisis, and second highest 
occurred in times of European debt crisis (May 2010 to December 2011), except Portugal. The crisis that 
originated in the subprime mortgage market in the US was strongly felt in all international financial sectors 
across the globe. While it started in the credit market in summer 2007, its destructive force was not fully 
sensed until the beginning of the first quarter of 2008.  
The assessment of the effect of tail risk spillover from financial sector on different areas and time 
periods is provided by Table 18. The Panel A of Table 18 shows summary statistics of CCX across different 
areas and time periods. We observe the most frequency of CCX occurred in Euro-periphery at full, stable, 
and EU debt crisis period, whereas the UK is relative stable because of least CCX frequency. The sovereign 
risk is indeed substantially spread out in many Europeans economies, and in particular among the euro area 
periphery (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy). During the global financial crisis, the non-Euro area 
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performs the highest CCX frequency. This circumstance could explain no countries could be escaped from 
world-wide credit crunch.  
In advanced, we test the differences on CCXs between two different areas for a given time period (see 
Panel B of Table 18). When testing for equality of the frequencies during different period, the standard 
Normality-based tests are inappropriate because, by construction, both variables follow non-Gaussian 
distributions. Therefore we employ the Wilcoxon rank-sum test which is a nonparametric alternative to the 
standard two sample t-test. There are two things needed to be noted. First of all, we find that there exists 
maximum difference and are significant occurred in euro-periphery and UK in terms of full, stable, and EU 
debt crisis period (0.334, 0.137, and 0.804). Second there is no significant difference of tail risk spillover 
between Non-Euro area (exclude UK) and UK during the global financial crisis. It demonstrated these two 
areas are all suffered extremely negative variation. Overall, the empirical evidence supports prediction 1 in 
the sense that we do find tail risk spillovers from the financial sector to real economy sectors, these spillovers 
being amplified during the period of financial crisis. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] 
[INSERT TABLE 18 HERE] 
 
4.5.3 . Baseline Regression Results 
Table 19 gives the results for our baseline regressions. Model (1) to (5) report the results of Panel 
Poisson regression as proposed in equation (3) for the full sample and subsamples on different regions. In the 
case of full sample (Model 1), as expected, the variables of vol and tlmta are positively related to CCX, 
whereas the variables of dd, ret, logmb, cashmta are negatively associated with CCX. We observe the 
coefficient of size shows a positive sign, indicating that larger firms are likely having higher level of CCX. 
Moreover, the vol is the most influential determinant to CCX because it shows the greatest degree of 
economic impact65 (33.22%) compared with other variables. The signs of these coefficients are consistent 
                                                            
65 Economic impact=[exp(std*coef)*mean(CCX)-mean(CCX)]/mean(CCX). This measures percentage change of CCX 
when the ratio of cash-to-asset moves one standard deviation. 
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across four subsamples, although their significant levels are various. By looking at economic impacts, the 
most significant variable determining CCX in Euro-core (Model 3) and Non-Euro (Model 4) is the same as 
in the case of full sample, the vol, whereas it becomes tlmta for euro-periphery region (Model 2) and size for 
the UK (Model 5). 
[INSERT TABLE 19 HERE] 
Next, we investigate whether the cash holding serves as a particular role during financial crises, in that 
it can mitigate CCX. We implement the regression as described in equation (4), and estimation results are 
reported in Table 20. Using the full sample (Model 1), we observe that the coefficient along with the variable 
                     is negatively significant. This result is consistent with our prediction 2 that 
reserving cashes can provide a buffer against shocks stemming from the distressed financial sector. During 
2007-09 crisis, the estimated coefficient along with cash is from -0.428 to -0.724 (-0.428+ -0.296) in 16 
European countries. The economic impact on this analysis is from -3.3% to -5.5%. It can be interpreted as 
one standard deviation increase in the ratio of cash holding significantly decreases 3.3% of CCX in tranquil 
times to 5.5% of CCX during 2007-2009 global financial crisis period.  
However, this effect does not systematically appear in Europe, where it only exists only for Euro-core 
countries and UK. For Euro-core countries, the estimated coefficient along with cash is from -0.278 to -0.896 
(-0.278+ -0.618), and the economic impact is from -2.2% to -6.8%. For UK, the estimated coefficient along 
with cash is from -0.446 to -1.072 (-0.446+ -0.626), and the economic impact is from -3.5% to -8.1%.  
Summing up the overall evidence is consistent with our prediction 2 in the sense that larger corporate 
cash reserves help to mitigate tail risks from distressed financial sector, and the advantage of carrying cash 
are restricted to the Euro-core and UK.  
[INSERT TABLE 20 HERE] 
 
4.5.4 . Financial constrained firms vs. unconstrained firms 
As shown in the above, cash holdings seem to be able to mitigate transmitted risks from the financial 
sector in times of crisis. We further examine whether firms’ financing conditions (financially constraint or 
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unconstraint) drive this effect. Firms are considered as unconstrained when they face favorable external 
financing conditions, i.e. they can increase their leverage whenever it is needed with low financing costs 
relative to market conditions. Thus, such firms are expected be more connected with capital markets. On the 
contrary, financially constrained firms tend to use less external finance relative to the unconstrained firms, 
and thus such firms are expected to be less exposed to uncertainties in capital markets. The overall picture of 
CCX to financially constrained firms (denoted as “C” henceforth) and unconstrained firms (denoted as “U” 
henceforth) are provided in Table 21. We find CCX is systematically greater for U than C across all 
subsamples, which is consistent with the above intuition. Furthermore, we assess how much is the CCX of U 
greater than CCX of C by taking the difference of CCX between U and C, and then divided by C for each 
subsample. We attribute the results to two points. 
1. (U-C)/C is consistently larger during crisis periods than during stable period. It indicates that CCX 
increases more rapidly to U than C in times of crisis periods. That might mean some variables drive this 
result. We consider one of explanation on this point. We presume that greater cash holdings in financially 
constrained firms have stronger role in reducing CCX in turbulent times. 
2. Our results show that UK has the largest (U-C)/C, followed by Euro-core countries. For example the 
subsample including UK firms during 2007-09 crisis presents the highest (U-C)/C of 1.13, indicating that 
CCX of U is two-fold to CCX of C. This result indicates that CCX trend is in different pattern for C and 
U, and it is especially more obvious for firms in UK and Euro-core countries and in times of crisis. 
[INSERT TABLE 21 HERE] 
The role of cash holdings should be important for C against U, because C tends to operate cashes as 
main financial strategy and choose to maintain higher cash reserves as a buffer against a possible cash flow 
shortfall in the future. On the other hand, U tends to use external funds as main financing tool, and thus the 
influence of cash holdings should be minor. Before jumping to the analysis of whether the positive effect of 
holding cash is stronger for financially constrained firms, we first look at whether financially constrained 
firms hold more cashes than financially unconstrained firms. Table 22 presents univariate comparisons of 
firms’ cash holdings for subsamples based on financial constraints.66  
                                                            
66  Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) provide evidence that firms with greater frictions in raising outside 
financing save a greater portion of their cash flow as cash than do those with fewer frictions. Financially constrained 
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As expected, for all classification criteria, the median and mean ratios of cash to total book assets are 
higher for financially constrained firms in the case of all countries. However, when separately looking at 
different regions, this rule is violated in Euro-periphery and Major Non-Euro countries, where we cannot 
observe cash holding is always greater for C across three classifications as we mark with bold face fonts. 
Therefore, it provides a clue that the cash holdings differently affecting C and U might be observe only in 
these two regions.  
[INSERT TABLE 22 HERE] 
We subsequently investigate whether the contribution of cash holdings to reduce CCX is greater for 
constrained firms. In Table 23, the interaction variable of                      is negatively 
significant only for subsamples that include C firms. The role of cash holding is more pronounced for C 
firms in times of crisis, than U firms, which is consistent with our prediction 3 that cash holdings is more 
valuable to C firms when the credit market is crunch. The economic impact is quite huge. For example, 
during 2007-09 crisis, when focusing on the measure of financial constraints based on firms’ size, the 
estimated coefficient along with cash is from -0.051 to -0.441 (-0.051+ -0.390) in the subsample including 
only financially constrained firms during the 2007-09 crisis, while it is from -0.798 to -1.099 (-0.798+ -0.301) 
in the subsample including only financially unconstrained firms. The economic impact on this analysis is 
from -0.4% to -3.7% for C, while from -5.5% to -7.3% for U. 
We also find consistent pattern for other two alternative measures of financial constraints. For instance, 
based on firms’ age, the estimated coefficient along with cash is from -0.133 to -0.548 (-0.133+-0.415) in the 
subsample with only C firms, while it is from -0.857 to -0.900 (-0.857+-0.043) in the subsample with only U 
firms. The economic impact is from -1.1% to -4.6% for the subsample with only C firms, while it is from -
5.9% to -6.1% for the subsample with only U firms. Based on payout ratio, the estimated coefficient along 
with cash is from -0.272 to -0.978 (-0.272+-0.706) in the subsample with only C firms, while it is from -
0.519 to -0.751 (-0.519+-0.232) in the subsample with only U firms. The economic impact is from -2.2% to -
7.7% for the subsample with only C firms, while it is from -3.5% to -5.1% for the subsample with only U 
firms .  
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
firms (small, non-rated, low payout firms) may also want to hold more cash (Acharya, Almeida, and Campello, 2007) 
irrespective of competition to be able to realize investment opportunities because of their restricted access to cheap 
external funding. 
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Our results show that the coefficient of                      is only negatively significant for 
constrained firms. We interpret these findings as consistent with the view that higher cash holdings of 
financially constrained firms are a risk-decreasing response to costly external financing. 
[INSERT TABLE 23 HERE] 
Our sample (Table 22) has presented that only for firms located in Euro-core countries and UK, 
constrained firms tend to reserve more cash than unconstrained firms based on the three classification of 
financial constraints. The results in Table 24 show that cash is risk-reducing, but this beneficial effect is 
restricted the regions of Euro-core and UK That is, the effect of cash holdings reducing CCX is only present 
in Euro-core and UK, but not in Euro-periphery and Non-euro (except UK). This result might give us some 
explanations why cash for financially constrained firms within Euro-periphery and Major non-Euro countries 
seems not to be as much important as those in Euro-core countries and UK. 
Regarding to economic impact on this analysis in Euro-core countries, for example, during 2007-09 
crisis, when focusing on the measure of financial constraints based on firms’ size, the estimated coefficient 
along with cash is from 0.083 to -0.894 (0.083+ -0.977) in the subsample including only financially 
constrained firms during the 2007-09 crisis, while it is from -0.653 to -1.164 (-0.653+ -0.511) in the 
subsample including only financially unconstrained firms. The economic impact on this analysis is from 
0.8% to -7.9% for C, while from -4.5% to -7.9% for U. 
We also find consistent pattern for other two alternative measures of financial constraints. For instance, 
based on firms’ age, the estimated coefficient along with cash is from -0.057 to -0.958 (-0.057+-0.901) in the 
subsample with only C firms, while it is from -0.569 to -0.876 (-0.569+-0.307) in the subsample with only U 
firms. The economic impact is from -0.5% to -8.3% for the subsample with only C firms, while it is from -
4.1% to -6.3% for the subsample with only U firms .Based on payout ratio, the estimated coefficient along 
with cash is from -0.258 to -1.457 (-0.258+-1.199) in the subsample with only C firms, while it is from -
0.309 to -0.463 (-0.309+-0.154) in the subsample with only U firms. The economic impact is from -2.2% to -
11.9% for the subsample with only C firms, while it is from -2.3% to -3.4% for the subsample with only U 
firms.  
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Regarding to economic impact on this analysis in UK, for example, during 2007-09 crisis, when 
focusing on the measure of financial constraints based on firms’ size, the estimated coefficient along with 
cash is from -0.213 to -1.328 (-0.213+ -1.115) in the subsample including only financially constrained firms 
during the 2007-09 crisis, while it is from -0.748 to -1.179 (-0.748+ -0.431) in the subsample including only 
financially unconstrained firms. The economic impact on this analysis is from 1.8% to -10.7% for C, while 
from -4.8% to -7.5% for U. 
We also find consistent pattern for other two alternative measures of financial constraints. For instance, 
based on firms’ age, the estimated coefficient along with cash is from 0.182 to -0.729 (0.182+-0.911) in the 
subsample with only C firms, while it is from -1.244 to -1.288 (-1.244+-0.044) in the subsample with only U 
firms. The economic impact is from 1.5% to -5.9% for the subsample with only C firms, while it is from -
8.0% to -8.2% for the subsample with only U firms. Based on payout ratio, the estimated coefficient along 
with cash is from 0.048 to -0.818 (0.048+-0.886) in the subsample with only C firms, while it is from -1.142 
to -1.478 (-1.142+-0.336) in the subsample with only U firms. The economic impact is from 0.4% to -6.3% 
for the subsample with only C firms, while it is from -6.5% to -8.3% for the subsample with only U firms.  
Overall, across each model specification, we find that financially constrained firms (smaller firms, 
younger firms, and firms with lower payout ratios) are more likely to reduce the number of CCX because 
they hold more cashes in times of crisis, and these results are only present in Euro-core countries and UK. 
These results support our prediction 3 and suggest that financial condition proximity is also an important 
determinant of the number of conditional coexceedance between a firm and the financial sector. 
[INSERT TABLE 24 HERE] 
 
4.6. Robustness Tests 
We consider a battery of robustness checks. First, we use global financial crisis and European debt 
crisis as crisis dummy to re-examine whether cash holdings is able to reduce CCX for constrained firms than 
for unconstrained firms, especially in times of crisis. Second, we apply this new crisis dummy to test the 
relation between CCX and cash holding in different region. Third, in order to avoid endogeneity problem, we 
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measure financial constraints at the second quarter of 2006 to re-examine the relation between CCX and 
cashing holding. Fourth, we use new identification of financial constraint to test CCX and cash holding in 
different regions.  
 
4.6.1.  New crisis dummy: Financial constraint, Cash holding, CCX, and Different Regions 
As a robustness test we adopt global financial crisis and European debt crisis as our crisis dummy. We 
re-examine the relationship between CCX and firms’ cash holding in different criteria of financial constraint. 
Generally speaking, our main analysis remains the same (see Table 25). Next step, we re-test the cases based 
on different regions to see whether cashing holding could reduce CCX in accordance with criteria of 
financial constraint (see Table 26). The results here are similar as main analysis. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 25 HERE] 
[INSERT TABLE 26 HERE] 
 
4.6.2.  Endogeneity Concern: Financial constraint, Cash holding, and CCX 
For our main analysis, we identify financial constrained firms every quarter and update every quarter 
(except for payout ratio, which is annual level measure). One would concern that there is an endogenous 
problem when re-identifying financially constrained firms during crisis period. In order to avoid this concern, 
we consider the other identification strategies by taking into account information one year before the onset of 
the mid-2007 subprime crisis. 
We classify a firm as financially constrained firm based on the information on the end of second quarter 
of 2006. Then, we measure financial constraints at the second quarter of 2006, to avoid endogeneity concerns. 
We only consider firms with available data of size, age, or payout ratio at the end of June 2006. With this 
information, we identify constrained firms with value of size (age or payout ratio) lower than the median of 
size distribution at this time point. Because of doing this identification strategy, the full sample number of 
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observations reduces to 87253 from 108139. Our results (see Table 27) do not change materially performing 
higher cash holdings of financially constrained firms are a risk-decreasing response to costly external 
financing.  
[INSERT TABLE 27 HERE] 
 
4.6.3 . Endogeneity Concern in different regions: Financial constraint, Cash holding, and CCX 
Furthermore, we employ this new identification strategy of financial constraint in different regions. The 
results (see Table 28) still reveal financially constrained firms (smaller firms, younger firms, and firms with 
lower payout ratios) are more likely to reduce the number of CCX because they hold more cashes in times of 
crisis, and these results are only present in Euro-core countries and UK. 
[INSERT TABLE 28 HERE] 
4.7. Conclusion 
It is generally accepted that the financial sector is more fragile than other sectors. Banks are more 
fragile than nonfinancial firms because of the inherent maturity mismatch on their balance sheet, which 
makes them vulnerable to bank runs. The banking sector interacts with the real economy, resulting in an 
additional mechanism that can amplify and propagate shocks hitting the financial sector. 
In this paper, we find evidence that tail risk spillovers of financial sectors is mostly driven by episodes 
of negative firms’ cash holding, past return, valuation, and distance to default, and is positive with firms’ size, 
volatility, and leverage. Moreover, we compare the severity of CCX in different regions and results show 
tail risk spillover is stronger for Euro-periphery countries and less influence for UK. Besides, we aim to 
examine whether reserving cash is still valuable for financially constrained firms in that it enables firms to 
mitigate tail risks transmitted from the financial sector. Our empirical result has offered some evidence that 
cash provides important benefits to financially constrained firms in Euro-core countries and UK by reducing 
the tail risk spillover from distress financial sector in times of credit crunch. Overall, we establish the 
connection between firms’ liquidity management (e.g., cash holdings), firms’ financing conditions (e.g., 
financial constraints) and tail risks propagated from distressed financial sectors. 
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This paper is also somewhat related to the contagion literature. In times of financial crisis, investors and 
policy makers have a very strong interest in whether and how the crisis propagates to non-financial firms; 
this is known as contagion effects. In this paper, we investigate the interaction effects in the developed 
European markets. Our analysis provides valuable information about the typical market conditions and 
dynamics. Furthermore our results add to the growing body of literature supporting the financial sector risk’s 
role as a leading indicator of real economy overall risk and specially tail risk. Our results may also help 
financial regulators trying to evaluate the true overall economic cost of financial crises. 
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Appendix 
 
A.1 Explanation of variables 
Variable  Definition  
Volatility Annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns. 
Distance to Default Standard deviation of a firm's value away from its default point, computed based on Merton model 
Growth Opportunity Logarithm of market equity scaled by book equity  
Return Sum of daily returns over a quarter. 
Cash Holding Cash and equivalents scaled by firm market equity plus total liability 
Firm Size Logarithm of book value of total assets in U.S. dollar 
Leverage Total liability scaled by firm market equity plus total liability 
 
 
 
A.2 The correlation among three criteria of financial constraint 
 
size age Payout ratio 
size 1.00  0.33  0.22  
age 0.33  1.00  0.15  
Payout ratio 0.22  0.15  1.00  
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CHAPTER 5 
Final Remarks 
    In this dissertation, we investigate the connection between industry structural constraints and firms’ failure 
prediction based on two dimensions: (1) the intensity of industry concentration, and (2) the degree of 
dependence on customers and suppliers. The key results are: (i) failure and bankruptcy probabilities increase 
when the degree of competition in a given industry decreases., (ii) the probability of bankruptcy is higher for 
firms in industries with relatively stronger customer dependency but this factor does not affect failure 
probabilities. 
    Also, we propose a new approach to measure tail risk spillovers from one economic sector to other sectors: 
the CCX. We apply this approach to the financial sector and real economy industries in the United States 
from 2001 to 2011. We find large volatility and tail risk spillovers from the financial sector to many real 
economy sectors during this period. These spillovers are even stronger during the 2007–2009 financial crisis. 
In addition, we find evidence suggesting that the higher the degree of competition, the stronger these tail risk 
spillovers. Three industry characteristics help explain the size of tail spillovers. The net debt financing has a 
positive effect on the size, whereas valuation and investment have a negative impact. 
    Finally, we find evidence that tail risk spillovers of financial sectors is mostly driven by episodes of 
negative firms’ cash holding, past return, valuation, and distance to default, and is positive with firms’ size, 
volatility, and leverage. Moreover, we compare the severity of CCX in different regions and results show tail 
risk spillover is stronger for Euro-periphery countries and less influence for UK. Besides, we aim to examine 
whether reserving cash is still valuable for financially constrained firms in that it enables firms to mitigate 
tail risks transmitted from the financial sector. The empirical result has offered some evidence that cash 
provides important benefits to financially constrained firms in Euro-core countries and UK by reducing the 
tail risk spillover from distress financial sector in times of credit crunch. Overall, we establish the connection 
between firms’ liquidity management (e.g., cash holdings), firms’ financing conditions (e.g., financial 
constraints) and tail risks prorogated from distressed financial sectors. 
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Figure 1. Bankruptcy and Failure by Year. Bankruptcy (Failure) must satisfy two conditions:  
(1) Firms have been listed in the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ exchange during 1998–2008 and (2) their reported 
delisting code in CRSP is 400, 572, or 574 (400 or 550–585). There are 247 bankruptcies and 2496 failures in the 
sample. 
 
 
Figure 2. Bankruptcy and Failure by Exchange. Bankruptcy (Failure) must satisfy two conditions: (1) Firms have 
been listed in the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ exchange during 1998–2008 and (2) their reported delisting code in 
CRSP is 400, 572, or 574 (400 or 550–585).  The 247 bankruptcies (black bars) and the 2496 failures (gray bars) in the 
sample are separated by exchange in this table, along with the percentages of the total number of bankruptcies (failures). 
 
 
Bankruptcy and Failure as Percentage of Active 
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% of failures % of bankruptcies
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Panel A: Euro-periphery countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain) 
 
 
Panel B: Euro-core countries (Austria, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Finland, Belgium) 
  
Panel C: Major non-euro zone countries (Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland) and UK 
Figure 3. CCX measures of countries. This figure plots CCX measure of 16 European countries during 2003-2011, by 
different regions. The Panel A, B, and C stand for Euro-periphery countries, Euro-core countries, and Major non-euro zone 
countries and UK. 
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Table 1. Bankruptcy and Failure by IOCode. Bankruptcy (Failure) must satisfy three conditions: (1) Firms have been 
listed in the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ exchange during 1998 to 2009; (2) their reported delisting code in CRSP is 
400 or 550–585 (400 or 550–585); and (3) this NAICS code mirrors an IOCode in the conversion table. The 247 
bankruptcies and 2496 failures are listed by IOCode. The industry classification system of Input-Output Sector table 
identifies fourteen industries after 1998.  
IOCode Industry Bankruptcy Failure 
11 Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting 0 6 
21 Mining 9 106 
22 Utilities 5 17 
23 Construction 6 46 
31G Manufacturing  96 965 
42 Wholesale trade 8 107 
44RT Retail trade 24 110 
48TW Transportation and warehousing  8 54 
51 Information 33 408 
FIRE Finance, insurance, real estate, rental, and leasing 31 311 
PROF Professional and business services 12 209 
6 Educational services, health care, and social assistance 7 60 
7 Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation, and food services 8 84 
81 Other services, except government 0 13 
  Total 247 2496 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics. This table offers summary statistics of the independent variables for the sample period 
1998–2009. The databases are COMPUSTAT and CRSP. There are 12031 firms and 72945 observations in the yearly 
sample. The variable definitions are: (1) EXRET = the sum of monthly excess return over the value-weighted 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ return for past 12 months; (2) RSIZ = relative size, measured as the log of the firm’s market 
capitalization divided by total NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ market capitalization; (3) SIGMA =the annualized standard 
deviation of residuals from the regression of each stock’s monthly returns on the monthly value-weighted 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ index return over past twelve months; (4) NI/TA = net income/total assets; (5) TL/TA = total 
liabilities/total assets; (6) CASH/TA = ratio of a company’s cash and short-term assets to its total assets; (7) HHI = 
Herfindahl index on sales; (8) Ci,C = direct customer constraint; (9) Ci,S = direct supplier constraint; (10) ICi,C=indirect 
customer constraint; (11) ICi,S = indirect supplier constraint. Panels B and C provide summary statistics on bankruptcy 
and failure observations respectively. 
Variable EXRET RSIZ SIGMA NI/TA TL/TA CASH/TA HHI Ci,C Ci,S ICi,C ICi,C 
Panel A: All firm-year observations over 1998–2009 (72945 observations) 
MEDIAN 0,016 -11,179 0,379 0,017 0,536 0,081 0,187 0,017 0,025 0,017 0,022 
MEAN 0,050 -11,101 0,474 -0,047 0,539 0,182 0,282 0,018 0,025 0,018 0,023 
MIN -1,391 -15,235 0,090 -1,309 0,034 0,000 0,026 0,011 0,008 0,015 0,021 
MAX 1,874 -5,92 1,789 0,277 1,216 0,887 1,000 0,042 0,034 0,021 0,026 
STD 0,563 2,054 0,333 0,251 0,273 0,223 0,262 0,004 0,006 0,001 0,001 
Panel B: Bankrupt firm-year observations over 1998–2009 (247 observations) 
MEDIAN -0,674 -12,862 0,724 -0,093 0,774 0,049 0,264 0,019 0,025 0,018 0,023 
MEAN -0,581 -12,669 0,805 -0,227 0,756 0,122 0,383 0,019 0,025 0,018 0,023 
STD 0,663 1,717 0,385 0,350 0,271 0,187 0,307 0,006 0,006 0,001 0,001 
Panel C: Failure firm-year observations over 1998–2009 (2496 observations) 
MEDIAN -0,484 -13,838 0,750 -0,156 0,659 0,075 0,231 0,018 0,025 0,018 0,023 
MEAN -0,403 -13,590 0,830 -0,338 0,643 0,180 0,342 0,018 0,025 0,018 0,023 
STD 0,774 1,441 0,421 0,432 0,301 0,230 0,290 0,005 0,006 0,001 0,001 
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Table 3. Correlation matrix  
Independent Variables EXERT RSIZ SIGMA NI/TA TL/TA CASH/TA HHI Ci,C Ci,S ICi,C ICi,S 
EXERT 1,000 0,163 0,279 0,039 -0,033 0,056 -0,005 0,025 -0,017 0,083 0,048 
RSIZ 
 
1,000 -0,354 0,303 0,069 -0,097 -0,053 0,014 0,005 0,013 -0,070 
SIGMA 
  
1,000 -0,448 -0,146 0,263 0,035 0,038 -0,061 0,086 0,196 
NI/TA 
   
1,000 0,002 -0,321 0,060 0,020 0,027 -0,076 -0,072 
TL/TA 
    
1,000 -0,470 -0,084 0,038 0,221 0,003 -0,075 
CASH/TA 
     
1,000 -0,098 -0,044 -0,087 0,015 0,003 
HHI 
      
1,000 -0,013 -0,202 0,010 0,073 
Ci,C 
       
1,000 0,455 -0,003 0,093 
Ci,S 
        
1,000 0,024 -0,098 
ICi,C 
         
1,000 0,677 
ICi,S 
          
1,000 
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Table 4. Logit Regressions of Bankruptcy Indicators on Predictor Variables. The table reports results from logit 
regressions of bankruptcies on predictors. The estimates include firms traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ with 
yearly observations from 1998 to 2009. Model 1 is the benchmark model including EXRET, RSIZ, SIGMA, NI/TA, 
TL/TA CASH/TA. Model 2 additionally includes the internal industry constraint (HHI). Model 3 expands Model 2 by 
including the direct external industry constrains (Ci,c and Ci,S). The indirect external industry constraints are added into 
Model 4. Parameter estimates are given first followed by chi-square values in brackets.*Significant at 10%, 
**Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. The -2LOG(LF) and McFadden-R2 is also reported in Panel A. In Panel B, 
the CHI-SQUARE is the difference of -2LOG(LF) in Model 1 and other Models, and its corresponding P-VALUE.   
Panel A: Estimation using 1998–2009 data       
    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 
 
-9,6531***(363,56) -9,8942***(380,04) -10,3457***(312,31) -11,2965***(68,85) 
EXRET 
 
-1,6835***(232,11) -1,6773***(230,76) -1,6923***(234,18) -1,7218***(238,69) 
RSIZ 
 
-0,0665*(2,73) -0,0553(1,9) -0,0557(1,93) -0,0675*(2,81) 
SIGMA 
 
 2,3540***(178,52) 2,2976***(165,43) 2,2706***(158,95)  2,2260***(148,76) 
NI/TA 
 
0,29(1,93) 0,2413(1,34) 0,2468(1,38) 0,2648(1,57) 
TL/TA 
 
2,4485***(95,19) 2,5138***(99,79)  2,6003***(103,2) 2,5339***(96,41) 
CASH/TA    -1,0164**(5,83)  -0,7798*(3,42) -0,6758(2,57)  -0,7203*(2,87) 
Internal industry constraint       
HHI      1,0093***(22,85)  0,9812***(20,33) 0,9978***(21,17) 
Direct external constraint         
Ci,C       53,8940***(20,96) 65,3657***(26,11) 
Ci,S       -23,7828**(3,99) -32,6557***(6,83) 
Indirect external constraint       
ICi,C           215,3000***(9,85) 
ICi,S 
    
-127,6*(2,85) 
# of observations 72945 72945 72945 72945 
# of bankruptcies or failures 247 247 247 247 
-2LOG(LF) 
 
2620,05 2598,93 2581,47 2571,25 
Pseudo-R2   0,2068 0,2132 0,2185 0,2216 
Panel B: Are industry constraint variables significant?       
CHI-SQUARE     21,12 38,58 48,80 
P-VALUE     0 0 0 
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Table 5. Logit Regressions of Failure Indicators on Predictor Variables. The table reports results from logit 
regressions of failures on predictors. The estimates include firms traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ with 
yearly observations from 1998 to 2009. Model 1 is the benchmark model including the controls EXRET, RSIZ, SIGMA, 
NI/TA, TL/TA CASH/TA. Model 2 additionally includes the internal industry constraint (H). Model 3 expands Model 2 
by including direct external industry constrains (Ci,C and Ci,S). The indirect external industry constraints are added into 
Model 4. Parameter estimates are given first followed by chi-square values in brackets.*Significant at 10%, 
**Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. The -2LOG(LF) and McFadden-R2 is also reported in Panel A. In Panel B, 
the CHI-SQUARE is the difference of -2LOG(LF) in Model 1 and other Models, and its corresponding P-VALUE. 
Panel A: Estimation using 1998–2009 data     
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant -13,1574***(3024,11) -13,2543***(3071,41) -13,3622***(2594,09)  -15,9314***(926,49) 
EXRET -1,0760***(873,92)  -1,0771***(872,93) -1,0768***(872,49) -1,0674***(851,13) 
RSIZ -0,6156***(1246,89)  -0,6049***(1204,76) -0,6049***(1204,89) -0,6010***(1186,29) 
SIGMA  1,7701***(757,35) 1,7496***(731,91) 1,7476***(727,33)  1,7040***(678,27) 
NI/TA  -0,7415***(121,08) -0,7703***(129,77)  -0,7741***(130,49) -0,7680***(127,53) 
TL/TA 1,4822***(291,63) 1,5325***(308,77)  1,5246***(299,59) 1,5727***(314,34) 
CASH/TA  -0,4393***(5,83)  -0,3185**(6,62) -0,3162**(6,5)  -0,2517**(4,0893) 
Internal industry constraint       
HHI 
 
 0,6146***(56,74)  0,6234***(56,84) 0,6187***(55,89) 
Direct external constraint       
Ci,C 
  
3,3028(0,34) -3,1863(0,30) 
Ci,S 
  
1,9816(0,22) 8,7005**(3,88) 
Indirect external constraint       
ICi,C 
   
-51,5095**(3,99) 
ICi,S 
   
151,3000***(31,38) 
# of observations 72945 72945 72945 72945 
# of bankruptcies or failures 2496 2496 2496 2496 
-2LOG(LF) 14779,7 14725 14724 14685,8 
Pseudo-R2 0,3206 0,3231 0,3232 0,3249 
Panel B: Are industry constraint variables significant?     
CHI-SQUARE 
 
54,7 55,7 93,9 
P-VALUE   0 0 0 
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Table 6. Additional Test on Concentration Ratios. The table reports estimated coefficients on alternative 
concentration measures from logit regressions of bankruptcies or failures on EXRET, RSIZ, SIGMA, NI/TA, TL/TA 
CASH/TA, and alternative measures of concentration. HHI is Herfindahl index computed by sales data in 
COMPUSTAT. CR4 is the four-firm concentration ratio collected from the census published in BEA. Dummy(0,4), 
Dummy(0,5), and Dummy(Medium) are a dummy variables that equal to 0 if HHI (In panel A) or CR4 (In panel B) is 
below 0,4, 0,5, and its medium respectively; otherwise is equal to 1. Parameter estimates are given followed by chi-
square values in brackets.*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%.  
Dependent variable:  Bankruptcy   Failure 
Sample Period: 1990–2009 1998–2009   1990–2009 1998–2009 
Panel A: COMPUSATAT concentration ratio 
        
HHI 0,8093*** (22,1441) 0,9955*** (22,3663) 
 
0,4717*** (55,8949) 0,5854*** (52,2973) 
Dummy(0,4) 0,4957*** (20,8203) 0,5855*** (18,5000) 
 
0,2503*** (41,2667) 0,3112*** (37,2694) 
Dummy(0,5) 0,4829*** (17,5751) 0,5777*** (16,2795) 
 
0,2427*** (33,0697) 0,3324*** (36,9556) 
Dummy(Medium) 0,4101*** (13,9709) 0,5549*** (16,1586) 
 
0,2146*** (33,8131) 0,2380*** (25,8882) 
# of observations 123304 73558 
 
123304 73558 
# of bankruptcy or failure 385 251 
 
4104 2581 
Panel B: Census concentration ratio                   
CR4 1,2644*** (13,8302) 0,7851** (4,0550) 
 
0,2022* (2,7845) 0,2315 (2,5378) 
Dummy(0,4) 0,5349*** (17,9102) 0,4302*** (9,1160) 
 
0,1151*** (6,6848) 0,1443*** (7,6156) 
Dummy(0,5) 0,3836** (6,3696) 0,3522** (4,5897) 
 
0,0711 (1,5629) 0,0807 (1,5651) 
Dummy(Medium) 0,5898*** (20,4328) 0,3740*** (6,3129) 
 
0,0613 (2,1312) 0,0743 (2,1210) 
# of observations 98703 65539 
 
98703 65539 
# of bankruptcy or failure 273 215   3109 2163 
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Table 7  
Descriptive statistics of industry-level returns over the full sample period. 
Industry Name Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera p-Value # of firmsa 
Crop Production 0.001 0.001 0.188 -0.155 0.021 0.246 11.286 7942.86 0 9.96  
Animal Production and Aquaculture 0 0.001 0.129 -0.149 0.021 -0.452 11.014 7497.95 0 2.59  
Forestry and Logging 0.001 0 0.241 -0.146 0.021 0.96 17.413 24375.91 0 2.60  
Oil and Gas Extraction 0.001 0.002 0.206 -0.166 0.022 -0.174 12.055 9466.69 0 138.83  
Mining (except Oil and Gas) 0.001 0.002 0.209 -0.135 0.023 0.117 9.867 5442.66 0 95.45  
Support Activities for Mining 0.001 0.001 0.23 -0.176 0.025 -0.209 9.041 4227.18 0 35.93  
Utilities 0.001 0.001 0.147 -0.086 0.013 0.454 16.244 20316.47 0 131.36  
Construction of Buildings 0.001 0 0.16 -0.126 0.026 0.196 5.595 794.36 0 25.41  
Heavy and Civil Engineering Construction 0.001 0.001 0.139 -0.176 0.023 -0.242 7.916 2813.71 0 25.02  
Specialty Trade Contractors 0.001 0.002 0.19 -0.142 0.024 -0.046 10.163 5916.09 0 11.99  
Food Manufacturing 0 0.001 0.093 -0.069 0.01 0.141 11.607 8549.41 0 74.57  
Beverage and Tobacco Product Manufacturing 0.001 0.001 0.112 -0.084 0.011 -0.14 10.695 6835.27 0 40.76  
Textile Mills 0.001 0.001 0.178 -0.13 0.021 0.174 8.811 3907.22 0 8.48  
Textile Product Mills 0.001 0 0.285 -0.126 0.024 0.838 13.183 12277.96 0 4.09  
Apparel Manufacturing 0.001 0.001 0.122 -0.093 0.017 0.078 7.028 1873.62 0 42.63  
Leather and Allied Product Manufacturing 0.001 0.001 0.13 -0.118 0.017 0.134 8.439 3418.76 0 20.45  
Wood Product Manufacturing 0.001 0.001 0.126 -0.154 0.021 -0.082 7.609 2451.83 0 18.53  
Paper Manufacturing 0 0.001 0.087 -0.097 0.014 -0.119 7.835 2701.93 0 39.85  
Printing and Related Support Activities 0.001 0.001 0.142 -0.113 0.019 0.156 10.64 6741.57 0 19.40  
Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing 0.001 0.001 0.177 -0.136 0.017 0.168 14.5 15259.19 0 36.56  
Chemical Manufacturing 0 0.001 0.109 -0.067 0.012 0.055 9.63 5069.22 0 474.89  
Plastics and Rubber Products Manufacturing 0.001 0.001 0.101 -0.109 0.017 -0.058 6.889 1745.08 0 36.63  
Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing 0.001 0.001 0.145 -0.119 0.022 0.172 8.508 3510.92 0 21.19  
Primary Metal Manufacturing 0.001 0.001 0.247 -0.179 0.026 0.055 11.86 9051.77 0 56.57  
Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing 0.001 0.001 0.104 -0.097 0.016 -0.019 7.582 2420.51 0 58.73  
Machinery Manufacturing 0.001 0.001 0.138 -0.117 0.019 0.03 7.525 2361.32 0 169.01  
Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing 0.001 0.001 0.171 -0.086 0.02 0.502 8.351 3416.61 0 627.70  
Electrical Equipment, Appliance, and Component Manufacturing 0.001 0.001 0.138 -0.124 0.018 0.039 8.485 3468.93 0 82.71  
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 0.001 0.001 0.125 -0.115 0.016 -0.117 8.858 3963.19 0 107.14  
Furniture and Related Product Manufacturing 0.001 0.001 0.12 -0.112 0.019 0.132 7.91 2787.63 0 24.58  
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 0.001 0.001 0.119 -0.072 0.012 -0.054 10.297 6139.63 0 135.39  
Merchant Wholesalers, Durable Goods 0.001 0.001 0.086 -0.088 0.015 -0.021 6.516 1425.62 0 88.63  
Merchant Wholesalers, Nondurable Goods 0.001 0.001 0.123 -0.085 0.013 -0.046 10.934 7258.44 0 53.74  
Wholesale Electronic Markets and Agents and Brokers 0.001 0 0.176 -0.268 0.023 -0.459 20.265 34461.76 0 2.26  
Motor Vehicle and Parts Dealers 0.001 0.001 0.116 -0.097 0.017 0.458 7.968 2941.8 0 19.26  
Furniture and Home Furnishings Stores 0.001 0 0.209 -0.115 0.022 0.753 9.057 4491.15 0 7.72  
Electronics and Appliance Stores 0.001 0.001 0.167 -0.171 0.023 0.171 8.406 3382.49 0 10.18  
Building Material and Garden Equipment and Supplies Dealers 0 0 0.15 -0.108 0.02 0.476 7.902 2874.39 0 5.03  
Food and Beverage Stores 0 0 0.08 -0.089 0.015 -0.354 6.518 1484.35 0 21.20  
Health and Personal Care Stores 0 0 0.133 -0.092 0.015 -0.05 9.232 4478.15 0 14.15  
Gasoline Stations 0.001 0.001 0.188 -0.163 0.021 0.348 9.669 5182.87 0 4.33  
Clothing and Clothing Accessories Stores 0.001 0.001 0.133 -0.121 0.019 0.183 6.95 1814.42 0 54.32  
Sporting Goods, Hobby, Musical Instrument, and Book Stores 0.001 0.001 0.124 -0.101 0.02 0.322 6.593 1536.61 0 17.31  
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General Merchandise Stores 0 0 0.118 -0.083 0.014 0.371 7.766 2682.41 0 25.15  
Miscellaneous Store Retailers 0.001 0 0.166 -0.12 0.021 0.537 8.688 3862.57 0 13.11  
Nonstore Retailers 0.002 0.001 0.195 -0.114 0.023 0.766 10.045 5992.94 0 33.25  
Air Transportation 0.001 0 0.162 -0.311 0.025 -0.322 13.839 13591.9 0 28.28  
Rail Transportation 0.001 0.001 0.111 -0.107 0.018 -0.043 6.381 1318.74 0 12.97  
Water Transportation 0.001 0.001 0.15 -0.25 0.021 -0.638 15.011 16819.24 0 37.40  
Truck Transportation 0.001 0 0.105 -0.116 0.02 0.108 5.561 761.31 0 24.79  
Pipeline Transportation 0.001 0.001 0.212 -0.1 0.015 0.374 22.74 44990.19 0 21.81  
Support Activities for Transportation 0.001 0.001 0.102 -0.101 0.018 0.04 6.229 1202.96 0 13.80  
Couriers and Messengers 0 0 0.079 -0.097 0.016 0.07 7.083 1924.53 0 8.35  
Warehousing and Storage 0.001 0.001 0.131 -0.108 0.014 0.26 14.762 15982.18 0 3.08  
Publishing Industries (except Internet) 0.001 0 0.152 -0.085 0.018 0.535 9.678 5273.83 0 273.65  
Motion Picture and Sound Recording Industries 0.001 0 0.108 -0.092 0.017 0.214 7.172 2028.13 0 18.94  
Broadcasting (except Internet) 0 0 0.154 -0.12 0.019 0.271 10.356 6271.68 0 63.26  
Telecommunications 0.001 0.001 0.142 -0.086 0.015 0.443 11.054 7570.13 0 156.64  
Data Processing, Hosting, and Related Services 0.001 0.001 0.114 -0.098 0.014 0.139 8.429 3406.36 0 44.25  
Other Information Services 0.001 0.001 0.162 -0.118 0.022 0.373 6.943 1856.62 0 53.81  
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 0.001 0.001 0.103 -0.072 0.015 0.277 7.802 2693.74 0 248.67  
Administrative and Support Services 0.001 0.001 0.095 -0.094 0.016 0.04 7.042 1884.53 0 85.91  
Waste Management and Remediation Services 0.001 0.001 0.151 -0.096 0.015 0.149 10.265 6094.81 0 19.46  
Educational Services 0.001 0.001 0.104 -0.13 0.018 -0.167 7.331 2175.22 0 22.45  
Ambulatory Health Care Services 0.001 0.002 0.125 -0.148 0.017 -0.755 11.155 7929.94 0 32.16  
Hospitals 0.001 0.001 0.231 -0.251 0.028 0.064 13.016 11569.13 0 5.48  
Nursing and Residential Care Facilities 0.001 0.001 0.42 -0.235 0.028 1.906 49.086 246548.2 0 7.36  
Performing Arts, Spectator Sports, and Related Industries 0 0 0.132 -0.113 0.018 -0.017 9.035 4198.78 0 7.43  
Amusement, Gambling, and Recreation Industries 0.001 0.001 0.146 -0.132 0.02 0.237 9.939 5577.67 0 21.81  
Accommodation 0.001 0.001 0.234 -0.199 0.026 0.322 11.849 9074.63 0 29.55  
Food Services and Drinking Places 0.001 0.001 0.093 -0.082 0.013 0.049 6.182 1168.22 0 67.25  
Repair and Maintenance 0.001 0 0.096 -0.117 0.021 0.148 5.06 499.36 0 2.91  
Personal and Laundry Services 0.001 0.001 0.168 -0.104 0.016 0.356 10.866 7192.03 0 14.85  
Finance 0.001 0.001 0.149 -0.13 0.019 0.482 13.813 13588.04 0 1796.00  
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics of the daily returns for each industry during the full sample period of 2001–2011, totaling 2767 daily observations for each industry.  
a The average number of firms that are contained in each industry.
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Table 8  
Descriptive statistics of industry-level returns during crisis period. 
Industry Name Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera p-Value # of firmsa 
Crop Production 0.001 0.002 0.188 -0.155 0.037 0.293 6.821 274.612 0 7.58  
Animal Production and Aquaculture 0 0 0.093 -0.149 0.023 -1.152 12.127 1628.216 0 2.71  
Forestry and Logging 0 0 0.241 -0.146 0.040 0.988 8.414 610.327 0 2.00  
Oil and Gas Extraction 0 0.003 0.206 -0.166 0.037 -0.023 7.880 437.618 0 157.99  
Mining (except Oil and Gas) 0.001 0.002 0.209 -0.135 0.038 0.274 6.496 230.041 0 111.47  
Support Activities for Mining -0.001 0.001 0.230 -0.176 0.038 -0.153 8.547 567.016 0 37.89  
Utilities 0 0.001 0.147 -0.086 0.021 0.939 11.791 1484.998 0 126.24  
Construction of Buildings 0 -0.001 0.160 -0.126 0.040 0.264 3.955 21.888 0 25.83  
Heavy and Civil Engineering Construction -0.001 0 0.139 -0.176 0.036 -0.296 6.278 203.842 0 26.76  
Specialty Trade Contractors 0 0 0.190 -0.142 0.039 0.146 6.581 237.244 0 13.74  
Food Manufacturing 0 0 0.093 -0.069 0.016 0.532 8.970 675.805 0 70.46  
Beverage and Tobacco Product Manufacturing 0 0 0.112 -0.078 0.015 0.403 12.55 1687.734 0 38.24  
Textile Mills -0.002 -0.001 0.105 -0.130 0.027 -0.140 5.739 139.329 0 6.07  
Textile Product Mills -0.002 -0.004 0.163 -0.126 0.034 0.434 5.655 143.380 0 4.00  
Apparel Manufacturing -0.001 -0.002 0.122 -0.093 0.027 0.188 4.729 57.546 0 38.68  
Leather and Allied Product Manufacturing -0.001 -0.001 0.130 -0.118 0.028 0.340 5.340 109.078 0 17.08  
Wood Product Manufacturing -0.001 0.001 0.126 -0.154 0.033 -0.074 5.289 96.669 0 17.01  
Paper Manufacturing -0.001 0 0.087 -0.097 0.020 -0.029 6.373 209.157 0 34.42  
Printing and Related Support Activities -0.002 -0.001 0.142 -0.113 0.031 0.384 6.015 177.797 0 14.49  
Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing 0 0.002 0.177 -0.136 0.028 0.397 9.774 854.685 0 34.98  
Chemical Manufacturing 0 0.001 0.109 -0.067 0.017 0.319 9.306 738.218 0 494.76  
Plastics and Rubber Products Manufacturing -0.001 -0.002 0.086 -0.109 0.027 -0.048 4.361 34.198 0 26.22  
Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing -0.001 -0.001 0.145 -0.119 0.034 0.327 5.667 138.526 0 19.01  
Primary Metal Manufacturing -0.001 0 0.247 -0.179 0.045 0.201 7.032 301.744 0 48.76  
Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing -0.001 0 0.104 -0.097 0.025 0.007 4.853 63.108 0 51.85  
Machinery Manufacturing -0.001 0.001 0.138 -0.117 0.029 -0.030 6.178 185.699 0 149.11  
Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing 0 0.001 0.118 -0.086 0.023 0.268 5.860 155.607 0 598.00  
Electrical Equipment, Appliance, and Component Manufacturing -0.001 0 0.138 -0.124 0.028 0.107 6.403 213.63 0 79.67  
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing -0.001 0 0.125 -0.093 0.025 0.227 6.469 224.951 0 101.92  
Furniture and Related Product Manufacturing -0.001 -0.001 0.120 -0.112 0.031 0.290 4.759 63.039 0 20.45  
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 0 0 0.119 -0.072 0.018 0.136 9.425 759.924 0 125.51  
Merchant Wholesalers, Durable Goods 0 0.001 0.086 -0.088 0.023 -0.110 4.885 66.179 0 79.39  
Merchant Wholesalers, Nondurable Goods -0.001 0 0.123 -0.078 0.020 0.300 9.148 701.022 0 51.40  
Wholesale Electronic Markets and Agents and Brokers 0 -0.001 0.128 -0.106 0.024 0.151 6.666 248.579 0 2.00  
Motor Vehicle and Parts Dealers 0 -0.002 0.116 -0.084 0.027 0.514 4.863 83.194 0 17.66  
Furniture and Home Furnishings Stores 0 -0.002 0.140 -0.103 0.031 0.620 4.905 94.893 0 7.55  
Electronics and Appliance Stores 0 0 0.149 -0.098 0.030 0.541 6.040 191.355 0 8.14  
Building Material and Garden Equipment and Supplies Dealers -0.001 -0.003 0.150 -0.084 0.029 0.717 5.209 127.394 0 4.47  
Food and Beverage Stores -0.001 -0.001 0.080 -0.085 0.021 -0.021 4.614 47.902 0 15.05  
Health and Personal Care Stores 0 -0.001 0.133 -0.092 0.021 0.424 9.217 723.419 0 13.08  
Gasoline Stations 0 0.001 0.188 -0.140 0.029 0.675 9.686 854.968 0 5.42  
Clothing and Clothing Accessories Stores 0 -0.002 0.117 -0.099 0.029 0.228 4.300 34.881 0 53.05  
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Sporting Goods, Hobby, Musical Instrument, and Book Stores -0.001 -0.003 0.112 -0.101 0.032 0.386 4.199 37.356 0 16.16  
General Merchandise Stores 0 -0.001 0.117 -0.083 0.021 0.425 6.230 204.948 0 20.03  
Miscellaneous Store Retailers -0.001 -0.003 0.139 -0.120 0.031 0.567 5.680 155.645 0 12.26  
Nonstore Retailers 0 -0.002 0.126 -0.114 0.031 0.478 5.562 137.404 0 31.30  
Air Transportation 0 -0.001 0.162 -0.116 0.039 0.428 4.446 51.870 0 28.27  
Rail Transportation 0 0.001 0.094 -0.107 0.027 -0.124 4.426 38.506 0 10.04  
Water Transportation -0.001 -0.001 0.150 -0.113 0.032 0.104 5.441 110.309 0 46.86  
Truck Transportation 0 -0.002 0.105 -0.116 0.029 0.118 4.270 30.656 0 21.45  
Pipeline Transportation 0 0 0.212 -0.100 0.023 1.313 21.13 6166.848 0 26.41  
Support Activities for Transportation 0 0 0.102 -0.101 0.027 0.097 4.752 57.076 0 15.20  
Couriers and Messengers -0.001 -0.002 0.079 -0.097 0.024 0.108 5.122 83.641 0 7.54  
Warehousing and Storage 0 0 0.131 -0.108 0.024 0.224 9.135 695.178 0 2.83  
Publishing Industries (except Internet) 0 -0.001 0.152 -0.085 0.024 0.627 8.071 501.349 0 211.78  
Motion Picture and Sound Recording Industries -0.001 -0.002 0.108 -0.09 0.024 0.299 5.544 125.494 0 16.42  
Broadcasting (except Internet) -0.001 -0.001 0.154 -0.111 0.027 0.584 8.941 673.678 0 62.17  
Telecommunications 0 0 0.142 -0.086 0.023 0.717 8.792 654.228 0 145.73  
Data Processing, Hosting, and Related Services 0 0 0.114 -0.086 0.020 0.232 7.451 368.014 0 30.63  
Other Information Services 0 -0.001 0.135 -0.106 0.026 0.483 6.786 280.492 0 63.70  
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 0 0 0.088 -0.071 0.020 0.238 5.577 126.222 0 217.01  
Administrative and Support Services -0.001 -0.001 0.095 -0.094 0.025 0.144 4.842 63.857 0 73.70  
Waste Management and Remediation Services 0 0 0.151 -0.074 0.021 0.780 10.269 1015.623 0 16.16  
Educational Services 0.001 0 0.094 -0.113 0.025 0.0790 4.872 64.834 0 20.33  
Ambulatory Health Care Services -0.001 0 0.125 -0.148 0.026 -0.885 9.427 816.685 0 26.16  
Hospitals 0 -0.002 0.231 -0.251 0.045 -0.03 8.297 515.563 0 3.56  
Nursing and Residential Care Facilities -0.003 -0.003 0.420 -0.235 0.053 1.815 22.447 7191.117 0 4.63  
Performing Arts, Spectator Sports, and Related Industries -0.002 -0.003 0.132 -0.113 0.029 0.161 5.473 114.242 0 7.34  
Amusement, Gambling, and Recreation Industries -0.002 -0.002 0.146 -0.111 0.032 0.565 6.439 240.770 0 21.85  
Accommodation -0.002 -0.001 0.234 -0.136 0.043 0.574 6.555 256.529 0 22.66  
Food Services and Drinking Places 0 0 0.093 -0.082 0.020 0.169 4.799 61.579 0 62.69  
Repair and Maintenance 0 -0.002 0.092 -0.117 0.031 0.219 3.458 7.386 0.025 2.00  
Personal and Laundry Services -0.001 -0.001 0.083 -0.104 0.023 -0.077 5.565 121.363 0 14.32  
Finance -0.001 -0.003 0.149 -0.130 0.035 0.455 6.004 180.977 0 1796.48  
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics of the daily returns for each industry in the crisis period from July 2007 until March 2009, totaling 441 daily observations for each 
industry.  
a The average number of firms that are contained in each industry. 
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Table 9  
Descriptive statistics of the dependent and explanatory variables. 
  CCXa NET_D_Ib VAL_Ic INV_Id VOLPe LEVf DEBT_COSTg EPh NIi SIZEj 
Panel A: from January 2001 to December 2011 (3212 observations) 
 Mean 1.640 0.008 0.001 0.046 0.027 0.212 0.230 -0.054 -0.002 6.068 
 Median 0 0.004 0.003 0.011 0.008 0.198 0.214 -0.006 0.004 5.945 
 Maximum 20 0.269 1.969 24.633 0.480 0.790 0.696 7.675 0.709 9.935 
 Minimum 0 -0.121 -2.114 -6.221 0 0.023 0.023 -6.238 -0.357 2.726 
 Std. Dev. 3.192 0.028 0.253 0.952 0.046 0.095 0.116 0.279 0.031 0.984 
Panel B: from July 2007 to March 2009 (511 observations) 
 Mean 5.511 0.017 -0.170 0.099 0.037 0.217 0.244 -0.112 -0.007 6.216 
 Median 3 0.012 -0.167 0.010 0.012 0.207 0.229 -0.019 0.001 6.019 
 Maximum 20 0.218 1.969 24.633 0.479 0.482 0.651 0.113 0.076 9.935 
 Minimum 0 -0.075 -1.285 -5.122 0 0.038 0.024 -6.238 -0.193 4.067 
 Std. Dev. 5.461 0.031 0.301 1.599 0.060 0.098 0.121 0.399 0.029 0.919 
Notes: This table presents summary statistics for variables employed in Equations (10a) and (10b).  
a Conditional coexceedance is computed as detailed in Section 3.3.2.  
b Net debt financing is computed as detailed in Section 3.4.  
c Spread from a normative value is computed as detailed in Section 3.4. 
d Spread from a normative investment is computed as detailed in Section 3.4. 
e Volatility of profitability is computed as detailed in Section 3.4. 
f Leverage is computed as detailed in Section 3.4. 
g Industry debt cost is computed as long-term debt divided by the sum of long-term debt and market equity. 
h Earnings per share. 
i Net income. 
j Logarithm of market capitalization. 
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Table 10  
Volatility spillovers.  
Industry Name γ1 (coef.) t-stat γ2 (coef.) t-stat γ1 γ2 Industry Name γ1 (coef.) t-stat γ2 (coef.) t-stat γ1 γ2 
Crop Production 0.453 2.74 1.210 3.15 c c Building Material and Garden Equipment and Supplies Dealers 0.373  4.3 0.744  3.13 c c 
Animal Production and Aquaculture 0.172 1.15 0.060 0.77   Food and Beverage Stores 0.280  4.46 0.344  2.82 c c 
Forestry and Logging 0.441 3.18 1.182 2.85 c c Health and Personal Care Stores 0.313  4.69 0.217  2.32 c c 
Oil and Gas Extraction 0.363 3.68 0.380 1.67 c c Gasoline Stations 0.800  4.19 0.332  1.53 c  
Mining (except Oil and Gas) 0.292 1.53 0.930 2.55  c Clothing and Clothing Accessories Stores 0.238  1.56 0.751  2.74  c 
Support Activities for Mining 0.642 3.73 0.247 1.09 c  Sporting Goods, Hobby, Musical Instrument, and Book Stores 0.256  3.74 0.543  2.58 c c 
Utilities 0.008 0.11 0.374 2.18  c General Merchandise Stores 0.149  2 0.403  2.76 c c 
Construction of Buildings 0.704 2.48 1.242 2.74 c c Miscellaneous Store Retailers 0.523  4.6 0.764  2.99 c c 
Heavy and Civil Engineering Construction 0.503 4.43 0.759 3 c c Nonstore Retailers 0.519  3.24 0.348  2.78 c c 
Specialty Trade Contractors 0.493 2.06 0.825 2.15 c c Air Transportation 2.350  7.33 2.388  2.85 c c 
Food Manufacturing 0.122 2.93 0.146 2.15 c c Rail Transportation 0.392  4.54 0.565  2.66 c c 
Beverage and Tobacco Product Manufacturing 0.352 5.99 0.006 0.1 c  Water Transportation 0.564  4.47 0.657  2.02 c c 
Textile Mills 0.415 3.48 0.170 1.16 c  Truck Transportation 0.702  4.97 1.043  3.46 c c 
Textile Product Mills 0.000 0 1.107 0.55   Pipeline Transportation 0.095  1.27 0.068  0.76   
Apparel Manufacturing 0.305 4.19 0.616 2.73 c c Support Activities for Transportation 0.582  3.47 0.606  2.57 c c 
Leather and Allied Product Manufacturing 0.362 4.45 0.762 3.19 c c Couriers and Messengers 0.369  5.16 0.249  1.89 c c 
Wood Product Manufacturing 0.365 4.18 0.671 2.7 c c Warehousing and Storage 0.309  4.27 0.153  1.72 c c 
Paper Manufacturing 0.218 2.5 0.284 2.43 c c Publishing Industries (except Internet) 0.195  4.05 0.260  2.28 c c 
Printing and Related Support Activities 0.225 4.48 0.520 2.59 c c Motion Picture and Sound Recording Industries 0.262  4.26 0.226  1.95 c c 
Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing 0.271 2.36 0.545 2.4 c c Broadcasting (except Internet) 0.090  0.95 0.340  2.47  c 
Chemical Manufacturing 0.116 1.76 0.115 1.45 c  Telecommunications 0.109  1.45 0.312  2.29  c 
Plastics and Rubber Products Manufacturing 0.408 4.97 0.779 3.05 c c Data Processing, Hosting, and Related Services 0.198  4.32 0.060  0.82 c  
Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing 0.455 2.53 1.023 2.95 c c Other Information Services 0.226  1.45 0.311  2.15  c 
Primary Metal Manufacturing 0.748 3.01 1.001 2.4 c c Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 0.057  0.61 0.172  1.7  c 
Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing 0.000 0 0.634 2.75  c Administrative and Support Services 0.237  4.25 0.461  2.72 c c 
Machinery Manufacturing 0.272 3.45 0.307 2.02  c Waste Management and Remediation Services 0.370  4.92 0.259  2.09 c c 
Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing 0.177 3.24 0.236 2.04 c c Educational Services 0.225  3.34 0.296  2.87 c c 
Electrical Equipment, Appliance, and Component Manufacturing 0.324 4.39 0.380 2.23 c c Ambulatory Health Care Services 0.252  1.62 1.260  3.56  c 
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 0.133 1.07 0.439 2.34  c Hospitals 0.413  4.68 1.267  3.81 c c 
Furniture and Related Product Manufacturing 0.337 4.43 0.852 3.05 c c Nursing and Residential Care Facilities 0.000  0 0.873  2.1  c 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 0.182 2.55 0.169 1.77 c c Performing Arts, Spectator Sports, and Related Industries 0.606  6.42 0.936  3.29 c c 
Merchant Wholesalers, Durable Goods 0.276 4.35 0.257 2.18 c c Amusement, Gambling, and Recreation Industries 0.815  6.09 0.291  1.28 c  
Merchant Wholesalers, Nondurable Goods 0.150 1.88 0.172 1.73 c c Accommodation 0.792  5.85 0.715  1.65 c c 
Wholesale Electronic Markets and Agents and Brokers 0.091 2.76 0.158 2.75 c c Food Services and Drinking Places 0.227  4.77 0.221  2.09 c c 
Motor Vehicle and Parts Dealers 0.248 2.11 0.661 2.87 c c Repair and Maintenance 0.899  4.75 1.081  3.65 c c 
Furniture and Home Furnishings Stores 0.000 0 1.131 3.17  c Personal and Laundry Services 0.172  1.41 0.180  1.32     
Electronics and Appliance Stores 0.202 0.89 0.211 1.22          
Notes: This table presents the results of the volatility spillover by after implementing Equations (1)-(5). We report estimated coefficients of γ1 and γ2 (scaled by 1000). The “c” stands for spillover 
during the whole sample and during the crisis period.
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Table 11  
The likelihoods of CCX. 
NAICS3 Proba Probcrisis
b Probnon-crisis
c NAICS3 Proba Probcrisis
b Probnon-crisis
c 
111 0.0192 0.0726 0.0090 444 0.0235 0.0930 0.0103 
112 0.0141 0.0385 0.0095 445 0.0231 0.0726 0.0138 
113 0.0289 0.1134 0.0129 446 0.0210 0.0726 0.0112 
211 0.0257 0.0794 0.0155 447 0.0231 0.0771 0.0129 
212 0.0213 0.0726 0.0116 448 0.0260 0.0952 0.0129 
213 0.0242 0.0816 0.0133 451 0.0289 0.0952 0.0163 
221 0.0246 0.0884 0.0125 452 0.0199 0.0748 0.0095 
236 0.0286 0.1111 0.0129 453 0.0264 0.0930 0.0138 
237 0.0253 0.0884 0.0133 454 0.0195 0.0726 0.0095 
238 0.0296 0.0998 0.0163 481 0.0249 0.0839 0.0138 
311 0.0271 0.0862 0.0159 482 0.0278 0.0907 0.0159 
312 0.0224 0.0748 0.0125 483 0.0325 0.1088 0.0181 
313 0.0253 0.0771 0.0155 484 0.0235 0.0839 0.0120 
314 0.0246 0.0794 0.0142 486 0.0206 0.0680 0.0116 
315 0.0314 0.1066 0.0172 488 0.0260 0.0930 0.0133 
316 0.0300 0.1066 0.0155 492 0.0275 0.0794 0.0176 
321 0.0322 0.1043 0.0185 493 0.0224 0.0703 0.0133 
322 0.0322 0.0975 0.0198 511 0.0202 0.0726 0.0103 
323 0.0332 0.1202 0.0168 512 0.0300 0.0975 0.0172 
324 0.0253 0.0930 0.0125 515 0.0275 0.0794 0.0176 
325 0.0289 0.0862 0.0181 517 0.0271 0.0998 0.0133 
326 0.0351 0.1088 0.0211 518 0.0278 0.0930 0.0155 
327 0.0332 0.1066 0.0193 519 0.0170 0.0544 0.0099 
331 0.0300 0.0952 0.0176 541 0.0275 0.0816 0.0172 
332 0.0354 0.1202 0.0193 561 0.0354 0.1111 0.0211 
333 0.0307 0.0907 0.0193 562 0.0249 0.0816 0.0142 
334 0.0192 0.0635 0.0107 611 0.0188 0.0612 0.0107 
335 0.0343 0.1066 0.0206 621 0.0206 0.0726 0.0107 
336 0.0340 0.1020 0.0211 622 0.0173 0.0726 0.0069 
337 0.0325 0.1111 0.0176 623 0.0242 0.0884 0.0120 
339 0.0271 0.0816 0.0168 711 0.0282 0.1043 0.0138 
423 0.0347 0.1066 0.0211 713 0.0304 0.1043 0.0163 
424 0.0296 0.0884 0.0185 721 0.0293 0.1020 0.0155 
425 0.0134 0.0408 0.0082 722 0.0253 0.0862 0.0138 
441 0.0249 0.0884 0.0129 811 0.0181 0.0703 0.0082 
442 0.0224 0.0794 0.0116 812 0.0282 0.0907 0.0163 
443 0.0192 0.0703 0.0095      
Average value of all industries        
 0.0261  0.0875  0.0144      
  Difference† 0.0730†          
    P-value‡ <0.0001‡     
Notes: The NAICS3 indicates the three-digit code of NAICS.  
a The likelihood of CCX over the whole sample period. 
b The likelihood of CCX during the crisis period (from July 2007 to March 2009). 
c The likelihood of CCX during the non-crisis period. 
† The average difference between Probcrisis and Probnon-crisis. 
‡ One-sided p-value of the Wilcoxon two-sample test. 
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Table 12  
The likelihoods of CCX: Competitive and concentrated industries. 
Year Proba Probcometitive
b Probconcentrated
c Difference†  P-value‡ 
2001 0.0163 0.0177 0.0141 0.0036 * 0.0674 
2002 0.0160 0.0168 0.0146 0.0022  0.1447 
2003 0.0186 0.0192 0.0190 0.0002  0.4807 
2004 0.0175 0.0201 0.0154 0.0047 ** 0.0139 
2005 0.0142 0.0141 0.0132 0.0009  0.2393 
2006 0.0203 0.0210 0.0190 0.0020  0.2307 
2007 0.0299 0.0297 0.0294 0.0003  0.3791 
2008 0.0329 0.0358 0.0329 0.0029 * 0.0821 
2009 0.0269 0.0300 0.0256 0.0044 ** 0.0156 
2010 0.0328 0.0351 0.0328 0.0023 * 0.0998 
2011 0.0331 0.0340 0.0313 0.0027 * 0.0971 
Total sample 0.0235 0.0248 0.0225 0.0023 *** 0.0092 
Notes: We identify competitive industries as those for which the fitted HHI is in the lowest 25% and concentrated 
industries as those in the highest 25%. For each year, the sample contains 73 industries, 18 of which belong to 
competitive industries and 18 of which are concentrated industries. 
a The average yearly likelihood of CCX for all industries. 
b The average yearly likelihood of CCX for competitive industries. 
b The average yearly likelihood of CCX for concentrated industries. 
† The average difference between Probcompetitive and Probconcentrated. 
‡ One-sided p-value of the Wilcoxon two-sample test. 
* Significance level at 10%. 
** Significance level at 5%. 
*** Significance level at 1% 
 
93 
 
Table 13  
CCX: The impact of industry characteristics. 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
  Coef.a  EIb  Coef.a  EIb  Coef.a  EIb  Coef.a  EIb  Coef.a   EIb 
NET_D_I       2.842 *** 8.52%              2.567 *** 7.67% 
     (3.25)            (3.06)   
VAL_I         -0.623 *** -14.67%      -0.618 *** -14.56% 
         (-6.37)        (-6.32)   
INV_I             -0.071 *** -6.59%  -0.056 *** -5.23% 
             (-4.01)    (-2.90)   
VOLP 1.984 *** 9.97%  1.858 *** 9.31%  2.09 *** 10.53%  1.97 *** 9.89%  1.934 *** 9.70% 
 (5.28)    (4.77)    (5.71)    (5.24)    (5.06)   
Debt_Cost 0.706 *** 8.62%  0.669 *** 8.15%  0.588 *** 7.13%  0.706 *** 8.62%  0.56 *** 6.78% 
 (3.33)    (3.18)    (2.78)    (3.33)    (2.65)   
EP -0.155 *** -4.30%  -0.155 *** -4.30%  -0.119 *** -3.32%  -0.156 *** -4.32%  -0.121 *** -3.37% 
 (-3.36)    (-3.40)    (-2.76)    (-3.40)    (-2.87)   
SIZE -0.114 *** -10.71%  -0.12 *** -11.24%  -0.095 *** -9.01%  -0.114 *** -10.71%  -0.103 *** -9.73% 
 (-3.37)    (-3.51)    (-2.84)    (-3.39)    (-3.03)   
cons -0.065     -0.052     -0.159     -0.054     -0.131    
 (-0.34)     (-0.27)     (-0.83)     (-0.28)    (-0.68)    
Time effect YES    YES    YES    YES    YES   
Industry effect YES    YES    YES    YES    YES   
Number of group 73    73    73    73    73   
Number of observations 3212    3212    3212    3212    3212   
Wald test null: all coefficients=0 0†     0 †    0†     0 †    0 †   
Pseudo-R2 0.3951     0.3976     0.4105     0.3965     0.4145    
Notes: Estimation results are obtained by using GMM with instrumental variables of the baseline balanced Poisson 
panel regressions, see Equation (10a). The dependent variable is the conditional coexceedance of the real economy 
industries. Independent variables are defined in Table 9. The sample spans from 1Q2001 to 4Q2011. All independent 
variables are lagged one quarter. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics adjusted for clustering at the industry level. 
a The estimated coefficient of regressions. 
b Economic impact, which is computed as detailed in Footnote 43 of the main text. 
† The p-value of the Wald test. 
* Significance level at 10%. 
** Significance level at 5%. 
*** Significance level at 1%. 
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Table 14  
CCX: The impact of industry characteristics in crisis and non-crisis periods.  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Coef.a   EIb Coef.a   EIb Coef.a   EIb 
NET_D_I*non-crisis dummy 1.855 * 4.87%       
 (1.91)         
NET_D_I*crisis dummy 3.066 ** 4.46%       
 (2.50)         
NET_D_I    2.54 *** 7.58% 2.571 *** 7.68% 
       (3.06)    (3.07)    
VAL_I*non-crisis dummy   -0.572 *** -11.84%    
    (-5.77)      
VAL_I*crisis dummy   -0.67 *** -7.99%    
    (-3.94 )     
VAL_I -0.614 *** -14.48%    -0.62 *** -14.61% 
  (-6.26)         (-6.34)    
INV_I*non-crisis dummy      -0.079 ** -5.48% 
       (-2.36)   
INV_I*crisis dummy      -0.049 ** -3.10% 
       (-2.11)   
INV_I -0.056 *** -5.23% -0.055 *** -5.14%    
  (-2.86)    (-2.76)         
VOLP 1.922 *** 9.64% 1.905 *** 9.55% 1.94 *** 9.74% 
 (4.99)   (4.74)   (5.07)   
Debt_Cost 0.561 *** 6.79% 0.569 *** 6.89% 0.558 *** 6.75% 
 (2.66)   (2.70)   (2.64)   
EP -0.12 *** -3.34% -0.118 *** -3.29% -0.121 *** -3.37% 
 (-2.85)   (-2.77)   (-2.86)   
SIZE -0.102 *** -9.64% -0.103 *** -9.73% -0.103 *** -9.73% 
 (-3.01)   (-3.05)   (-3.03)   
Cons -0.123   -0.125   -0.127   
 (-0.64)   (-0.66)   (-0.66 )  
Time effect YES   YES   YES   
Industry effect YES   YES   YES   
Number of group 73   73   73   
Number of observations 3212   3212   3212   
Wald test null: all coefficients=0 0†   0†   0†   
Pseudo-R2 0.4178    0.4229    0.4148    
Notes: We obtained estimation results using GMM with instrumental variables of the baseline balanced Poisson panel 
regressions as shown in Equation (10b). The dependent variable is the CCX of the real economy industries. Independent 
variables are defined in Table 9. The sample spans from 1Q2001 to 4Q2011. We split our three main industry variables 
into two variables: the first variable represents industry variable times non-crisis dummy, which equals one before the 
third quarter of 2007 and after the first quarter of 2009 and zero otherwise, and the second variable represents industry 
variable times crisis dummy, which equals one between the third quarter of 2007 and the first quarter of 2009 and zero 
otherwise. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics adjusted for clustering at the industry level. 
a The estimated coefficient of regressions. 
b Economic impact, which is computed as detailed in Footnote 43 in the main text.  
† The p-value of the Wald test. 
* Significance level at 10%. 
** Significance level at 5%. 
*** Significance level at 1%. 
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Table 15  
CCX: The impact of industry characteristics in competitive and concentrated industries 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
 Coef.a  EIb  Coef.a  EIb  Coef.a  EIb  Coef.a   EIb  
Panel A: Estimation results for competitive industries (792 observations) 
NET_D_I*non-crisis dummy    2.765          
     (1.09)          
NET_D_I*crisis dummy    6.085 * 6.53%         
     (1.78)          
NET_D_I 4.798 ** 12.63%     4.768 * 12.54%  4.748 * 12.49%  
  (2.00)        (1.97)   (1.99)    
VAL_I*non-crisis dummy         -0.812 *** -15.04%        
        (-4.42)       
VAL_I*crisis dummy       -0.834 *** -7.66%      
        (-2.68)       
VAL_I -0.82 *** -16.74%  -0.806 *** -16.48%     -0.82 *** -16.74%  
  (-4.81)     (-4.74)          (-4.82)     
INV_I*non-crisis dummy          -0.152 *** -11.22%  
           (-2.84)    
INV_I*crisis dummy          -0.052    
           (-0.32)    
INV_I -0.112   -0.113   -0.112       
  (-1.61)     (-1.64)     (-1.61)           
Pseudo R2 0.438    0.448    0.457    0.438    
Panel B: Estimation results for concentrated industries (792 observations) 
NET_D_I*non-crisis dummy    0.013         
     (0.01)         
NET_D_I*crisis dummy    2.531         
     (1.16)         
NET_D_I 1.867      1.886   1.848   
  (1.08)        (1.09)   (1.07)   
VAL_I*non-crisis dummy         -0.580 *** -12.45%       
        (-3.12)      
VAL_I*crisis dummy       -0.739 * -10.72%     
        (-1.90)      
VAL_I -0.674 *** -17.14%  -0.672 *** -17.09%     -0.668 *** -17.00% 
  (-2.74)     (-2.70)          (-2.64)    
INV_I*non-crisis dummy          0.079   
           (0.50)   
INV_I*crisis dummy          0.032   
           (0.33)   
INV_I 0.042   0.045   0.052      
  (0.50)     (0.53)     (0.50)          
Pseudo R2 0.429    0.431    0.441    0.431   
Notes: We obtained estimation results using GMM with instrumental variables of the baseline balanced Poisson panel 
regressions as shown in Equations (10a) and (10b). The dependent variable is the CCX of the real economy industries. 
Independent variables are defined in Table 9. The sample contains only competitive industries, from the first quarter of 
2001 to the fourth quarter of 2011. We split our three main industry variables into two variables: the first variable 
represents industry variable times non-crisis dummy, which equals one before the third quarter of 2007 and after the 
first quarter of 2009 and zero otherwise, and the second variable represents industry variable times crisis dummy, which 
equals one between the third quarter of 2007 and the first quarter of 2009 and zero otherwise. The numbers in brackets 
are t-statistics adjusted for clustering at the industry level. All models include control variables, industry dummy, and 
time dummy as used in Table 13 and 14. To save space, we do not report these results here. 
a The estimated coefficient of regressions. 
b Economic impact, which is computed as detailed in Footnote 43 in the main text.  
† The p-value of the Wald test. 
* Significance level at 10%. 
** Significance level at 5%. 
*** Significance level at 1%. 
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Table 16  
Tail risk spillover using DD. 
Variables       Model 1 Model 2 
DDfin
a*non-crisis dummy 1.508  *** 
   (13.71)   
DDfina* crisis dummy  1.693  
*** 
   (14.08)   
DDfin
a 1.508  ***   
 (13.71)     
VOLP  -0.227   -0.227   
 (-1.14)   (-1.14)   
LEV -4.671  *** -4.671  *** 
 (-17.35)  (-17.35)   
EP  0.066  ** 0.066  ** 
 (2.23)   (2.23)   
SIZE 0.098  *** 0.098  *** 
 (3.28)   (3.28)   
Time effect YES  YES  
Industry effect YES  YES  
Number of groups 73  73  
Number of observations 3139  3139  
R-squared   0.6238   0.6238   
Notes: Estimation results are for the baseline balanced panel regressions. The dependent variable is the DD values for 
73 industries. Our sample spans from second quarter 2001 to fourth quarter 2011. We estimate the coefficients by 
means of a Prais-Winsten robust to heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous correlation across panels. The table first 
presents the estimated coefficients and then in parentheses the t-statistics adjusted for clustering at the industry level. 
a The DD value of financial sector 
** Significance level at 5%. 
*** Significance level at 1%. 
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Table 17. Descriptive statistics across countries and regions: 2003–2011 
This table reports the summary statistics on CCX and independent variables across 16 European countries and four regions. The definition of regions is as follows: Euro-periphery 
countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain), Euro-core countries (Austria, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Finland, Belgium), major non-euro zone countries, except for UK 
(Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland), and UK. 
Country Country code Obs. Percent of observations Number of firms   CCX vol dd logmb ret cashmta size tlmta 
Panel A: Summary statistics on CCX and independent variables for each country                 
Austria AUT 1585 1.54% 62 
 
0.625 0.456 5.308 0.224 0.026 0.09 6.034 0.537 
Belgium BEL 2545 2.47% 94 
 
0.679 0.389 7.348 0.401 0.018 0.089 5.915 0.484 
Switzerland CHE 4076 3.95% 156 
 
0.752 0.372 8.316 0.48 0.021 0.098 6.244 0.39 
Germany DEU 14112 13.68% 561 
 
0.604 0.503 5.445 0.346 0.026 0.094 5.489 0.506 
Denmark DNK 2852 2.76% 111 
 
0.629 0.487 6.302 0.551 0.014 0.087 4.895 0.411 
Spain ESP 3139 3.04% 115 
 
0.922 0.319 8.069 0.586 0.012 0.06 6.913 0.477 
Finland FIN 3397 3.29% 118 
 
0.617 0.419 6.378 0.494 0.020 0.081 5.378 0.436 
France FRA 16018 15.52% 615 
 
0.662 0.45 6.289 0.446 0.017 0.097 5.403 0.504 
United Kingdom GBR 29023 28.13% 1356 
 
0.547 0.446 6.663 0.523 0.008 0.076 5.063 0.433 
Greece GRC 5174 5.01% 199 
 
0.925 0.498 3.069 -0.179 -0.024 0.055 5.438 0.624 
Ireland IRL 1169 1.13% 50 
 
0.503 0.514 5.989 0.452 0.007 0.105 5.987 0.446 
Italy ITA 6022 5.84% 237 
 
0.949 0.347 6.306 0.342 -0.012 0.08 6.224 0.546 
Netherlands NLD 3052 2.96% 131 
 
0.810 0.401 6.857 0.574 0.023 0.065 6.47 0.462 
Norway NOR 3646 3.53% 179 
 
0.768 0.598 4.630 0.832 0.012 0.069 5.228 0.418 
Portugal PRT 1388 1.35% 48 
 
0.646 0.396 5.053 0.294 -0.003 0.043 6.509 0.659 
Sweden SWE 5991 5.81% 288   0.699 0.519 5.769 0.578 0.016 0.071 4.686 0.412 
Panel B: Summary statistics on CCX and independent variables across different regions                 
Euro-periphery countries 16892 16.37% 649 Mean 0.881 0.403 5.517 0.232 -0.009 0.067 6.118 0.559 
{PRT, IRL, ITA, GRC, ESP} 
   
Std 1.712 0.208 4.847 0.888 0.185 0.066 1.571 0.224 
Euro-core countries 40709 39.45% 1581 Mean 0.649 0.458 6.074 0.414 0.021 0.092 5.567 0.496 
{AUT. DEU, FRA, NLD, BEL, FIN} 
  
Std 1.559 0.262 4.386 0.779 0.186 0.083 1.865 0.219 
Major non-euro zone countries, except for UK 16565 16.05% 734 Mean 0.715 0.495 6.237 0.605 0.016 0.08 5.225 0.408 
{SWE, NOR, DNK, CHE} 
   
Std 1.643 0.307 4.714 0.893 0.202 0.079 1.759 0.223 
United Kingdom (UK) 29023 28.13% 1356 Mean 0.547 0.446 6.663 0.523 0.008 0.076 5.063 0.433 
  
 
      Std 1.323 0.273 5.037 0.916 0.215 0.077 2.02 0.213 
Panel C: Summary statistics on CCX and independent variables for the whole sample                 
Total 
 
103189 100% 4320 Mean 0.669 0.452 6.175 0.445 0.012 0.081 5.461 0.474 
          Std 1.541 0.267 4.72 0.864 0.197 0.079 1.884 0.225 
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Table 18. Descriptive statistics across regions and time periods 
This table reports the summary statistics on CCX across different areas and time periods in Panel A. The testing of 
differences on CCX between any two areas for a given time period is presented in Panel B. In Panel B, bold fonts stand 
for the difference between a pair of CCX across two regions is significant at more than 5% level. 
Panel A: Summary statistics of CCX across different areas and time periods 
Region\Period Full sample Stable Crisis_07_09 Crisis_EU 
Euro-periphery 0.881 0.326 1.793 1.421 
(number of observations) (16892) (9606) (3748) (3538) 
Euro-core 0.649 0.264 1.546 0.845 
(number of observations) (40709) (24254) (8685) (7770) 
Non-Euro (exclude UK) 0.715 0.303 1.809 0.716 
(number of observations) (16565) (9551) (3599) (3415) 
UK 0.547 0.189 1.533 0.617 
(number of observations) (29023) (18105) (6231) (4687) 
Panel B: Test the differences on CCXs between two different areas for a given time period 
Region\Period Full sample Stable Crisis_07_09 Crisis_EU 
Euro-periphery versus Euro-core 0.232 0.062 0.246 0.575 
Euro-periphery versus Non-Euro (exclude UK) 0.165 0.023 -0.016 0.705 
Euro-periphery versus UK 0.334 0.137 0.260 0.804 
Euro-core versus Non-Euro (exclude UK) -0.067 -0.039 -0.262 0.130 
Euro-core versus UK 0.101 0.075 0.013 0.228 
Non-Euro (exclude UK) versus UK 0.168 0.114 0.275 0.099 
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Table 19. Firms’ characteristics and CCX 
This table presents estimates from Panel Poisson regressions explaining firm-level quarterly CCX within different regions. Dependent variable is quarterly CCX. Explanatory 
variables are: Volatility (vol), Distance to Default (dd), Growth opportunity (logmb), Past Quarterly Return (ret), Cash Holding (cashmta), Firm size (logsize), and Leverage (tlmta). 
All regressions include firm fixed effects and control for business cycle. Standard errors (in brackets) are heteroskedasticity-consistent and clustered by firm. ***, **, or * indicates 
that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. E.I. (%) stands for “Economic Impact at percentage”. 
  
 
Full sample   E. I. (%) Euro-periphery E. I. (%) Euro-core   E. I. (%) Non-Euro   E. I. (%) UK   E. I. (%) 
Model (1)   (2)  (3)   (4)   (5)   
volt-1 1.076  *** 33.22 0.722  *** 16.23 1.405  *** 44.59 0.997  *** 35.80 0.883  *** 27.26 
 
[0.035]  
  
[0.102]  
  
[0.056]  
  
[0.081]  
  
[0.062]  
  
ddt-1 -0.009  *** -3.98 -0.021  *** -9.57 -0.008    
-0.006  
  
-0.001  
  
 
[0.003]  
  
[0.007]  
  
[0.005]  
  
[0.006]  
  
[0.005]  
  
logmbt-1 -0.071  *** -5.99 -0.045    
-0.083  *** -6.26 -0.100  ** -8.58 -0.095  *** -8.34 
 
[0.018]  
  
[0.038]  
  
[0.031]  
  
[0.044]  
  
[0.030]  
  
rett-1 -0.730  *** -13.42 -0.710  *** -12.29 -0.529  *** -9.39 -0.851  *** -15.80 -0.917  *** -17.93 
 
[0.032]  
  
[0.073]  
  
[0.053]  
  
[0.084]  
  
[0.059]  
  
cashmtat-1 -0.633  *** -4.87 -0.419    
-0.626  *** -5.09 -0.680  * -5.22 -0.873  *** -6.48 
 
[0.145]  
  
[0.364]  
  
[0.208]  
  
[0.352]  
  
[0.278]  
  
logsizet-1 0.090  *** 18.48 0.035    
-0.004  
  
0.068  *** 12.73 0.365  *** 109.07 
 
[0.024]  
  
[0.048]  
  
[0.040]  
  
[0.047]  
  
[0.043]  
  
tlmtat-1 0.709  *** 17.30 1.113  *** 28.30 0.666  *** 15.74 0.414  ** 9.69 0.400  *** 8.90 
 
[0.083]  
  
[0.210]  
  
[0.137]  
  
[0.188]  
  
[0.148]  
  
Control Business cycle (GDP) Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Time dummy Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Number of observations 103189  
  
16892  
  
40709  
  
16565  
  
29023  
  
Log pseudolikelihood -90656     -17041     -35878     -15890     -20228     
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Table 20. Cashing holding and CCX during the 07-09 financial crisis 
This table presents estimates from Panel Poisson regressions explaining firm-level quarterly CCX within different 
regions. Dependent variable is quarterly CCX. Crisis_07_09 is an indicator variable equal to one for calendar quarters 
between July 2007 and March 2009. Crisis_07_09 dummy x cashmta is interaction term. All explanatory variables are 
defined in Table 19. All regressions include firm fixed effects and control for business cycle. Standard errors (in 
brackets) are heteroskedasticity-consistent and clustered by firm. ***, **, or * indicates that the coefficient estimate is 
significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. 
 
Full sample 
 
Periphery 
 
Core 
 
Non-euro-zone (no UK) UK 
 
Model (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
cashmtat-1 -0.428 *** -0.494  
-0.278 
 
-0.847 ** -0.446 
 
 
[0.159] 
 
[0.392] 
 
[0.221] 
 
[0.384] 
 
[0.321] 
 
crisis_07_09 dummy 1.129 *** 0.743 *** 1.243 *** 0.993 *** 1.398 *** 
 
[0.024] 
 
[0.047] 
 
[0.041] 
 
[0.059] 
 
[0.041] 
 
crisis_07_09 dummy x cashmtat-1 -0.296 ** 0.307  
-0.618 *** 0.542 
 
-0.626 ** 
 
[0.151] 
 
[0.368] 
 
[0.221] 
 
[0.367] 
 
[0.276] 
 
volt-1 0.715 *** 0.429 *** 0.987 *** 0.687 *** 0.509 *** 
 
[0.035] 
 
[0.106] 
 
[0.057] 
 
[0.081] 
 
[0.062] 
 
ddt-1 -0.022 *** -0.027 *** -0.024 *** -0.019 *** -0.014 *** 
 
[0.003] 
 
[0.007] 
 
[0.005] 
 
[0.006] 
 
[0.005] 
 
logmbt-1 -0.095 *** -0.058  
-0.110 *** -0.116 *** -0.126 *** 
 
[0.018] 
 
[0.039] 
 
[0.032] 
 
[0.045] 
 
[0.031] 
 
rett-1 -0.279 *** -0.355 *** -0.068  
-0.439 *** -0.396 *** 
 
[0.034] 
 
[0.075] 
 
[0.057] 
 
[0.086] 
 
[0.063] 
 
logsizet-1 0.010  
-0.025 
 
-0.064 
 
0.009 
 
0.202 *** 
 
[0.024] 
 
[0.050] 
 
[0.039] 
 
[0.048] 
 
[0.042] 
 
tlmtat-1 0.876 *** 1.314 *** 0.779 *** 0.589 *** 0.573 *** 
 
[0.084] 
 
[0.220] 
 
[0.140] 
 
[0.189] 
 
[0.148] 
 
Control Business cycle (GDP) Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Time dummy Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Number of observations 103189 
 
16892 
 
40709 
 
16565 
 
29023 
 
Log pseudolikelihood -88772 
 
-16845 
 
-35144 
 
-15631 
 
-19438 
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Table 21. Financial constraint: CCX across different periods and regions 
Numbers in the table are the average values of CCX across all three financially constrained criteria. The ‘C’ stands for 
financially constrained firms and ‘U’ for financially unconstrained firms. We report the average values across different 
regions and across different time period. Bold face fonts present numbers of (U-C)/C. 
  2003-2011 Stable Crisis_07_09 Crisis_EU 
 
C U C U C U C U 
All countries 0.550  0.816  0.229  0.296  1.319  2.040  0.714  1.091  
 
0.527  
 
0.329  
 
0.588  
 
0.603  
 
Euro-periphery 0.785  1.014  0.304  0.362  1.603  2.036  1.240  1.678  
 
0.319  
 
0.219  
 
0.287  
 
0.401  
 
Euro-core 0.541  0.770  0.239  0.293  1.272  1.893  0.687  1.046  
 
0.458  
 
0.252  
 
0.521  
 
0.600  
 
Non-Euro (exclude UK) 0.598  0.846  0.268  0.343  1.537  2.185  0.573  0.909  
 
0.446  
 
0.308  
 
0.454  
 
0.656  
 
UK 0.396  0.748  0.153  0.238  1.089  2.172  0.457  0.857  
 
1.006   0.640   1.130   1.018   
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Table 22. Financial constraint: Descriptive statistics on cash holding across regions 
This table presents the ratio of a firm’s cash holding to its total asset in 16 European countries across financially 
constrained firms (C) and financially unconstrained firms (U) based on three alternative criteria (Firm size, firm age, 
and payout ratio). We report the values of means and medians for each category. Bold face fonts indicate the cases that 
financially constrained firms have lower cash holding than unconstrained firms. 
    Financial constraint criteria  
  
Firm size 
 
Firm age 
 
Payout ratio 
  
C U 
 
C U 
 
C U 
All countries Mean 0.089  0.074  
 
0.089  0.073  
 
0.085  0.073  
 
Median 0.058  0.052  
 
0.060  0.050  
 
0.056  0.051  
 
Std 0.087  0.069  
 
0.085  0.071  
 
0.082  0.069  
Euro-periphery Mean 0.064  0.071  
 
0.067  0.065  
 
0.063  0.068  
 
Median 0.040  0.052  
 
0.044  0.046  
 
0.044  0.049  
 
Std 0.067  0.064  
 
0.067  0.062  
 
0.060  0.064  
Euro-core Mean 0.103  0.080  
 
0.106  0.079  
 
0.096  0.084  
 
Median 0.072  0.059  
 
0.077  0.055  
 
0.067  0.061  
 
Std 0.093  0.071  
 
0.091  0.074  
 
0.088  0.075  
Non-Euro (exclude UK) Mean 0.087  0.073  
 
0.078  0.080  
 
0.084  0.072  
 
Median 0.055  0.050  
 
0.048  0.055  
 
0.053  0.050  
 
Std 0.087  0.069  
 
0.082  0.074  
 
0.084  0.068  
UK Mean 0.085  0.066  
 
0.086  0.066  
 
0.079  0.059  
 
Median 0.057  0.045  
 
0.056  0.045  
 
0.053  0.041  
  Std 0.085  0.066   0.084  0.067   0.079  0.059  
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Table 23. Financial constraints, cash holdings, and CCX during the 07-09 financial crisis 
This table presents estimates from Panel Poisson regressions explaining firm-level quarterly CCX within 16 European 
countries. Dependent variable is quarterly CCX. For three measures of financial constrains (firm size, firm age, payout 
ratio), the subsamples comprises firms with financial constraint measures below and above the sample median. Crisis is 
an indicator variable equal to one for calendar quarters between July 2007 and March 2009. Crisis x cashmta is 
interaction term. All variables are defined in Table 19. All regressions include firm fixed effects and control for 
business cycle. Standard errors (in brackets) are heteroskedasticity-consistent and clustered by firm. ***, **, or * 
indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. 
  Firm size   Firm age   Payout ratio 
 C  U   C  U   C  U  
cashmtat-1 -0.051  
-0.798 *** 
 
-0.133 
 
-0.857 *** 
 
-0.272 
 
-0.519 * 
 
[0.230] 
 
[0.227] 
  
[0.231] 
 
[0.234] 
  
[0.241] 
 
[0.282] 
 
crisis  1.229 *** 1.081 *** 
 
1.158 *** 1.121 *** 
 
1.139 *** 1.149 *** 
 
[0.041] 
 
[0.030] 
  
[0.039] 
 
[0.031] 
  
[0.039] 
 
[0.035] 
 
crisis x cashmtat-1 -0.390 * -0.301   
-0.415 * -0.043 
  
-0.706 *** -0.232 
 
 
[0.232] 
 
[0.205] 
  
[0.214] 
 
[0.220] 
  
[0.245] 
 
[0.259] 
 
volt-1 0.614 *** 0.761 ***  
0.697 *** 0.739 *** 
 
0.753 *** 0.716 *** 
 
[0.053] 
 
[0.051] 
  
[0.052] 
 
[0.054] 
  
[0.054] 
 
[0.066] 
 
ddt-1 -0.017 *** -0.022 ***  
-0.010 *** -0.024 *** 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.026 *** 
 
[0.005] 
 
[0.004] 
  
[0.005] 
 
[0.004] 
  
[0.005] 
 
[0.004] 
 
logmbt-1 -0.067 ** -0.123 ***  
-0.120 *** -0.107 *** 
 
-0.140 *** -0.101 *** 
 
[0.027] 
 
[0.027] 
  
[0.027] 
 
[0.027] 
  
[0.028] 
 
[0.037] 
 
rett-1 -0.143 *** -0.317 ***  
-0.194 *** -0.245 *** 
 
-0.220 *** -0.219 *** 
 
[0.050] 
 
[0.046] 
  
[0.051] 
 
[0.048] 
  
[0.051] 
 
[0.057] 
 
logsizet-1 0.053  
0.030 
  
0.039 
 
-0.027 
  
0.005 
 
-0.093 * 
 
[0.038] 
 
[0.036] 
  
[0.036] 
 
[0.040] 
  
[0.035] 
 
[0.050] 
 
tlmtat-1 0.981 *** 0.938 ***  
0.924 *** 0.925 *** 
 
0.782 *** 1.479 *** 
 
[0.123] 
 
[0.127] 
  
[0.126] 
 
[0.127] 
  
[0.132] 
 
[0.156] 
 
gdp -0.199 
 
-0.430 *** 
 
-0.519 ** -0.383 ** 
 
-0.434 ** 0.013 
 
 
[0.216] 
 
[0.147] 
  
[0.203] 
 
[0.152] 
  
[0.213] 
 
[0.190] 
 
Firm-fixed effects Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Time dummy Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Number of observations 50401 
 
51217 
  
47257 
 
48224 
  
41583 
 
41062 
 
Log pseudolikelihood -33776 
 
-53355 
  
-36911 
 
-45967 
  
-34521 
 
-38423   
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Table 24. Financial constraints, cash holdings, and CCX during the 07-09 financial crisis across different areas 
This table presents estimates from Panel Poisson regressions explaining firm-level quarterly CCX within 16 European 
countries. Dependent variable is quarterly CCX. For three measures of financial constrains (firm size, firm age, payout 
ratio), the subsamples comprises firms with financial constraint measures below and above the sample median. Crisis is 
an indicator variable equal to one for calendar quarters between July 2007 and March 2009. All regressions include 
firm-level controls (vol, dd, logmb, ret, logsize, tlmta), gdp per capital is used to control for business cycles, firm-fixed 
effects, time dummy. Standard errors (in brackets) are heteroskedasticity-consistent and clustered by firm. ***, **, or * 
indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Within Euro-periphery countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain) 
  Firm size   Firm age   Payout ratio 
 C  U   C  U   C  U  
cashmtat-1 0.150  
-1.143 ** 
 
-0.117 
 
-1.143  
  
-0.453 
 
-0.529 
 
 
[0.611] 
 
[0.546] 
  
[0.586] 
 
[0.546]  
  
[0.719] 
 
[0.575] 
 
crisis  0.846 *** 0.678 *** 
 
0.753 *** 0.678  *** 
 
0.691 *** 0.832 *** 
 
[0.068] 
 
[0.064] 
  
[0.071 
 
[0.064]  
  
[0.081] 
 
[0.072] 
 
crisis x cashmtat-1 0.388  
0.473 
  
0.390 
 
0.473  
  
-0.008 
 
0.143 
 
 
[0.590] 
 
[0.475] 
  
[0.524] 
 
[0.475]  
  
[0.747] 
 
[0.576] 
 
Number of observations 8218 
 
8418 
  
7693 
 
7715  
  
6719 
 
6900 
 
Log pseudolikelihood -6989   -9577     -7100   -8356     -6674   -6968   
Panel B: Within Euro-core countries (Austria, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Finland, Belgium) 
  Firm size   Firm age   Payout ratio 
 C  U   C  U   C  U  
cashmtat-1 0.083  
-0.653 ** 
 
-0.057 
 
-0.569 * 
 
-0.258 
 
-0.309 
 
 
[0.320] 
 
[0.311] 
  
[0.308] 
 
[0.332] 
  
[0.315] 
 
[0.385] 
 
crisis  1.439 *** 1.140 *** 
 
1.298 *** 1.219 *** 
 
1.341 *** 1.188 *** 
 
[0.071] 
 
[0.051] 
  
[0.065] 
 
[0.056] 
  
[0.064] 
 
[0.059] 
 
crisis x cashmtat-1 -0.977 *** -0.511   
-0.901 *** -0.307 
  
-1.199 *** -0.154 
 
 
[0.334] 
 
[0.316] 
  
[0.294] 
 
[0.355] 
  
[0.347] 
 
[0.349] 
 
Number of observations 20061 
 
20162 
  
19227 
 
18907 
  
17960 
 
17168 
 
Log pseudolikelihood -13614   -20889     -15619   -17491     -14348   -15863   
Panel C: Within major non-euro zone countries, except for UK (Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland) 
  Firm size   Firm age   Payout ratio 
 C  U   C  U   C  U  
cashmtat-1 -0.206  
-1.276 ** 
 
-0.640 
 
-1.253 ** 
 
-0.454 
 
-1.289 * 
 
[0.587] 
 
[0.547] 
  
[0.596] 
 
[0.527] 
  
[0.610] 
 
[0.761] 
 
crisis  1.089 *** 0.980 *** 
 
1.072 *** 0.969 *** 
 
1.089 *** 0.954 *** 
 
[0.104] 
 
[0.074] 
  
[0.098] 
 
[0.080] 
  
[0.101] 
 
[0.088] 
 
crisis x cashmtat-1 0.608  
0.222 
  
0.706 
 
0.799 * 
 
0.198 
 
0.569 
 
 
[0.535] 
 
[0.472] 
  
[0.610] 
 
[0.455] 
  
[0.578] 
 
[0.662] 
 
Number of observations 8067 
 
8237 
  
7315 
 
8064 
  
6918 
 
6650 
 
Log pseudolikelihood -5947   -9332     -6196   -8384     -6179   -6561   
Panel D: Within UK 
  Firm size   Firm age   Payout ratio 
 C  U   C  U   C  U  
cashmtat-1 -0.213  
-0.748 * 
 
0.182 
 
-1.244 ** 
 
0.048 
 
-1.142 * 
 
[0.484] 
 
[0.452] 
  
[0.479] 
 
[0.496] 
  
[0.506] 
 
[0.666] 
 
crisis  1.566 *** 1.329 *** 
 
1.480 *** 1.340 *** 
 
1.335 *** 1.429 *** 
 
[0.079] 
 
[0.050] 
  
[0.079] 
 
[0.051] 
  
[0.071] 
 
[0.060] 
 
crisis x cashmtat-1 -1.115 ** -0.431   
-0.911 ** -0.044 
  
-0.866 ** -0.336 
 
 
[0.514] 
 
[0.358] 
  
[0.364] 
 
[0.450] 
  
[0.431] 
 
[0.615] 
 
Number of observations 14055 
 
14400 
  
13022 
 
13538 
  
9986 
 
10344 
 
Log pseudolikelihood -6555   -12509     -7242   -10769     -6622   -8321   
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Table 25. Financial constraints, cash holdings, and CCX during the 07-09 and EU debt crisis 
This table presents estimates from Panel Poisson regressions explaining firm-level quarterly CCX within 16 European 
countries. Dependent variable is quarterly CCX. For three measures of financial constrains (firm size, firm age, payout 
ratio), the subsamples comprises firms with financial constraint measures below and above the sample median. Crisis is 
an indicator variable equal to one for calendar quarters from July 2007 to March 2009 (Global crisis) and from May 
2010 to December 2011 (EU crisis). Crisis x cashmta is interaction term. All variables are defined in Table 19. All 
regressions include firm fixed effects and control for business cycle. Standard errors (in brackets) are 
heteroskedasticity-consistent and clustered by firm. ***, **, or * indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at 
the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. 
  Firm size   Firm age   Payout ratio 
 C  U   C  U   C  U  
cashmtat-1 0.164  
-0.665 ** 
 
0.256 
 
-0.877 *** 
 
-0.096 
 
-0.358 
 
 
[0.265] 
 
[0.263] 
  
[0.268] 
 
[0.266] 
  
[0.277] 
 
[0.322] 
 
crisis  1.185 *** 1.085 *** 
 
1.153 *** 1.108 *** 
 
1.096 *** 1.154 *** 
 
[0.043] 
 
[0.031] 
  
[0.041] 
 
[0.033] 
  
[0.040] 
 
[0.035] 
 
crisis x cashmtat-1 -0.576 ** -0.363   
-0.819 *** 0.008 
  
-0.686 ** -0.375 
 
 
[0.248] 
 
[0.234] 
  
[0.233] 
 
[0.250] 
  
[0.270] 
 
[0.278] 
 
volt-1 0.620 *** 0.745 ***  
0.701 *** 0.722 *** 
 
0.756 *** 0.694 *** 
 
[0.052] 
 
[0.050] 
  
[0.052] 
 
[0.053] 
  
[0.053] 
 
[0.065] 
 
ddt-1 -0.019 *** -0.025 ***  
-0.012 *** -0.028 *** 
 
-0.009 * -0.030 *** 
 
[0.005] ` [0.004] 
  
[0.005] 
 
[0.004] 
  
[0.005] 
 
[0.004] 
 
logmbt-1 -0.061 ** -0.115 ***  
-0.110 *** -0.103 *** 
 
-0.129 *** -0.098 *** 
 
[0.027] 
 
[0.027] 
  
[0.027] 
 
[0.027] 
  
[0.027] 
 
[0.037] 
 
rett-1 -0.174 *** -0.317 ***  
-0.216 *** -0.251 *** 
 
-0.244 *** -0.218 *** 
 
[0.050] 
 
[0.045] 
  
[0.050] 
 
[0.048] 
  
[0.051] 
 
[0.057] 
 
logsizet-1 0.060  
0.033 
  
0.043 
 
-0.024 
  
0.012 
 
-0.091 * 
 
[0.038] 
 
[0.036] 
  
[0.035] 
 
[0.040] 
  
[0.035] 
 
[0.050] 
 
tlmtat-1 0.956 *** 0.916 ***  
0.911 *** 0.887 *** 
 
0.771 *** 1.427 *** 
 
[0.123] 
 
[0.127] 
  
[0.126] 
 
[0.127] 
  
[0.133] 
 
[0.157] 
 
gdp -0.189 
 
-0.425 *** 
 
-0.532 *** -0.369 ** 
 
-0.422 ** 0.026 
 
 
[0.216] 
 
[0.147] 
  
[0.202] 
 
[0.153] 
  
[0.213] 
 
[0.189] 
 
Firm-fixed effects Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Time dummy Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Number of observations 50401 
 
51217 
  
47257 
 
48224 
  
41583 
 
41062 
 
Log pseudolikelihood -33708   -53102     -36812   -45753     -34424   -38241   
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Table 26. Financial constraints, cash holdings, and CCX during the 07-09 and EU debt crisis across different 
areas 
This table presents estimates from Panel Poisson regressions explaining firm-level quarterly CCX within 16 European 
countries. Dependent variable is quarterly CCX. For three measures of financial constrains (firm size, firm age, payout 
ratio), the subsamples comprises firms with financial constraint measures below and above the sample median. Crisis is 
an indicator variable equal to one for calendar quarters from July 2007 to March 2009 (Global crisis) and from May 
2010 to December 2011 (EU crisis). All regressions include firm-level controls (vol, dd, logmb, ret, logsize, tlmta), gdp 
per capital is used to control for business cycles, firm-fixed effects, time dummy. Standard errors (in brackets) are 
heteroskedasticity-consistent and clustered by firm. ***, **, or * indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at 
the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Within Euro-periphery countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain) 
     
  Firm size   Firm age   Payout ratio 
 C  U   C  U   C  U  
cashmtat-1 0.663   -1.219 **  
0.825 
 
-1.461 ** 
 
-0.200   -0.174   
 
[0.815] 
 
[0.573] 
  
[0.670] 
 
[0.576] 
  
[0.886] 
 
[0.668] 
 
crisis  0.715 *** 0.549 *** 
 
0.644 *** 0.582 *** 
 
0.543 *** 0.714 *** 
 
[0.079] 
 
[0.064] 
  
[0.076] 
 
[0.064] 
  
[0.084] 
 
[0.069] 
 
crisis x cashmtat-1 -0.654  
0.249 
  
-1.076 * 0.806 
  
-0.424 
 
-0.520 
 
 
[0.736] 
 
[0.499] 
  
[0.577] 
 
[0.516] 
  
[0.854] 
 
[0.587] 
 
Number of observations 8218 
 
8418 
  
7693 
 
7715 
  
6719 
 
6900 
 
Log pseudolikelihood -7004   -9584     -7117   -8355     -6687   -6976   
Panel B: Within Euro-core countries (Austria, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Finland, Belgium) 
  Firm size   Firm age   Payout ratio 
 C  U   C  U   C  U  
cashmtat-1 0.083  
-0.653 ** 
 
-0.057 
 
-0.569 * 
 
-0.258 
 
-0.309 
 
 
[0.320] 
 
[0.311] 
  
[0.308] 
 
[0.332] 
  
[0.315] 
 
[0.385] 
 
crisis  1.439 *** 1.140 *** 
 
1.298 *** 1.219 *** 
 
1.341 *** 1.188 *** 
 
[0.071] 
 
[0.051] 
  
[0.065] 
 
[0.056] 
  
[0.064] 
 
[0.059] 
 
crisis x cashmtat-1 -0.977 *** -0.511   
-0.901 *** -0.307 
  
-1.199 *** -0.154 
 
 
[0.334] 
 
[0.316] 
  
[0.294] 
 
[0.355] 
  
[0.347] 
 
[0.349] 
 
Number of observations 20061 
 
20162 
  
19227 
 
18907 
  
17960 
 
17168 
 
Log pseudolikelihood -13549   -20776     -15541   -17397     -14281   -15773   
Panel C: Within major non-euro zone countries, except for UK (Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland) 
  Firm size   Firm age   Payout ratio 
 C  U   C  U   C  U  
cashmtat-1 -0.206  
-1.276 ** 
 
-0.640 
 
-1.253 ** 
 
-0.454 
 
-1.289 * 
 
[0.587] 
 
[0.547] 
  
[0.596] 
 
[0.527] 
  
[0.610] 
 
[0.761] 
 
crisis  1.089 *** 0.980 *** 
 
1.072 *** 0.969 *** 
 
1.089 *** 0.954 *** 
 
[0.104] 
 
[0.074] 
  
[0.098] 
 
[0.080] 
  
[0.101] 
 
[0.088] 
 
crisis x cashmtat-1 0.608  
0.222 
  
0.706 
 
0.799 * 
 
0.198 
 
0.569 
 
 
[0.535] 
 
[0.472] 
  
[0.610] 
 
[0.455] 
  
[0.578] 
 
[0.662] 
 
Number of observations 8067 
 
8237 
  
7315 
 
8064 
  
6918 
 
6650 
 
Log pseudolikelihood -5909   -9245     -6148   -8312     -6130   -6504   
Panel D: Within UK 
  Firm size   Firm age   Payout ratio 
 C  U   C  U   C  U  
cashmtat-1 -0.213  
-0.748 * 
 
0.182 
 
-1.244 ** 
 
0.048 
 
-1.142 * 
 
[0.484] 
 
[0.452] 
  
[0.479] 
 
[0.496] 
  
[0.506] 
 
[0.666] 
 
crisis  1.566 *** 1.329 *** 
 
1.480 *** 1.340 *** 
 
1.335 *** 1.429 *** 
 
[0.079] 
 
[0.050] 
  
[0.079] 
 
[0.051] 
  
[0.071] 
 
[0.060] 
 
crisis x cashmtat-1 -1.115 ** -0.431   
-0.911 ** -0.044 
  
-0.866 ** -0.336 
 
 
[0.514] 
 
[0.358] 
  
[0.364] 
 
[0.450] 
  
[0.431] 
 
[0.615] 
 
Number of observations 14055 
 
14400 
  
13022 
 
13538 
  
9986 
 
10344 
 
Log pseudolikelihood -6552   -12407     -7217   -10689     -6591   -8250   
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Table 27. Financial constraints (identified before crisis), cash holdings, and CCX during the 07-09 financial crisis. 
This table presents estimates from Panel Poisson regressions explaining firm-level quarterly CCX within 16 European 
countries. Dependent variable is quarterly CCX. For three measures of financial constrains (firm size, firm age, payout 
ratio), the subsamples comprises firms with financial constraint measures below and above the sample median. Crisis is 
an indicator variable equal to one for calendar quarters between July 2007 and March 2009. Crisis x cashmta is 
interaction term. All variables are defined in Table 19. All regressions include firm fixed effects and control for 
business cycle. Standard errors (in brackets) are heteroskedasticity-consistent and clustered by firm. ***, **, or * 
indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. 
  Firm size   Firm age   Payout ratio 
 
C 
 
U 
  
C 
 
U 
  
C 
 
U 
 
cashmtat-1 -0.065  
-0.754 *** 
 
0.013 
 
-0.835 *** 
 
-0.279 
 
-0.455 * 
 
[0.240] 
 
[0.242] 
  
[0.255] 
 
[0.242] 
  
[0.253] 
 
[0.263] 
 
crisis  1.203 *** 1.110 *** 
 
1.187 *** 1.103 *** 
 
1.154 *** 1.129 *** 
 
[0.043] 
 
[0.031] 
  
[0.039] 
 
[0.033] 
  
[0.042] 
 
[0.034] 
 
crisis x cashmtat-1 -0.782 *** -0.268   
-1.012 *** 0.147 
  
-0.729 *** -0.226 
 
 
[0.250] 
 
[0.218] 
  
[0.237] 
 
[0.230] 
  
[0.256] 
 
[0.233] 
 
volt-1 0.634 *** 0.818 ***  
0.676 *** 0.794 *** 
 
0.827 *** 0.742 *** 
 
[0.058] 
 
[0.055] 
  
[0.057] 
 
[0.056] 
  
[0.058] 
 
[0.062] 
 
ddt-1 -0.022 *** -0.026 ***  
-0.017 *** -0.029 *** 
 
-0.019 *** -0.027 *** 
 
[0.005] 
 
[0.004] 
  
[0.005] 
 
[0.004] 
  
[0.005] 
 
[0.004] 
 
logmbt-1 -0.074 *** -0.112 ***  
-0.127 *** -0.092 *** 
 
-0.108 *** -0.084 ** 
 
[0.028] 
 
[0.028] 
  
[0.029] 
 
[0.028] 
  
[0.028] 
 
[0.033] 
 
rett-1 -0.180 *** -0.209 ***  
-0.154 *** -0.237 *** 
 
-0.163 *** -0.207 *** 
 
[0.058] 
 
[0.047] 
  
[0.055] 
 
[0.052] 
  
[0.054] 
 
[0.056] 
 
logsizet-1 0.021  
-0.039 
  
0.002 
 
-0.012 
  
-0.013 
 
-0.039 
 
 
[0.033] 
 
[0.039] 
  
[0.036] 
 
[0.039] 
  
[0.035] 
 
[0.045] 
 
tlmtat-1 0.783 *** 0.880 ***  
0.784 *** 0.866 *** 
 
0.642 *** 1.088 *** 
 
[0.125] 
 
[0.129] 
  
[0.131] 
 
[0.130] 
  
[0.133] 
 
[0.141] 
 
gdp -0.461 ** -0.657 *** 
 
-0.711 *** -0.463 *** 
 
-0.393 * -0.527 *** 
 
[0.229] 
 
[0.154] 
  
[0.203] 
 
[0.166] 
  
[0.206] 
 
[0.181] 
 
Firm-fixed effects Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Time dummy Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Number of observations 40744 
 
46376 
  
38332 
 
44698 
  
37194 
 
39304 
 
Log pseudolikelihood -28408   -47322     -31175   -41324     -30857   -37897   
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Table 28. Financial constraints (identified before crisis), cash holdings, and CCX during the 07-09 financial crisis 
across different areas 
This table presents estimates from Panel Poisson regressions explaining firm-level quarterly CCX within 16 European 
countries. Dependent variable is quarterly CCX. For three measures of financial constrains (firm size, firm age, payout 
ratio), the subsamples comprises firms with financial constraint measures below and above the sample median. Crisis is 
an indicator variable equal to one for calendar quarters from July 2007 to March 2009 (Global crisis) and from May 
2010 to December 2011 (EU crisis). Crisis x cashmta is interaction term. All variables are defined in Table 4. All 
regressions include firm fixed effects and control for business cycle. Standard errors (in brackets) are 
heteroskedasticity-consistent and clustered by firm. ***, **, or * indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at 
the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Within Euro-periphery countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain) 
  Firm size   Firm age   Payout ratio 
 
C 
 
U 
  
C 
 
U 
  
C 
 
U 
 
cashmtat-1 0.141  
-0.563 
  
0.148 
 
-0.964 
  
-0.530  
 
-0.297  
 
 
[0.576] 
 
[0.571] 
  
[0.608] 
 
[0.599] 
  
[0.680]  
 
[0.605]  
 
crisis  0.826 *** 0.711 *** 
 
0.803 *** 0.687 *** 
 
0.819  *** 0.710  *** 
 
[0.075] 
 
[0.067] 
  
[0.071] 
 
[0.072] 
  
[0.084]  
 
[0.067]  
 
crisis x cashmtat-1 -0.527  
0.362 
  
-0.763 
 
0.738 
  
-0.373  
 
0.331  
 
 
[0.732] 
 
[0.482] 
  
[0.679] 
 
[0.524] 
  
[0.762]  
 
[0.511]  
 
Number of observations 6976 
 
7503 
  
6736 
 
6630 
  
6247  
 
6513  
 
Log pseudolikelihood -6135   -8150     -6648   -6754     -6098   -6968   
Panel B: Within Euro-core countries (Austria, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Finland, Belgium) 
  Firm size   Firm age   Payout ratio 
 
C 
 
U 
  
C 
 
U 
  
C 
 
U 
 
cashmtat-1 0.052  
-0.697 ** 
 
-0.067 
 
-0.524 
  
-0.088 
 
-0.439 
 
 
[0.333] 
 
[0.333] 
  
[0.351] 
 
[0.330] 
  
[0.338] 
 
[0.353] 
 
crisis  1.425 *** 1.155 *** 
 
1.285 *** 1.209 *** 
 
1.340 *** 1.181 *** 
 
[0.074] 
 
[0.054] 
  
[0.072] 
 
[0.056] 
  
[0.071] 
 
[0.058] 
 
crisis x cashmtat-1 -1.000 *** -0.476   
-0.823 ** -0.259 
  
-1.146 *** -0.079 
 
 
[0.348] 
 
[0.344] 
  
[0.330] 
 
[0.346] 
  
[0.365] 
 
[0.329] 
 
Number of observations 16706 
 
18579 
  
15044 
 
18679 
  
16188 
 
16730 
 
Log pseudolikelihood -11684   -18943     -12492   -16902     -12738   -16015   
Panel C: Within major non-euro zone countries, except for UK (Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland) 
  Firm size   Firm age   Payout ratio 
 
C 
 
U 
  
C 
 
U 
  
C 
 
U 
 
cashmtat-1 -0.496  
-1.432 ** 
 
-0.352 
 
-1.556 *** 
 
-0.840 
 
-0.759 
 
 
[0.623] 
 
[0.589] 
  
[0.684] 
 
[0.535] 
  
[0.588] 
 
[0.723] 
 
crisis  1.056 *** 0.988 *** 
 
1.068 *** 0.963 *** 
 
1.053 *** 0.989 *** 
 
[0.116] 
 
[0.080] 
  
[0.104] 
 
[0.083] 
  
[0.112] 
 
[0.087] 
 
crisis x cashmtat-1 0.022  
0.471 
  
-0.332 
 
0.991 ** 
 
0.144 
 
0.544 
 
 
[0.599] 
 
[0.512] 
  
[0.639] 
 
[0.496] 
  
[0.571] 
 
[0.649] 
 
Number of observations 6022 
 
7046 
  
5308 
 
7165 
  
5804 
 
6258 
 
Log pseudolikelihood -4890   -7919     -4913   -7392     -5492   -6375   
Panel D: Within UK 
  Firm size   Firm age   Payout ratio 
 
C 
 
U 
  
C 
 
U 
  
C 
 
U 
 
cashmtat-1 0.106  
-0.748 
  
0.623 
 
-1.017 * 
 
0.151 
 
-1.066 * 
 
[0.580] 
 
[0.482] 
  
[0.531] 
 
[0.534] 
  
[0.535] 
 
[0.597] 
 
crisis  1.553 *** 1.361 *** 
 
1.515 *** 1.332 *** 
 
1.371 *** 1.410 *** 
 
[0.084] 
 
[0.050] 
  
[0.070] 
 
[0.056] 
  
[0.074] 
 
[0.061] 
 
crisis x cashmtat-1 -1.515 *** -0.279   
-1.770 *** 0.142 
  
-0.845 * -0.436 
 
 
[0.575] 
 
[0.381] 
  
[0.430] 
 
[0.496] 
  
[0.460] 
 
[0.608] 
 
Number of observations 11040 
 
13248 
  
11244 
 
12224 
  
8955 
 
9803 
 
Log pseudolikelihood -5078   -11304     -6439   -9385     -5866   -8003   
 
 
 
